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Summary
This dissertation contributes to the literature by providing an answer to the following research question:
To what extent do external party system pressures and internal party organizational structures impact parties’
issue attention strategies in western European multi-party systems?
Issue attention strategies are conceptualized as parties’ selective emphasis of policy issues. Party system pressures are
conceptualized in two ways: (1) parties’ strategic position within the party system as being a mainstream government,
mainstream opposition or challenger party, and (2) the degree of electoral support for ‘issue entrepreneurs. Internal
party organizational structures refer to the extent to which organizational structures within parties favour the party
leadership, or rather the activist base.
The core of this dissertation consists of three empirical chapters. The first empirical chapter analyses ‘party
interaction’ in issue competition. It shows that parties are, generally speaking, responsive to the agendas of their
competitors. Changes in the systemic salience of issue domains, that is the extent to which other parties emphasize
groups of issues, significantly impact individual parties’ issue attention. However, not all parties are equally respon-
sive. Experience in government coalitions should make mainstream parties more ‘sensitive’ towards their competitive
environment whereas challenger parties, on the other hand, push forward their own agendas and ignore shifts in
the systemic salience of issue domains. Furthermore, party leaders perceive the need for their party to respond to
competitors and ‘ride the wave’ of the party system agenda more strongly than do party activists. Activists are
mainly driven by policy-seeking motivations and would like to see the party maintain its focus on its traditional
policy agenda. The chapter employs regression techniques which indicate tentative support for these theoretical ex-
pectations. The results also suggest differences in issue responsiveness to competitors when comparing the economic
and the cultural issue domain.
The second empirical chapter deals with the scope of parties’ issue agendas. Why do political parties in some
election campaigns offer a broad and encompassing policy agenda to voters, whereas at other times they confine their
policy appeals and pursue a narrow agenda focusing on a few issues only? By addressing this question, the chapter
aims to advance our understanding of the politics of ‘issue attention diversity’. The argument is that challenger
parties, losers in the current system, seek to change the political status quo by focusing on a few issues only, hence
presenting a confined agenda. Mainstream parties have an incentive to reinforce existing patterns of competition
and thus distribute their attention across a wide range of issues. Moreover, mainstream parties change the scope of
their agenda when they are confronted with electoral losses or when they are excluded from office. The extent to
which parties respond to these external stimuli, however, depends on intra-party politics. Party leaders seek to satisfy
vote- and office-seeking motivations and ‘appeal broadly’, whereas activist want the party to ‘speak to the base’ and
narrow down its issue appeals. These theoretical expectations are empirically tested.
The third empirical chapter deals with innovations in political issue-markets. It examines how parties respond
to the pressure to address new issues, induced by the electoral success of issue entrepreneurs. When do parties engage
in political competition on issue dimensions promoted by these issue entrepreneurs, and when do they dismiss their
appeals? This chapter seeks to contribute to our understanding of the dynamics of the issue space in European
democracies by examining the impact of electoral support for green, far right and Eurosceptic parties on the issue
agendas of other parties. The empirical analyses highlight two things. First, in addition to green and far right
support, Eurosceptic party success also provokes other parties to adjust their issue salience strategies. Specifically,
parties adapt to the Eurosceptic challenger by addressing European integration issues more strongly. Second, this
effect is conditional and depends on the salience the challengers themselves attach to the issue. If Eurosceptic
parties regard European integration issues as particularly important, other parties adapt and shift salience to this
issue dimension. For green and far right parties, who uniformly regard ‘their’ issues as highly important, such a
conditional effect is absent.
Zusammenfassung
Diese Dissertation tra¨gt zur Forschungsliteratur bei,in dem sie eine Antwort auf folgende Forschungsfrage liefert:
Inwiefern beeinflussen der externe Druck durch Parteisystem und die interne, organisationale Parteistruktur
die thematischen Beru¨cksichtigungsstrategien in westlichen, Europa¨ischen Mehrparteiensystemen?
Thematische Beru¨cksichtigungsstrategien werden konzeptualisiert als parteiliche, selektive Hervorhebung
von policy issues. Der externe Druck durch das Parteisystem wird auf zwei Arten konzipiert: (1) die strategis-
che Position einer Partei innerhalb eines Parteisystems als etablierte Regierungspartei, etablierte Opposition, oder
herausfordernde Partei, und (2) dem Grade der elektoralen Unterstu¨tzung fu¨r ’Themen-Entrepreneure’. Die inner-
parteiliche, organisationale Struktur bezieht sich darauf, inwiefern die Struktur innerhalb der Partei die Parteifu¨hrung
oder eher die aktivistische Parteibasis begu¨nstigt.
Der Kern dieser Dissertation besteht aus drei empirischen Kapiteln.Das erste empirischen Kapitel analysiert
die ’Parteieninteraktion’ im thematischen Wettbewerb. Es zeigt, dass Parteien, allgemein betrachtet, empfa¨nglich fu¨r
die Agenda ihrer Mitbewerber sind. A¨nderungen in der system-internen Salienz von Themenbereichen, sprich, dem
Grade zu dem andere Parteien einzelne Themengruppen betonen, beeinflusst signifikant die parteiliche Aufmerk-
samkeit gegenu¨ber einem Thema. Allerdings sind nicht alle Parteien in gleichem Maße empfa¨nglich. Erfahrung in
Koalitionen sollte etablierte Regierungsparteien empfa¨nglicher fu¨r Signale der wettbewerblichen Umgebung machen,
wohingegen herausfordernde Parteien ihre eigene Agenda antreiben und Vera¨nderungen in der system-internen
Salienz von Themenbereichen ignorieren. Weiterhin nehmen die Parteifu¨hrungen eine gro¨ßere Notwendigkeit wahr,
auf Konkurrenten zu reagieren und auf der Welle der Themen des Parteisystems mitzuschwimmen. Aktivisten
sind stattdessen eher von ’policy-seeking’-Motivationen angetrieben und bevorzugen eher, dass die Partei thema-
tisch einen traditionellen Fokus beibeha¨lt. Das Kapitel gebraucht dabei Regressionstechniken, welche vorla¨ufige
Unterstu¨tzung liefen fu¨r diese theoretischen Erwartungen. Die Resultate legen dabei ebenfalls Unterschiede der
thematischen Empfa¨nglichkeit gegenu¨ber Konkurrenten nahe, wenn verschiedene Bereiche, etwa der kulturelle oder
wirtschaftliche, betrachtet werden.
Das zweite empirische Kapitel behandelt die Reichweite von parteilichen Themenkatalogen. Warum bieten
politische Parteien den Wa¨hlern in einigen Wahlen eine breite und umfassende Agenda, wohingegen sie sich in an-
deren Zeiten in ihrem Anspruch beschra¨nken und eine enge politische Agenda verfolgen, in dem sie lediglich einige
wenige Themen fokussieren? Durch das behandeln dieser Frage versucht das Kapitel unser Versta¨ndnis von ‘issue
attention diversity’ zu erweitern. Das Argument ist dabei, dass herausfordernde Parteien, Verlierer im aktuellen
System, den Status quo zu a¨ndern suchen, indem sie sich auf wenige Themen fokussieren und dadurch eine begren-
zte Agenda pra¨sentieren. Etablierte Parteien hingegen haben einen Anreiz, bestehende Muster des Wettbewerbs zu
untermauern und verteilen somit ihre Aufmerksamkeit auf eine Vielzahl von Themen. Weiterhin a¨ndern etablierte
Parteien die Reichweite ihrer Agenda, wenn sie mit elektoralen Verlusten konfrontiert, oder von Regierungen aus-
geschlossen sind. Der Umfang zu welchem Parteien auf diese externen Stimuli reagieren ha¨ngt dabei jedoch von
innerparteilicher Politik ab. Parteifu¨hrungen versuchen, sowohl stimmen- als auch a¨mterbezogene Motivationen zu
befriedigen, als auch breitgefa¨chert anzusprechen, wohingegen Aktivisten wollen, dass zur Parteibasis gesprochen
wird und der thematische Anspruch beschra¨nkt wird. Diese empirischen Erwartungen werden empirisch untersucht.
Der dritte empirische Teil behandelt Innovationen auf dem Markt der politischen Themen. Er untersucht,
wie Parteien auf den Druck reagieren, neue Themen anzusprechen, veranlasst durch den Wahlerfolg von soge-
nannten ,Themen-Entrepreneuren’. Wann engagieren sich Parteien in einem Wettbewerb hinsichtlich von solchen
Entrepreneuren induzierten Themen und wann weisen sie diesen Anreiz ab? Das Kapitel sucht dabei zum Versta¨nd-
nis von Dynamiken des ,thematischen Raumes’ Europa¨ischer Demokratien beizutragen, indem der Einfluss von
Wa¨hlerunterstu¨zung fu¨r gru¨ne, rechtsaußen- und euroskeptische Parteien auf thematische Agenden untersucht wird.
Die empirische Analyse hebt dabei zwei Sachen hervor. Zum einen, neben Unterstu¨tzung fu¨r gru¨ne und rechtsaußen
Parteien, provoziert auch der Erfolg von euroskeptischen Parteien andere Parteien dazu, ihre thematischen Beru¨ck-
sichtigungsstrategien anzupassen. Im Besonderen passen Parteien sich der europaskeptischen Partei an, indem sie
Themen der Europa¨ischen Integration sta¨rken adressieren. Zum anderen ist dieser Effekt konditional und ha¨ngt von
der Salienz ab, die die herausfordernde Partei dem Thema zumisst. Wenn europaskeptische Parteien die Europa¨ische
Integration als besonders wichtig ansehen, passen sich andere Parteien an und verlagern Aufmerksamkeit in diesen
Themenbereich. Hinsichtlich gru¨ner und rechtsaußen-Parteien, die jeweils durchweg ’ihre’ Themen als sehr wichtig
betrachten, bleibt dieser konditionale Effekt aus.
Voor Laurens,,,
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Chapter 1. Introduction 2
“ To speak of politics is to speak of political issues, almost invariably. Wespeak of them as if we knew of them. But we truly do not. We do
not know why they arise, why one question rather than another comes to
seem important, why it happens at a particular time, rather than another,
why some last, why most do not. ”
Edward G. Carmines & James A. Stimson, Issue Evolution. Race and the
Transformation of American Politics, 1989 (p.3)
1.1 The Puzzle
Scholars, journalists and other (professional) observers of politics tendto explain elections and their outcomes by referring to the issues that havecome to dominate the political system at that particular time. The 2002
general election in the Netherlands, which saw a newly formed populist radical
right party becoming the second largest party, should be understood in the context
of the dominance of issues related to asylum seekers and the integration of immi-
grants in the country (van Holsteyn and Irwin, 2003). Grasping the 1998 federal
election in Germany, which produced the most significant vote swing between the
major parties since the 1950s, scholars have pointed out the failed attempts by the
Christian democratic party to shift attention to European Union matters (Pulzer,
1999). Examining the Labour Party’s poor electoral performance in the 2005 gen-
eral election in the United Kingdom, as compared to the previous cycle, Clarke
et al. (2006, p.4) point out the “radically different issue agendas at play in the 2001
and 2005 elections.”
To understand contemporary politics we need to understand why certain
issues dominate political agendas and why other issues remain under the surface.
As the quote above by Carmines and Stimson (1989) highlights, however, polit-
ical science seems to have fallen short in providing answers to basic questions
of how political issues emerge and become salient. Recent work has echoed this
critique. For example, de Vries and Hobolt (2012, p.247) argue that “we have a
limited understanding of how new issues become salient and how changes within
the dimensional structure of party and electoral competition occur, especially in
multi-party systems.” In a similar vein, Tavits and Potter (2015, p.744) claim that
“little is known about whether and how parties themselves attempt to shape the
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competitive space to their own advantage by manipulating the salience of certain
issues.” Why have immigration matters been among the most hotly debated issues
in many western European countries, and why, up until recently, have they not
been of much concern to political parties in Sweden (Odmalm, 2011; Dahlstro¨m
and Esaiasson, 2011)? How is that euthanasia became an important issue in Dutch
and Belgian politics, but is usually perceived a ‘non-issue’ in Denmark (Green-
Pedersen, 2007a)? Why did the Fukushima disaster result in the politicization
of nuclear energy policy in Germany (Meyer and Schoen, 2015) while political
elites in France, which has more nuclear power plants, hardly responded at all
(van de Wardt, 2014a, p.2)? Why have political parties long been so reluctant to
address European integration issues in national election campaigns (van der Eijk
and Franklin, 2004)?
The literature offers two distinct analytical frameworks that take up ques-
tions of how policy issues become salient in the political arena, and how this
relates to political parties. The first is a societal ‘bottom up’ view, building on the
seminal contribution by Lipset and Rokkan (1976). It perceives parties as “agents
of conflict” (Lipset and Rokkan, 1976, p.3), vehicles translating social cleavages
into the party system. The second is a ‘top down’ perspective, which ascribes
a much more active role to parties and politicians. In this view, the selection of
politicized issues is not a function of ‘structural variables’ such as societal cleav-
ages, but is explained by the electoral strategies of political elites. Carmines and
Stimson (1986, p.6) explain: “strategic politicians play the most obvious and per-
haps most influential role in determining the relative competition among political
issues [as they] instinctively understand which issues benefit them and their party
and which not.” The “trick”, then, is to emphasize the former and downplay the
importance of the latter. This idea of selective emphasis of preferred issues, devel-
oped further by Robertson (1976), Budge and Farlie (1983) and in Petrocik’s (1996)
issue ownership theory, constitutes the core of salience theory.
Inspired by salience theory, empirical studies of issue attention exhibit a
strong one-sided focus on parties’ incentives to selectively emphasize issues that
are beneficial to them. Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2014, p.2) conclude that
the literature “has been slow to move beyond the idea that parties have issues
they prefer.” As a result, important questions with regard to other components
of parties’ issue attention strategies have been left unexplored. This dissertation
singles out three such aspects.
First, selective emphasis theories largely ignore that parties are constrained
in their issue attention strategies by the actions of their competitors; in other
words, that parties interact in issue competition. Empirical studies have exposed
that issue overlap – that is, partisan elites addressing the same issues –, actually
occurs relatively frequently (Damore, 2004; Sigelman and Buell, 2004). Parties dif-
fer, however, in the extent to which they follow other parties’ issue attention; i.e.
in the extent to which they set the agenda or respond to the agenda.
Second, parties might be tempted to go beyond addressing the issues on
which they have traditionally enjoyed advantages over their competitors. Vote-,
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and office-, seeking incentives might push them towards reaching out to voters
beyond their core constituencies (Somer-Topcu, 2015). Issue diversification – that
is: adding issues to the agenda in the hope of appealing to a broader electorate –, is
an attractive strategy for parties to achieve this goal. Selective emphasis theories,
however, have little to say as to why parties would appeal broadly or narrow down
their issue appeals.
Third, selective emphasis theories are static in nature, as they expect parties
to constantly emphasize ‘their’ issues. As such, these theories are not very well
equipped to account for the emergence of new issues. ‘Issue entrepreneurs’, how-
ever, seek to innovate political markets by bringing new issues to the fore (de Vries
and Hobolt, 2012). The question, then, is how other parties in the system strategi-
cally adjust their issue attention in response; whether they adapt to the new agenda
or dismiss it.
This dissertation focuses on these three aspects of parties’ issue attention
strategies: (1) the degree of responsiveness to competitors (settting the agenda or
responding to the agenda?), (2) the scope of issue attention (appealing broadly or nar-
rowing down?), and (3) the degree of innovation (adaption to-, or dismissal of new
issues?). These components of parties’ issue attention strategies can be subsumed
under a generic research question, which will be introduced in the next section.
This introductory chapter then proceeds by highlighting the main argument of the
dissertation and and by sketching the dissertation outline before it closes with a
brief reflection upon the academic relevance of this study.
1.2 The Research Question
This dissertation can be located within the top down perspective on issue politi-
cization. Its starting point is the assumption that partisan elites strategically ma-
nipulate the salience of issues in an attempt to shape the political space in which
they compete to their own advantage. This dissertation contributes to the litera-
ture by providing an answer to the following research question:
To what extent do external party system pressures and internal party organi-
zational structures impact parties’ issue attention strategies in western Euro-
pean multi-party systems?
Three components of this research question stand out: (1) parties’ issue at-
tention strategies, (2) external party system pressures and (3) internal party orga-
nizational structures. In the following these three components are briefly elabo-
rated upon.
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1.3 The Argument
Issue Attention Strategies
Issue attention strategies, also referred to as issue salience strategies, are
conceptualized as parties’ selective emphasis of policy issues. This dissertation
contributes to the literature by going beyond the notion that parties only face
incentives to highlight their preferred issues. The argument is that by focusing
solely on the notion that partisan elites emphasize issues they deem favourable
and deemphasize issues that help their competitors, the literature has overlooked
other important features of parties’ issue attention strategies. This dissertations
focuses on: (1) the degree to which a party responds to the issue attention of its
competitors, (2) the degree to which a party’s attention is confined to a few issues
only or, rather, whether a party offers a broad issue agenda to voters, and (3) to
what extent a party seeks to innovate its issue agenda.
External Party System Pressures
What explains the dynamics of parties’ issue attention strategies? This dis-
sertation considers, firstly, the role of party system pressures, which originate
externally from the party system and a party’s strategic position within that sys-
tem. Party system pressures are conceptualized in two ways: (1) parties’ strategic
position within the party system as being a mainstream government, mainstream
opposition or challenger party, and (2) the degree of electoral support for ‘issue
entrepreneurs.’
The insight that parties’ strategic positions within the party system affect
their issue strategies derives from the classical top down perspective on issue
politicization. Generally, a distinction is made between ‘political winners’ and
‘political losers’. Winners, the argument is, have an incentive to maintain the
status quo of the issue space while political losers seek to advance their position
within the system by attempting to upset the underlying dimensional structure
of political competition (see for example Carmines and Stimson, 1986, 1989). The
distinction between winners and losers corresponds to the party in- and out-of-
government in two-party systems. The winner-loser distinction is, however, more
complex in multiparty systems where coalition governments are the norm (Hobolt
and Karp, 2010). Following other recent studies that have applied insights from
the top down framework to explain issue competition in multi-party systems,
this dissertation therefore adopts the threefold distinction between mainstream
opposition parties, mainstream government parties and challenger parties (see for
example de Vries and Hobolt, 2012). Challenger parties are parties that have never
been in government. Having not (yet) been able to push through their policy ideals
by participating in a governing coalition and having not (yet) enjoyed the ‘spoils’
of office, they are the political losers in multi-party systems and have an incentive
to change the issue space. Mainstream parties, on the other hand, are the political
winners as they regularly switch between opposition and government. As such,
they have an incentive to maintain the status quo of the political system. External
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party system pressures, thus, refer to a party’s strategic position in the competitive
party system as being a mainstream government, a mainstream opposition or a
challenger party.
However, this dissertation does not only consider parties’ strategic positions
in the party system, it also conceptualizes external party system pressures as the
degree of electoral support for ‘issue entrepreneurs’. ‘Issue entrepreneurs’ are
parties that predominantly campaign on new issue dimensions, or that take out-
lying positions on existing policy dimensions. The argument is that increasing
electoral support for such a party puts a pressure on other parties to adjust their
issue strategies. This insight derives from classical spatial models of party compe-
tition (Downs, 1957), in which it is assumed that parties re-position themselves in
response to the emergence of new parties. The expectation as put forward in this
dissertation is that parties not only change their policy positions, but also system-
ically adjust their issue salience strategies following the electoral success of ’issue
entrepreneurs’.
Internal Party Organizational Structures
The second factor that is considered in this dissertation as affecting issue
attention is a party’s internal organizational structure. In addition to external
pressures originating from the party system, internal party politics also matters
for how parties strategically behave in terms of their selective emphasis of issues.
Specifically, the extent to which organizational structures within parties favour
the party leadership, or rather the activist base, is examined. Following domi-
nant theories of party behavior, it is assumed that party leaders mainly seek to
satisfy vote- and office-seeking motivations whereas party activists are more con-
cerned with policy goals (see for example Mu¨ller and Strøm, 1999). Other studies
have shown how the internal balance of power between party leaders and the ac-
tivist base is relevant for parties’ positioning on a generalized left-right dimension
(Schumacher, de Vries and Vis, 2013). Building on these insights, this dissertation
maintains that the issue salience strategies of leadership-oriented parties differ
from parties with more powerful internal activist bases.
1.4 Dissertation Outline
The core of this dissertation consists of three empirical chapters, each dealing
with one of the three components of parties’ issue salience strategies as identified
above. The dissertation opens with a chapter that briefly describes the literature
on issue competition and lays out the theoretical framework unifying the subse-
quent analytical chapters. Brief synopses of the chapters are provided below.
Chapter 2: The Conflict over Conflicts
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the literature on issue competition. It
describes the role of political parties in the ‘conflict over conflicts’ and discusses
why the dissertation singles out the three components of issue salience strategies
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that are then analysed in the three subsequent empirical chapters. It explains the
focus on internal party organizational structures, on the one hand, and external
party system pressures on the other hand, devoting attention to the mainstream-
challenger framework and how it relates to other party classifications, such as the
mainstream-niche distinction (Meguid, 2005). The chapter closes with discussing
the case selection and the data sources.
Chapter 3: Setting the Agenda or Responding to the Agenda?
The first empirical chapter analyses ‘party interaction’ in issue competition.
It shows that parties are, generally speaking, responsive to the agendas of their
competitors. Changes in the systemic salience of issue domains, that is the extent
to which other parties emphasize groups of issues, significantly impact individual
parties’ issue attention. However, not all parties are equally responsive. Experi-
ence in government coalitions should make mainstream parties more ‘sensitive’
towards their competitive environment whereas challenger parties, on the other
hand, push forward their own agendas and ignore shifts in the systemic salience
of issue domains. Furthermore, party leaders perceive the need for their party
to respond to competitors and ‘ride the wave’ of the party system agenda more
strongly than do party activists. Activists are mainly driven by policy-seeking
motivations and would like to see the party maintain its focus on its traditional
policy agenda. The chapter employs regression techniques which indicate tenta-
tive support for these theoretical expectations. The results also suggest differences
in issue responsiveness to competitors when comparing the economic and the cul-
tural issue domain.
Chapter 4: Appealing Broadly or Narrowing Down?
Chapter 4 deals with the scope of parties’ issue agendas. Why do political
parties in some election campaigns offer a broad and encompassing policy agenda
to voters, whereas at other times they confine their policy appeals and pursue a
narrow agenda focusing on a few issues only? By addressing this question, the
chapter aims to advance our understanding of the politics of ‘issue attention di-
versity’. The argument is that challenger parties, losers in the current system, seek
to change the political status quo by focusing on a few issues only, hence present-
ing a confined agenda. Mainstream parties have an incentive to reinforce existing
patterns of competition and thus distribute their attention across a wide range of
issues. Moreover, mainstream parties change the scope of their agenda when they
are confronted with electoral losses or when they are excluded from office. The
extent to which parties respond to these external stimuli, however, depends on
intra-party politics. Party leaders seek to satisfy vote- and office-seeking motiva-
tions and ‘appeal broadly’, whereas activist want the party to ‘speak to the base’
and narrow down its issue appeals. These theoretical expectations are empirically
tested.
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Chapter 5: Adaptation or Dismissal?
This final empirical chapter deals with innovations in political issue-markets.
It examines how parties respond to the pressure to address new issues, induced
by the electoral success of issue entrepreneurs. When do parties engage in po-
litical competition on issue dimensions promoted by these issue entrepreneurs,
and when do they dismiss their appeals? This chapter seeks to contribute to
our understanding of the dynamics of the issue space in European democracies
by examining the impact of electoral support for green, far right and Eurosceptic
parties on the issue agendas of other parties. The empirical analyses highlight two
things. First, in addition to green and far right support, Eurosceptic party success
also provokes other parties to adjust their issue salience strategies. Specifically,
parties adapt to the Eurosceptic challenger by addressing European integration is-
sues more strongly. Second, this effect is conditional and depends on the salience
the challengers themselves attach to the issue. If Eurosceptic parties regard Eu-
ropean integration issues as particularly important, other parties adapt and shift
salience to this issue dimension. For green and far right parties, who uniformly
regard ‘their’ issues as highly important, such a conditional effect is absent.
Chapter 6: Conclusion
The concluding chapter summarizes the most important findings of the sep-
arate empirical chapters and discusses their academic and societal relevance. The
chapter concludes by pointing to interesting avenues for future research.
1.5 Academic Relevance
The separate empirical chapters each make specific contributions to the academic
literature. These will be discussed in the respective chapters, and will be summa-
rized in the concluding chapter. This dissertation offers, in addition, three over-
arching contributions to the scholarly literature on party competition and issue
attention in established democracies.
First, this dissertation goes beyond the notion of selective emphasis – that is,
the notion that parties have incentives to selectively emphasize the issues on which
they enjoy competitive advantages while they have an interest in downplaying the
importance of issues that might benefit their competitors. This idea underpins
much of the extant literature on issue competition. Recent work has argued that
the issue competition literature suffers from a “one-sided theoretical focus”, a
result of which is that studies “have been slow to move beyond the idea that
parties have issues they prefer” (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2014, p.1-2). This
dissertation offer a contribution to the literature by highlighting three additional
components of issue salience strategies that have received relatively little attention
in the empirical literature on party behaviour: parties’ inclination to respond to
Chapter 1. Introduction 9
the issue appeals of other parties, the scope of parties’ issue agendas and parties’
incentives to highlight new issues.
In addition, this dissertation systemically explains variation in the extent
to which parties pursue these issue attention strategies. External party system
pressures, conceptualized as parties’ relative positions in the competitive party
system, are considered an important explanatory factor in this regard. This dis-
sertation shows how the threefold distinction between mainstream government,
mainstream opposition and challenger parties matters when it comes to differ-
ences in issue attention strategies across parties. The challenger-mainstream has
been introduced in other recent studies (see for example de Vries and Hobolt,
2012), but has been mainly used to explain parties’ incentives to campaign on Eu-
ropean integration matters. Challenger parties, the argument goes, seek to upset
the political status quo by highlighting European integration issues in an attempt
to increase the underlying dimensionality of the political issue space (de Vries and
Hobolt, 2012; Hobolt and de Vries, 2015; van de Wardt, de Vries and Hobolt, 2014;
van de Wardt, 2015). This dissertation broadens the scope of inquiry and argues
that mainstream government, mainstream opposition and challenger parties pur-
sue different issue salience strategies, induced by the different incentives they face
resulting from their relative position in the competitive party system. As such, the
second overarching contribution emerges from advancing the applicability of this
behavioural classification of political parties in multi-party settings.
A third overarching contribution comes with the assessment of the impact
of parties’ internal organizational structures on their issue strategies. Increas-
ingly, studies of party behaviour seek to ‘open the black box’ of political parties,
acknowledging that intra party politics precedes, and affects, parties’ policy pro-
posals, election manifestos and strategic political choices. In the introduction to a
recent special issue about the causes and consequences of internal party politics,
Polk and Ko¨lln (2016, p.1) write: “parties may be collective entities but internal
factions, groups and divisions structure those entities.” A key aspect of contem-
porary intra party research concerns “the electoral and other ramifications of in-
ternal party tensions or divisions” (Polk and Ko¨lln, 2016, p.1). Recent research
has indeed taken up such questions, and has examined the impact of intra party
politics on party policy positioning. Schumacher, de Vries and Vis (2013), for ex-
ample, posit that parties in which activist dominate respond to changes in the
positions of party voters while leadership-dominated party organizations induce
responsiveness to the mean voter position. Lehrer (2012), adopting a similar line
of argumentation, maintains that inclusive parties – parties in which rank-and-
file members select leaders – respond to the issue positions of party members
whereas exclusive parties – parties in which a small group of officials select lead-
ers – respond to median voter shifts. These studies provide valuable insights in
the effects of intra party dynamics on parties’ policy positioning on generalized
left-right dimensions. This dissertation adds to the literature by highlighting that
internal organizational structures are relevant as well for parties’ issue attention
strategies.
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The larger debates to which this dissertation speaks, though, relate to ques-
tions of why certain issues become the focus of political conflict in party sys-
tems whereas others are of minor importance or remain largely ignored. These
questions are relevant beyond the academic sphere, and this dissertation aims to
provide a contribution by enhancing our understanding of political parties’ issue
attention strategies in western European countries.
2The Conflict over Conflicts
Parties, Issue Attention and Political Competition
11
Chapter 2. The Conflict over Conflicts 12
“ There are billions of potential conflicts in any modern society, but onlya few become significant. The reduction of the number of conflicts
in an essential part of politics. Politics deals with the domination and
subordination of conflicts. A democratic society is able to survive be-
cause it manages conflict by establishing priorities among a multitude of
potential conflicts. ”
Elmer E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People. A Realist’s View of
Democracy in America, 1960 (p.66)
2.1 Introduction
Politics is essentialy concerned with the management of conflicts. Theabove quote by Schattschneider (1960) highlights the importance of thisnotion: democratic societies survive because they prioritize certain con-
flicts over others. But how does this occur, establishing priorities among the many
conflicts in democracies? What determines the selection of salient issues? And
what role do political parties play in this process?
This chapter consists of three parts. The first part (section 2.2) briefly dis-
cusses and summarizes the literature on issue competition. The second part (sec-
tion 2.3) introduces this study’s theoretical framework. It discusses the three com-
ponents of parties’ issue salience strategies that are the focus of this dissertation:
(1) the extent to which parties respond to the issue attention of their competitors,
(2) the scope of parties’ issue agendas and (3) the extent to which parties innovate
their platforms. In addition, it discusses the two factors that are considered as
crucially influencing parties’ issue salience strategies: (1) external party system
pressures and (2) internal party organizational structures. The third part (section
2.4) puts forward some remarks on measurement and case-selection before this
chapter closes with a brief summary.
2.2 Issues and Political Competition
Issue competition refers to the struggle between political parties over which is-
sues should dominate the political agenda (Green-Pedersen, 2007b). The literature
dealing with the relation between issues, parties and political competition can be
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divided into two perspectives, following Colomer and Puglisi (2005). The first is
the societal ‘bottom up’ view, the starting point of which is Lipset and Rokkan’s
(1976) study of the persisting influence of social cleavages on western European
party systems. The second view can be labelled the ‘top down’ perspective, and
emphasizes the strategic actions of political elites in the selection of salient is-
sues. Although this dissertation can be located within this second perspective, the
bottom up view will be briefly discussed first.
2.2.1 The Societal ‘Bottom Up’ Perspective
Lipset and Rokkan (1976) perceive the emergence and development of western
European party systems a result of societal cleavages, which are in turn pro-
duced by revolutions. The national revolutions in Europe created centre-periphery
and state-church cleavages while industrial revolutions led to the rural-urban and
workers-employers divisions. Political parties, the issues they address and the
party systems of Europe as a whole reflect these societal cleavage structures. This
view does not leave much room for the strategic actions of political elites in the
process of translating societal divisions into the political system. Therefore, the
Lipset-Rokkan perspective, and similar studies such as Bartolini (2000), have been
labelled a form of “sociological determinism” (Colomer and Puglisi, 2005, p.503).1
Next to these remote historical events, more short term factors are as well
considered in the bottom up perspective. Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup (2008,
p.612) identify three forms of “societal inputs” to the political agenda: the magni-
tude of societal problems, shifts in mass media attention and public opinion shifts.
This list can be complemented with focusing events that draw political attention
to specific issues (Birkland, 1998).
Problem magnitude refers to the existence, magnitude and development of
public policy problems. After all, “parties do not pay attention to non-existent
problems” (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup, 2008, p.612). Problem magnitude as
a form of societal input to the political agenda implies that variation in the mag-
nitude of a public policy problem is related to the degree of political attention to
an issue. For example, increases in the inflow of immigrants in a country, as an
indication of the magnitude of the ‘problem’ of immigration, would then correlate
with increasing attention to immigration issues in political agendas.
Mass media attention is a second factor considered among the societal in-
puts to the political agenda. Agenda setting effects of the mass media have long
been identified in the literature (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). The basic argument
is that “the salience of a particular issue on the public agenda is a function [...] of
its salience on the media agenda” (McCombs and Zhu, 1995, p.496). However, the
relationship between media attention and issue selection by politicians is likely
to be of reciprocal nature, and several studies show that party agendas drive me-
dia attention to issues, and not the other way around (see for example Walgrave
1For a contrasting view of Lipset and Rokkan’s (1976) study, see Kitschelt (2007, p.541).
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and van Aelst, 2006; Brandenburg, 2002). Hopmann et al. (2012, p.173) summa-
rize: “political parties have substantial influence on which issues the news media
cover during election campaigns, while the media have limited influence on party
agendas”.
Third, the bottom up perspective considers the role of public opinion shifts.
Dynamic representation implies that if public opinion changes, public policy will
follow suit (Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson, 1995). Political parties, intermediaries
between voters and their government, play a crucial role in this process. Empirical
studies have established that party policy positioning indeed follows a patterns
of dynamic representation – that is, parties adapt their positions on a general-
ized left-right dimension in response to shifts in the mean voter left-right position
(Adams et al., 2004, 2006; Ezrow et al., 2011). At the same time, however, theories
of ‘opinion leadership’ have argued that the correlation between party and voter
positions is due to the fact that voters adopt elite policy attitudes (for a recent
study see Broockman and Butler, 2015). A similar picture emerges with regard
to parties’ issue attention and voters’ issue priorities. On the one hand, studies
report that if the mass public prioritizes certain issues, partisan elites take these
cues and respond by emphasizing these issues more strongly (Klu¨ver and Spoon,
2014; Klu¨ver and Sagarzazu, 2016). On the other hand, voters also take their issue
concerns from politicians (Green and Hobolt, 2008; Be´langer and Meguid, 2008).
Adams (2016, p.26) states that “there is extensive evidence that [...] voters recip-
rocally take cues from parties about which issues to prioritise – in that increasing
party attention to an issue prompts increased attention to this issue in the mass
public.” Hence, the literature is inconclusive as to whether causality runs from
voters’ issue priorities to parties’ issue emphases or the other way around. Taking
this into account, recent empirical studies leave out measures of public opinion
altogether arguing that it is, in fact, endogenous to elite issue attention, the de-
pendent variable in their models (Abou-Chadi, 2014, p.11).
Fourth, bottom up explanations stress the role of focusing events, “sudden,
striking large-scale occurrences that attract political attention” (Alexandrova, 2015,
p.505). Focusing events are typically natural or human made disasters (Birkland,
1998; Walgrave and Varone, 2008). Meyer and Schoen (2015) show, for example,
how the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster resulted in increased attention for
nuclear power policy in Germany, eventually leading to a policy shift by the gov-
ernment.
2.2.2 The Agenda-Setting ‘Top Down’ Perspective
The bottom up perspective perceives political parties and politicians to be rather
passive actors. The issues they address merely reflect the societal inputs and
cues they receive. By contrast, the top down perspective holds that political elites
are highly influential in the selection of salient issues. Their strategic decisions
determine to a large extent the issues that are being discussed in politics. But
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which issues do politicians choose to focus on? How do they select the issues for
their electoral campaign? Salience theory addresses these questions.
Salience theory builds on the premise that parties craft their policies by
emphasizing some issues more than others. Its origins can be traced back to
Stokes’s (1963) important critique of spatial models of party competition.2 The
spatial modeling literature, originated from the classical models as put forward
by Hotelling (1929) and most famously Downs (1957), assumes that there is at
least one set of ordered policy alternatives that parties advocate and voters can
choose between. Typically, this concerns the degree of government intervention
in the economy. Leftist parties argue in favor of active involvement in the econ-
omy while parties on the right generally advocate a more modest role of the state.
Since “parties formulate policies to win elections” (Downs, 1957, p.28), they have
an incentive to adjust their positions approaching the median voter position on
the policy continuum. Stokes (1963) argues, however, that many political issues
do not involve sets of ordered policy alternatives. He distinguishes valence from
positional issues. The latter involve advocacy of action from a set of alternatives
whereas valance issues involve the linking of parties with conditions that are pos-
itively or negatively valued by voters. Valence issues can not be represented by
Downsian spatial models that use policy dimensions with opposed ends. Corrup-
tion is often cited as a prime example, since neither voters nor candidates would
ever come out in favor of corruption.
The agenda formation literature (Riker, 1982, 1986, 1993a) voices an addi-
tional critique of Downsian spatial models of electoral competition, targeting the
emergence of issues. Downs (1957) assumes that the issues that make up the ide-
ological dimension(s) in the model are determined exogenously. The issue space
is given, and within these constraints parties strategically choose their positions.
Riker (1982, 1986, 1993a) assumes by contrast that parties’ positions are given
and relatively fixed, as they are constrained by the bounds of political ideologies.
Candidates and partisan elites, then, give salience to specific issue dimensions at-
tempting to shape the political space to their advantage. Hence, Rikerian models
endogenize issue selection (see also Colomer and Puglisi, 2005, p.507).
Salience theory accommodates these critique of the Downsian spatial mod-
elling literature, arguing that parties differentiate themselves by highlighting dif-
ferent policy areas, rather than advocating different courses of action on a common
set of issues. Robertson (1976), studying British party manifestos, finds only few
specific ‘pro’ or ‘contra’ issue positions. Instead, “selective emphasis on differ-
ent policies [seems] the guiding rhetorical principle” (Budge, 2015, p.762). Budge
and Farlie (1983) have developed the idea of selective emphasis further, arguing
that if a party has favorable issues, and if these issues come to dominate an elec-
tion campaign, then this party should benefit in terms of electoral support. Such
‘issue effects’ can thus help to predict election outcomes (see also Budge, 2015,
p.764-765).
2Budge (2015) provides a more extensive historical and conceptual overview of salience theory.
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Budge and Farlie (1983) assume the existence of associations between parties
and issues. Parties have favorable issues because in voters’ minds specific issues
are tied to specific parties. These associations are given and relatively fixed in
Budge and Farlie’s (1983) model of issue effects and election outcomes (Budge,
2015, p.766). Other approaches posit that these party-issue linkages are, in fact,
shaped by parties’ strategic actions. Riker’s (1993b) theory of rhetorical interaction
between politicians revolves around the principles of dominance and dispersion.
According to the dominance principle, politicians should abandon an issue when
their opponents win the argument. The winner, then, should continue to exploit
his advantage and keep pressing the issue. The dispersion principle holds that
when neither side wins the argument, both sides have an incentive to drop the
issue and to bring up another issue (Riker, 1993b, p.81-82). As a result, politicians
are engaged in a constant search for issues on which they enjoy advantages over
their opponents.
Petrocik (1996) goes one step further and argues that parties can establish
ownership over an issue. Some parties are in voters’ minds considered better
able to deal with a specific issue than other parties. For issue ownership to be
established, “a history of attention, initiative, and innovation toward [the issue]” is
needed (Petrocik, 1996, p.826). The Democratic party in the United States may own
the issue of social welfare while Republicans have an advantage when it comes to
issues related to taxes and government spending (Petrocik, Benoit and Hansen,
2003). Walgrave, Lefevere and Tresch (2012) point out that issue ownership entails
two distinct dimensions. The competence dimension refers to whether parties are
considered to be the ‘best’ to deal with an issue while the associative dimension
refers to the natural or spontaneous identification of parties with issues, similar
as in Budge and Farlie (1983). Candidates are expected to campaign on the issue
they own, “in order to prime their salience in the decision calculus of the voters”
(Petrocik, Benoit and Hansen, 2003, p.599).
2.2.3 Summary
Above, I have briefly summarized the two main research paradigms that deal with
the selection of salient issues in politics. The bottom up perspective perceives po-
litical elites as rather passive actors in the process of issue selection and empha-
sizes societal inputs to the political agenda. The top down perspectives ascribes a
much more active role to parties and politicians and argues that it is their actions
that to a large extent determine which issues are the focus of political contest. The
next section will argue that salience theory overlooks important components of
parties’ issue salience strategies and it will outline the three aspects of issue atten-
tion that are the focus of this study. In addition, I will argue why external party
system pressures and, secondly, internal party organizational structures need to
be taken into account when explaining parties’ issue salience strategies.
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2.3 Issue Attention Strategies – A New Framework
Salience theory argues that parties have issues on which they enjoy advantages
over their competitors. That being so, the rational thing for parties to do is to
emphasize ‘their’ issues and to downplay the importance of issues being owned by
their competitors. Salience theory almost exclusively deals with parties’ incentives
to focus on advantaged issues. This “one-sided theoretical focus” (Green-Pedersen
and Mortensen, 2014, p.1) is problematic since it overlooks other components of
the issue salience strategies pursued by parties. I identify three such components.
The first is issue overlap. Salience theory implies that different parties focus
on different issues. If political elites address only their advantaged issues, and
neglect those of their competitors, then “most of the time opponents do not talk
about the same things” (Riker, 1993b, p.82). It is the basic claim of salience theory
that parties hardly ever address the issues and policies of their opponents (see also
Dolezal et al., 2014, p.59). Empirical analyses of elite issue attention, however, tell
a different story. It has been shown that the election campaigns of Democratic and
Republican presidential candidates in the United States quite often converge on
the same issues (Sigelman and Buell, 2004; Damore, 2004, 2005), and considerable
overlap exists in the issues that are being addressed by the different parties in
European multiparty systems (Green-Pedersen, 2007b). Such interactions in issue
competition are largely ignored by salience theories.
The second is issue diversity. Studies show how issue agendas in mod-
ern democracies have become more diverse over time (Green-Pedersen, 2007b).
Salience theory, however, deals with the nature of the issues that parties are ex-
pected to address, and not with the number of issues. It has little to say regarding
the scope of issue agendas, whether parties attach salience to many different issues
or whether they confine their attention on a few core issues only.
The third is innovation in issue agendas. Salience theory suggest that parties’
issue attention is relatively stable. If parties continuously emphasize the issues on
which they dominate, then their issue profiles should be more or less fixed. How-
ever, recent years have seen the influx of new issues in European party systems.
Examples include environmental, European integration and immigration issues.
Salience theory has little to say as to how innovation in issue markets occurs.
This dissertation focuses on these three components of parties’ issue atten-
tion strategies: (1) the extent to which parties respond to the issue attention of
their competitors (settting the agenda or responding to the agenda?), (2) the scope of
parties’ issue attention (appealing broadly or narrowing down?) and (3) the extent to
which parties innovate their platforms (adaption to-, or dismissal of new issues?). I ar-
gue that two factors crucially impact parties’ issue attention strategies: (1) external
party system pressures and (2) internal party organizational structures.
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2.3.1 External Party System Pressures
External party system pressures refer to incentives for parties that originate ex-
ternally from the party system and a party’s position within this system. The
empirical chapters make the following arguments:
• Chapter 5 (adaptation or dismissal?) conceptualizes external party system
pressures as the degree of electoral support for issue entrepreneurs. Issue
entrepreneurs are parties that highlight a new issue or a deviating stance on
an existing issue. Support for such parties, the argument is, exerts a pressure
on other parties to adapt to the agenda of the issue entrepreneurs and shift
attention to the issue dimension they promote.
• Chapter 3 (setting the agenda or responding to the agenda?) and chapter 4 (ap-
pealing broadly or narrowing down?) conceptualize external party system pres-
sures as a party’s position within the party system as being a mainstream
government, mainstream opposition or challenger party. The argument is
that mainstream parties, switching regularly between government and op-
position status, have an incentive to reinforce existing patterns of political
competition as to maintain their advantageous position in the system. Chal-
lenger party occupy losing positions in the system and seek to challenge the
mainstream. This implies, in terms of issue attention strategies, that chal-
lenger parties are less likely than mainstream parties to respond to the issue
attention of competitors (chapter 3) and that challenger parties pursue more
narrow issue profiles than do mainstream parties (chapter 4).
The argument that these two types of external party system pressures im-
pact parties’ issue strategies builds on classical theories of issue evolution and
issue selection. These theories distinguish between political losers and political
winners. The basic argument is that political elites who find themselves in win-
ning positions have an incentive to maintain the status quo whereas those who
are in disadvantageous positions have an incentive to upset the status quo of
the political system. Carmines and Stimson’s (1989) model of issue evolution re-
volves around the expectation that political losers seek to change the dimensional
structure of political conflict by introducing policy issues that cut across, rather
than reinforce, existing party divisions. Schattschneider (1960) sees a similar role
for political losers in the ‘displacement of one policy issue by another.’ Rikerian
agenda setting theories make a distinction between ‘rhetoric’, as the art of arguing
about political issues using persuasion, and ‘heresthetics’, as the art of selecting
issues; the latter being an especially powerful tool for political losers as they seek
“some alternative that beats the current winner” (Riker, 1982, p.209).
Political losers, thus, strategically select issues to manipulate the political
environment and advance their disadvantageous position within the system. The
aforementioned theories are developed in the context of the two-party system in
the United States and argue that the party in government is the political winner
whereas the opposition party is the political loser. In Europe’s multiparty systems,
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governed most of the time by coalitions of parties, the distinction between winners
and losers is less straightforward. Analogous to recent studies I therefore adopt
the threefold distinction between mainstream government, mainstream opposi-
tion and challenger parties (see de Vries and Hobolt, 2012; Hobolt and de Vries,
2015; van de Wardt, de Vries and Hobolt, 2014; van de Wardt, 2015; Hobolt and
Tilley, 2016). Challenger parties are defined as parties that have no prior experi-
ence with government participation. Having not (yet) been able to push through
their policy ideals by participating in a governing coalition and having not (yet)
enjoyed the ‘spoils’ of office, they are the political losers in multi-party systems
and have an incentive to change the political status quo. Mainstream government
parties are the incumbents while mainstream opposition parties have previously
governed but are, in the election at hand, in opposition. Mainstream parties oc-
cupy advantageous positions because they regularly switch between opposition
and government status, and as such have an incentive to maintain the status quo
of the political system. As de Vries and Hobolt (2012, p.250) put it: “owing to
their overall advantageous position in the system, mainstream parties have an in-
centive to reinforce existing patterns of political competition and the policy issues
underlying them.”
The challenger-mainstream framework offers a behavioural conceptualiza-
tion of party types with testable implications. The expectation is that participation
in government crucially affects issue agendas. The policy platforms of mainstream
parties are affected by their past experience with government participation, and
by their motivation to gain access to office again. As a result, mainstream parties
adopt programs that stabilize the political status quo. They are therefore reluc-
tant to mobilize around new issues and to pursue issue agendas that deviate from
those of other parties, because both would harm their office aspirations. Chal-
lenger parties seek to reshape the political landscape. By the same logic, their lack
of government experience and their fairly limited opportunity to gain access to of-
fice in the near future allows them to pursue more risky policy platforms (Hobolt
and Tilley, 2016, p.974-975). Challenger parties oppose the political mainstream
and seek to restructure politics, for example by putting new issues on the agenda
(de Vries and Hobolt, 2012; Hobolt and de Vries, 2015; van de Wardt, de Vries and
Hobolt, 2014; van de Wardt, 2015).
Parties change their issue strategies once they have been rewarded with ac-
cess to office (de Vries and Hobolt, 2012). The reason for this is that parties take
into account a ‘reference point’ when making strategic political decisions (van de
Wardt, 2015). If parties gain access to office, government membership becomes
their reference point and they will adjust their issue salience strategies accord-
ingly. Office inclusion induces parties to switch to more mainstream issue profiles.
Case studies of the impact of government membership on green parties’ electoral
strategies largely confirm this argument (Rihoux and Ru¨dig, 2006; Bischof, 2015,
p.12). As such, the challenger-mainstream framework explicates behavioural ex-
pectations as to why different parties pursue different issue attention strategies.
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The challenger-mainstream framework is closely related to the concept of
‘niche’ parties. The original definition states that niche parties “reject the tradi-
tional class-based orientation of politics”, raise issues that are “not only novel, but
they often do not coincide with existing lines of political division” and “differen-
tiate themselves by limiting their issue appeals” (Meguid, 2005, p.347-348). The
mainstream-challenger framework is, however, preferable for three reasons.
The first reason is that the mainstream-challenger framework is dynamic.
Whereas the original niche party concept is static, based on party family designa-
tions (Meguid, 2005, 2008; Adams et al., 2006; Ezrow, 2008; Ezrow et al., 2011), the
challenger-mainstream distinction is dynamic; parties cease to be challengers once
they have governed. This accommodates Wagner’s (2011) argument that parties
can switch between niche and mainstream issue profiles (see also van de Wardt,
2015, p.98).
Second, niche party conceptualizations employ issue salience information.
Table 2.1 serves to illustrate this. In Wagner’s (2011) conceptualization, niche par-
ties emphasize a limited number of non-economic issues while Meyer and Miller
(2015) consider niche parties those parties that emphasize issues that are neglected
by their competitors. Bischof (2015) adds that niche parties offer a ‘condensed’
message on these issue segments. For the purpose of this study, however, it would
be tautological to explain issue attention strategies by a party type classification
that is based on issue salience information (for a similar argument, see de Vries
and Hobolt, 2012; van de Wardt, 2015).
Table 2.1 – Concepts of Niche Parties Compared
Study
Definition Method
Meguid (2005, 2008)
(1) Reject traditional orientation of politics Party family
(2) Present novel issues (green & radical right parties)
(3) Limited issue appeals
Adams et al. (2006)
Ezrow (2008)
Ezrow et al. (2011)
Non-centrist Party family
or extreme ideology (green, radical right
& communist parties)
Wagner (2011)
(1) Do not emphasize economic issues Distance to mean issue salience
(2) Emphasize a narrow range of non-economic issues (dichotomous measurement)
Meyer and Miller (2015)
Emphasize policy areas neglected by their competitors Parties’ ‘nicheness’
(continuous measurement)
Bischof (2015)
(1) Emphasize issue dimensions neglected by competitors ‘Nicheness’ on 2 dimensions
(2) Present narrow offer on these issue dimensions (continuous measurement)
Note: Adapted from Bischof (2015) and updated.
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Third, the mainstream-challenger framework is preferred over the niche
party concept because it distinguishes between parties with greater parsimony
and simplicity. Participation in coalition government is isolated as the defining
characteristic that distinguishes between parties. This conceptualization of party
types is much more straightforward than what constitutes to be a ‘niche’ party.
In fact, “the conceptualization of niche parties lacks a common conceptual back-
ground” (Bischof, 2015, p.1), since studies disagree on the definition of niche par-
ties and its measurement (see table 2.1). Hobolt and Tilley (2016, p.974) compare
the niche party concept to the mainstream-challenger framework, and argue:
[...] measuring whether or not parties ordinarily participate in govern-
ment has the advantage that it indirectly captures many of the features
of niche and populist parties (the mobilisation of new issues and/or
extreme positions on existing issues as well as the rejection of the po-
litical establishment) [...]. Moreover, it highlights an important aspect
of challenger parties that is not captured by existing classifications,
namely the degree to which a party has government responsibility for
political outcomes for which they can be held to account.
For these three reasons, this dissertation adopts the challenger-framework.
This is not to say, however, that the mainstream-niche and the mainstream-challenger
classifications are completely independent. I categorize the party-election year ob-
servations in my dataset according to the traditional niche-mainstream classifica-
tion and according to the mainstream-challenger classification. Although the two
measures are strongly correlated, they do not completely overlap. Table 2.2 illus-
trates this. A considerable number of mainstream parties identified by Meguid
(2005) and Adams et al. (2006) (parties belonging to social democratic, liberal,
Christian democratic and conservative party families) are, in some election years
at least, classified as challengers in my dataset. Similarly, some of the niche par-
ties in Meguid (2005) and Adams et al. (2006) have turned into mainstream parties
following the dynamic party classification.
A particular concern with the mainstream-challenger framework relates to
the possibility that the emergence of challenger parties is especially apparent in
specific time periods. Since challenger parties are defined based on prior ex-
perience with government participation, newly formed parties are by definition
challenger parties (until they gain access to office). Many of these newly formed
parties, such as green and radical right parties, have been contesting elections
since the 1980s (Norris, 2005; Meguid, 2005). As such, it is likely that the number
of challenger parties in this period is much higher as compared to, say, the 1950s.
This could substantiate the claim that the challenger party phenomenon is charac-
teristic for specific time periods rather than being an enduring fact of political life
in European party systems. Figure 2.1 addresses this concern. It shows the num-
ber of party-election year observations for challenger and mainstream (opposition
and government) parties per time period. The number of observations increases
from the 1970s onwards, but the challenger-mainstream ratio remains relatively
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Table 2.2 – Contingency Table of Niche-Mainstream Conceptualizations
based on Party Family across Mainstream-Challenger
Framework
Mainstream Challenger Total
Meguid (2005, 2008)
Mainstream 74.15 (855) 25.85 (298) 100.00 (1,153)
Niche 19.78 (36) 80.22 (146) 100.00 (182)
Other 33.57 (188) 66.43 (372) 100.00 (560)
Total 56.94 (1,079) 43.06 (816) (1,895)
Chi Square 366.6∗∗∗
∗∗∗ < .01
Adams et al. (2006)
Mainstream 70.81 (866) 29.19 (357) 100.00 (1,223)
Niche 19.72 (86) 80.28 (350) 100.00 (436)
Other 53.81 (127) 46.19 (109) 100.00 (236)
Total 56.94 (1,079) 43.06 (816) (1,895)
Chi Square 343.2∗∗∗
∗∗∗ < .01
Note: Total number of observations per categorie in parentheses.
Intepretation: 25.85% of party-election year observations counted as mainstream parties according to
the conceptualization by Meguid (2005, 2008) are qualified as challenger party-election years in this
study, compared to 80.22% of party-election year obsersvations counted as niche parties.
Figure 2.1 – Number of Observations for Challenger and Mainstream
Parties
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36% 64%
45% 55%
40% 60%
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46% 54%
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1960−69
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2000−09
2010−13
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Count
Party Type
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Mainstream
Note: The unit of analysis is a party in an election year. The total number of observations is 1, 895. The
total number of challenger parties is 816 (43%). The total number of mainstream parties is 1,079 (57%).
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stable. One reason for this could be the fact that some challenger parties relatively
quickly managed to gain access to office, turning into mainstream parties. Quite
a number of green (Rihoux and Ru¨dig, 2006) and radical right parties (Akkerman,
2012) managed to enter national governments (but compare Dumont and Ba¨ck,
2006).
2.3.2 Internal Party Organizational Structures
A second factor that is considered in this dissertation as affecting issue attention
strategies is a party’s internal organizational structure. Internal party organiza-
tional structures refer to incentives for parties that originate internally from the
party organization. More specifically, the question is whether the organizational
structure favours the party leadership or party activists. I refer to this as the in-
tra party balance of power between leaders and activists. The empirical chapters
make the following arguments:
• Chapter 3 (setting the agenda or responding to the agenda?) argues that the intra
party balance of power affects the degree to which parties are responsive
to the issue attention of other parties. Party leaders, driven by vote- and
office-seeking motivations, perceive the need for their party to respond to
competitors and ‘ride the wave’ of the party system agenda more strongly
than do party activists. Party leaders want their party to address the issues
of the day and want their party not deviate too much from the agendas of
other parties as to ease post-election coalition negotiations. Party activists,
driven by policy motives, are less concerned with what other parties are
saying and would like their party to pursue its own policy agenda.
• Chapter 4 (appealing broadly or narrowing down?) argues that there is an in-
ternal struggle over the scope of parties’ issue agendas within parties. Party
activists want the party to focus on its original policy agenda. A focus on
core issues is likely to satisfy the policy-seeking incentives of the activist
base. The leadership of the party, on the other hand, is tempted by the elec-
toral consequences of a strategy of issue diversification that reaches out to
many different constituencies. Appealing broadly is likely to satisfy their
vote- and office-seeking motivations.
The argument that intra party politics affect parties’ issue strategies builds
on existing theories of party behavior and party organization. The basic premise
is that parties pursue different goals, such as increasing electoral support, gaining
access to elected office or influencing specific public policies. Parties’ vote, office
and policy objectives are, usually, mutually conflicting and therefore trade-offs are
involved when parties decide on their strategies (Strøm, 1990; Mu¨ller and Strøm,
1999). The internal organizational structure influences the way in which parties
reach decisions; i.e. how they solve their collective action problems (Aldrich, 2011).
Building on this insight, several studies have argued that there is a link between
party organization and party’s strategic behavior (Kitschelt, 1989, 1994; Pedersen,
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2010, 2012; Ceron, 2012; Ware, 1992; Schumacher, de Vries and Vis, 2013; Wagner
and Meyer, 2014).
Panebianco (1988) identifies party leaders and party activists as the crucial
actors within parties. They have diverging preferences. Party leaders are pri-
marily motivated by office-seeking goals whereas party activists are driven by
policy objectives (Strøm, 1990; Mu¨ller and Strøm, 1999; Schlesinger, 1975; Aldrich,
2011). Party leaders are usually portrayed as pragmatic office seekers. Since they
enjoy the private spoils of their party being in government, they are “primarily
motivated by their expected office benefits” (Strøm, 1990, p.574). Activists, on
the other hand, invest time, effort and sometimes money in the party in order
to change public policies. If leaders are “careerists”, to speak with Panebianco
(1988), then activists are “believers.”
Consequently, leaders and activists have different perceptions of the trade-
offs involved in parties’ decisions between conflicting strategic goals. Leaders are
more pragmatic and have wide “policy limits” (Pedersen, 2012, p.901). They are
willing to sacrifice policy objectives in order to gain access to office. Activists are
more rigid and more likely to let policy objectives prevail over vote- or office-
seeking incentives. Mu¨ller and Strøm (1999, p.10) phrase it as follows:
[if a party’s] platform contains everything that the hard-core activists
want, then it will probably cause the party to fare poorly among the
regular voters. On the other hand, an electorally optimal platform may
imply policy sacrifices that are hard for the party faithful to swallow.
Chapter 3 and chapter 4 build on this logic to explain parties’ issue atten-
tion strategies. I locate parties on a continuum indicating whether the organiza-
tional structures favor party leadership or the activist base. Leadership dominated
parties are more likely to respond to office-seeking incentives while activist domi-
nated parties are more likely to respond to policy-seeking incentives. Schumacher,
de Vries and Vis (2013) adopt a similar line of argumentation to explain parties’
policy positioning: if leaders are powerful, parties respond to shifts in the mean
voter position as this is likely to result in electoral advantages and access to office,
if activists have more of a say, parties respond to the shifts in the positions of their
supporters, in line with policy objectives. Similarly, I argue that parties in which
the leadership is powerful let vote- and office-seeking incentives prevail and are
more responsive to the issue attention of competitor parties (chapter 3) and are
more likely to pursue broad appeal strategies (chapter 4). Activist-dominated par-
ties, by contrast, are more concerned with their own agendas. A party of this kind
is less likely to respond to rival parties, and presents agendas more confined in
scope, as they focus on their core issues.
As to get a sense of the variation in intra party organizational structures,
figure 2.2 displays box plots of the variable indicating the intra party balance of
power per party family. Higher scores on the variable indicate more power for
the party leadership. Both across and within party families, considerable varia-
tion in party organization is observed. Ecologist parties tend to have intra party
Chapter 2. The Conflict over Conflicts 25
Figure 2.2 – Intra Party Balance of Power across Party Families
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Note: The y-axis depicts scores on the intra party balance of power variable, with higher scores in-
dicating more power for the leadership, for the different party families as shown on the x-axis. The
party family designations are taken from the party manifesto data (Volkens et al., 2014), the niche-
mainstream classification follows Adams et al. (2006).
structures favouring the activist base, while communist parties are more oriented
to the leadership. Nationalist parties’ internal structures gives even more leeway
to their leaders. These parties, often grouped together as niche parties (Adams
et al., 2006; Ezrow, 2008; Ezrow et al., 2011), are in terms of internal organizational
features thus rather diverse. The data also reveals variation across, and within, the
parties usually classified as mainstream parties. Christian-democrats and conser-
vatives have party organizations that lend on average more power to party leaders
as compared to liberal and social democratic parties.
How does variation in internal party organizational structures relate to the
mainstream-challenger framework? This is an important question since it is likely
that the internal organizations of many of the newly formed challenger parties are
less well-structured and established as compared to those of mainstream parties.
As a result, one would find challenger parties to be especially internally domi-
nated by party activists. Employing both sets of variables to explain parties’ issue
attention strategies would consequently lead to overfitting in the statistical models.
Figure 2.3 therefore shows the distribution of the internal balance of power vari-
able for all parties and for subsets including challenger and mainstream parties
only. The figure indicates that party organization exhibits meaningful variation
both across challenger parties and across mainstream parties.
It is important to note here that chapter 5 does not incorporate an argument
stressing the role of internal party organizational structures. Chapter 5 examines
how parties respond to increasing electoral support for issue entrepreneurs. Do
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parties adapt to the new agenda and shift attention to the issue dimension pro-
moted by issue entrepreneurs or do parties dismiss the new agenda and downplay
the importance of the new issue? For two reasons this chapter deviates from the
other empirical chapters in this dissertation. First, the theoretical interest of the
chapter is with the effect of electoral support for issue entrepreneurs on the agen-
das of all other parties. Such a focus on average effects is in line with the literature
in this field (Abou-Chadi, 2014; Spoon, Hobolt and de Vries, 2014). Hence, the hy-
potheses generated in chapter 5 do not explicate differences between activist and
leadership dominated parties. Second, the empirical strategy in chapter 5 is to
include party-level fixed effects in the regression models. Since the available mea-
sure for the intra party balance of power is time invariant, the inclusion of this
variable in the models is ruled out.3
3The time invariant measure of the intra party balance of power would drop out of the equation
as there would be perfect correlation with the time invariant party dummy variables.
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Figure 2.3 – Distribution of Intra Party Balance of Power across Party
Types
0
50
100
0 10 20 30
Intra Party Balance of Power
C
ou
nt
(a) All parties (n=1,408)
0
25
50
75
100
10 20
Intra Party Balance of Power
C
ou
nt
(b) Mainstream parties (n=926)
0
10
20
30
40
0 10 20 30
Intra Party Balance of Power
C
ou
nt
(c) Challenger parties (n=482)
Note: The figures show the distribution of the intra party balance
of power variable. The shaded area under the solid line indicates
the Kernel density plot.
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2.4 Measuring Issue Attention
This section presents a brief discussion on the data sources used in the empirical
chapters, and it puts forward the case selection and time period under review.
2.4.1 Data Sources
Issue attention strategies are in the three empirical papers measured using data
from the Manifesto Project (sometimes also referred to in this dissertation as ‘Party
Manifesto Data’) (MRG-CMP-MARPOR) (Volkens et al., 2014; Klingemann et al.,
2006; Budge et al., 2001). Chapter 5, in addition, also employs data from the
Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES), it combines the 1999-2010 CHES trendfile
(Bakker et al., 2015) with the Expert Surveys collected by Ray (1999) which covers
the years 1984-1996.
Hooghe et al. (2010) have documented the reliability and validity of the
CHES data. The Manifesto Project dataset, on the other hand, has been sub-
jected to extensive methodological debates. Gemenis (2013) provides an overview
of these debates and singles out four issues: (1) the theoretical underpinnings of
the coding scheme, (2) the selection of documents, (3) the reliability of the cod-
ings and (4) scaling procedures. The latter is the most hotly debated aspect of the
dataset and involves discussions of how to correctly infer parties’ policy positions
from the data. Indeed, several authors have proposed sophisticated scaling tech-
niques as alternatives to the standard left-right scale provided in the data (Gabel
and Huber, 2000; Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006; Lowe et al., 2011).
For the purpose of this study, however, I circumvent these debates since
I am not interested in parties’ policy positions, but rather in their attention to
individual issues. As such, I use the data set as it was originally intended, to
measure parties emphasis of policy issues (Budge et al., 2001). The Manifesto
Project data set is well equipped for such a task as it relies on trained coders
who manually code ‘quasi-sentences’ of party manifestos, assigning them into
one of the 56 issue categories specified by the code book. The resulting data
set measures parties’ relative emphasis on each issue. Furthermore, the Manifesto
Project provides currently the only data set capable of constructing rich time series
of parties’ issue attention across a large number of parties in different countries.
2.4.2 Case Selection
The empirical chapters examine the issue attention strategies of political parties in
western European party systems from 1950 to 2013. I exclude eastern European
countries because these systems have exhibited a high degree of party system in-
stability and because patterns of political competition in these systems are distinct
from western European structures of competition, which renders comparisons not
feasible within the scope of this study (see for example Rovny, 2014; Marks et al.,
2006). The following countries are included: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Great-Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
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Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. The inclusion
criteria for parties follows the Manifesto Project data set. Parties that have con-
tested less than two elections are dropped from the sample in order to create time
series. The dataset comprises information on 259 political parties. Table A.1 in
appendix A presents a list of parties included in the empirical part of this study.
In chapter 5 the time period under investigation is from 1980 onwards. Elec-
toral support for issue entrepreneurial parties is a key predictor in the models
in chapter 5, and many of these parties first emerged and became successful in
the 1980s. The models are based on information of 146 parties. Chapter 5 also
presents a model based on data from the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys. The data set
for this model comprises information on 138 parties in 14 countries. Luxembourg
is not included in the CHES data and non EU-member states are dropped since
this model serves to explain party attention to European Union issues.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter I have argued that there are two theoretical approaches to the
study of how issues become salient in political systems. The bottom up approach
emphasizes societal inputs to the political agenda whereas the top down perspec-
tive argues that the strategic actions of political elites to a large extent determine
which issues are the focus of political contest. Salience theory has gained a domi-
nant position within the top down research tradition, but suffers from a one-sided
focus on parties’ incentives to selectively emphasize the issues that are beneficial
to them. Salience theory has little to say about (1) overlap in parties’ issue atten-
tion, (2) the scope of parties’ issue agendas and (3) innovation in issue agendas.
These three components will be the focus of the subsequent empirical chapters.
Building on classical theories of issue evolution and party behavior, I examine the
extent to which (1) external party system pressures and (2) internal party orga-
nizational structures have an impact on these three components of parties’ issue
attention strategies.
3Setting the Agenda or Responding to the Agenda?
Explaining the Degree of Responsiveness to Competitors
in Parties’ Issue Agendas
?Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the the Work in Progress seminar of the research unit ‘Democ-
racy and Democratization’ of the WZB Berlin Social Science Center (2015, Berlin); at the Work in Progress
Workshop of the Berlin Graduate School of Social Sciences at the Humboldt University Berlin (2015, Berlin)
and at the annual conference of the Elections, Public Opinion and Parties (EPOP) specialist group of the Polit-
ical Studies Association (2015, Cardiff). I thank Christoffer Green-Pedersen, Onawa Promise Lacewell, Arndt
Leininger, Nicolas Merz, Dag Tanneberg, Pola Lehmann, Claudia Ritzi, Rob Gruijters, Ilyas Saliba, Tim Winke,
Sybille Luhmann & Mathias Poertner for their valuable comments.
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“ Surely, neither side chose to emphasize themes that gave an advantage tothe other. The results of this method of choosing issues was that rhetors
in two groups did not, by and large, discuss the same things. But of
course they were conscious of each others’ claims and, in may ways,
phrased their arguments to undercut the opponents’ positions. So while
we have two campaigns with different themes, we also have responses
and deprecations. In some degree [...] these interactions affected both the
course of debate and, possibly, the outcomes. ”
William H. Riker, Rhetorical Interaction in the Ratification Campaigns, 1993
(p.84)
Studying the political debates surrounding the ratification of the constitution of the United
States in 1787-1788 to test his theory of agenda formation, William Riker acknowledges
that although both the federalists and the antifederalists focused on different things, the
debates were also characterized by interactions with both sides responding to one another
and discussing common themes.
3.1 Introduction
Contrasting Downsian spatial logic, which assumes parties to competeby means of direct confrontation on a set of exogenously determined policyissues (Downs, 1957), issue salience theories posit that parties engage
in political competition through their selective emphasis of different issues. The
issues that are being discussed in politics are, as such, endogenous to political
competition, and are determined by the strategic actions of political parties (cf.
Colomer and Puglisi, 2005). Parties are exptected to focus on issues on which
they enjoy relative advantages over their competitors (Budge and Farlie, 1983;
Robertson, 1976), for example because they have come to ‘own’ the issue (Petrocik,
1996). By the same logic, parties avoid issues that might benefit their rivals. Taken
this line of reasoning to its logical end, the implication is that political opponents,
quite literally, “do not talk about the same things” (Riker, 1993b, p.82).
Despite this prediction, an expanding body of literature has exposed in-
stances of issue overlap (Damore, 2005), issue convergence (Sigelman and Buell, 2004),
issue engagement (Meyer and Wagner, 2015) or issue trespassing (van de Wardt,
2015), describing situations in which parties talk about issues brought forward
by competitors.
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This chapter explores the extent to which parties are responsive to the issue
appeals of their competitors on two general issue-domains: the economic- and the
cultural issue domain. Do parties take into account the actions of their competi-
tors when they decide whether to increase or decrease the emphasis they place
on issues pertaining to either one of those larger issue domains? This constitutes
an important question since the concept of party competition, from a theoreti-
cal perspective, implies the existence of ‘competitive interactions’ between parties
(Bartolini, 1999).1 Selective emphasis theories, however, only posit expectations
with regard to the issue appeals of individual parties; they are expected to em-
phasize their own preferred issues. This chapter, by contrast, examines the degree
of responsiveness to competitors in issue salience strategies, and variation therein.
As such, it represents an attempt to focus on interaction in issue competition (cf.
Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2014).
Other studies have established that issue convergence in election campaigns
occurs quite often. This chapter goes one step further and focusses on variation in
the extent to which parties are responsive to the issue appeals of their competitors.
It makes three arguments. First, parties are, generally speaking, responsive to
the issue appeals of their competitors. Second, parties differ in their degree of
responsiveness to competitors based on their competitive position in the party
system and, thirdly, intra party politics affects parties’ inclination to respond to
their rivals.
The first argument holds that parties adjust the salience of issues in their
election manifestos in response to changes in the systemic salience of issue domains.
Systemic salience, the degree of attention that other parties in the system pay to
an issue domain, serves as an indicator for parties of the relative importance of
issues, and provides them with information on the structure and the content of
the political space in which they compete.
However, not all parties are equally responsive. Mainstream parties regu-
larly switch between government and opposition and have experience with other
parties in coalition governments (see de Vries and Hobolt, 2012). Therefore, they
should be more ‘sensitive’ to the agendas of their competitors. Moreover, main-
stream parties seek to maintain the status quo of the political system, which re-
sulted in their advantageous position. They do not want to upset (future) coalition
partners by proposing agendas that are radically different from the party system
agenda. Challenger parties have no prior experience with coalition government
and are more likely to push forward their own issue agendas. As they occupy
losing positions in the system, they have an incentive to change the status quo
and, hence, they do not need to be responsive to competitors’ agendas.
1For a more extensive discussion of competition in the political ‘issue market’, and the distinc-
tion between competition as a macro level phenomenon and contest and cooperation as forms of
interaction between actors at the micro level, see Franzmann (2011).
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The third argument relates to the intra party balance of power between lead-
ers and activists. Party leaders, this chapter argues, perceive the need to be re-
sponsive to other parties more strongly as it serves their office-seeking motiva-
tions. Party activists are driven by policy motives; Panebianco (1988) refers to
them as ‘policy-believers’. They would like to see the party maintain its focus on
its traditional agenda, and they are less convinced of the need for the party to
respond to its competitive context. Hence, if leaders are dominant, parties should
be more responsive to changes in the systemic salience of issue domains. Pooled
time series analyses of the systemic salience of economic and cultural issue do-
mains and the issue profiles of 259 parties in 18 European countries between 1950
and 2013 provide tentative support for these theoretical propositions.
This chapter proceeds by discussing the literature on issue-competition and
party organization, and by deriving hypotheses on parties’ degree of issue respon-
siveness to competitors. Data, operationalization and the estimation techniques
are put forward in the second part after which the empirical results are presented.
The chapter closes with discussing its findings and proposing some possibilities
for future research.
3.2 Issue Responsiveness to Rival Parties
Why should political parties be responsive to the issue strategies of their competi-
tors? The spatial modeling literature, originating from the classical models as put
forward by Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957), revolves around the prediction
that parties’ policy positions converge on the median voter position.2 In terms
of parties’ strategic behavior, this prediction has two implications. First, parties
should be responsive to shifts in public opinion, an expectation which has received
empirical support (Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson, 1995; Adams et al., 2004, 2006;
Ezrow et al., 2011). Second, parties are expected to respond to the policy positions
as taken by their rivals, leading to a type of Nash equilibrium in the party system:
a party chooses its optimal position given the policy positions of the other parties.
Empirical evidence offers support for this notion in as far that parties seem to shift
their policy positions, from one election to another, in the same direction as their
opponents do (Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009).
Following critiques of the axiom of ordered dimensions that underpins spa-
tial models (Stokes, 1963), issue competition theories have put forward that party
competition is not so much a matter of diverging or converging policy positions,
but, rather, that parties differentiate themselves from one another by putting for-
ward some issues more strongly than others. Parties, in this view, compete for the
attention of the public for their preferred issues. The logic of ‘selective emphasis’
(Budge and Farlie, 1983; Robertson, 1976), then, implies that parties do not talk
about their rivals’ policies (see also Dolezal et al., 2014).
2Grofman (2004), however, discusses the assumptions on which the convergence result in Down-
sian models rests, and how violations of these assumptions make the result disappear.
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Even proponents of the issue competition perspective acknowledge, how-
ever, that parties at times respond to the issue strategies of their competitors.
Budge and Farlie (1983, p.29) state that sometimes issues are impossible for politi-
cians to ignore, even if addressing them would not be beneficial, simply because
“the state of the world” imposes constraints. And Petrocik (1996, p.829) argues
that when an issue of the opponent becomes unavoidable, strategic politicians
use an “advantageous interpretation of the problem” to highlight their compe-
tence. Still, issue competition theories predict issue convergence – that is, political
opponents talking about the same issues in election campaigns –, to occur only
incidentally. Indeed, as Sigelman and Buell (2004, p.652) state, it “should be the
exception rather than the rule.”
However, empirical studies of the issue appeals of political elites tell a rather
different story. Studies of issue convergence in the United States find evidence
that it occurs relatively frequently (Sigelman and Buell, 2004; Damore, 2004, 2005;
Petrocik, Benoit and Hansen, 2003). And in one of the few studies going beyond
the United States context, Green-Pedersen (2007b) reports that the different Eu-
ropean party families tend to address similar issues in their election manifestos.
Furthermore, following the framework proposed by Meguid (2005), several recent
studies describe how mainstream parties in Europe are responsive to the issue ap-
peals as put forward by ‘issue entrepreneurs’ (Spoon, Hobolt and de Vries, 2014;
Abou-Chadi, 2014; Schumacher and van Kersbergen, 2014; van de Wardt, 2015)
(see also chapter 5). Apparently, parties feel the urge to respond to their rivals’
policy agendas, as such creating a ‘party system agenda’ consisting of issues rele-
vant to all parties in the system (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010).
In sum, parties face incentives to selectively emphasize ‘their’ issues, but
at the same time they exhibit responsiveness to the issue appeals of their com-
petitors. Relative differences in the degree of issue responsiveness to other parties
depends, this chapter argues, on two things. First, parties’ competitive position in
the party system matters. This is captured by the distinction between mainstream
and challenger parties. Mainstream parties should respond more strongly to other
parties’ agendas than do challenger parties. Second, intra-party politics plays a
role. Party activists are more concerned with a party’s ‘own’ issues while party
leaders are more ‘sensitive’ towards the competitive environment in which the
party operates. These arguments are further developed in the following section.
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3.2.1 Challenger versus Mainstream & Activists versus Leaders
Political parties compete in an inherently uncertain environment, as there is no
reliable information about the effects of their issue strategies on electoral support
(Budge, 1994).3 One piece of information that parties have at their disposal con-
sists of the electoral successes, or failures, associated with previous issue strate-
gies. Empirical evidence suggests, in this respect, that parties change their issue
profiles in response to past election results, especially when they have lost votes
and when not much time has elapsed since the last election (Somer-Topcu, 2009).
An alternative source of information for parties when deciding on their issue
strategies is composed of the actions of their competitors. The systemic salience of
an issue domain, that is the extent to which other parties in the system emphasize
a specific group of issues, should inform the strategies of individual parties. It
gives them a sense of the relative importance of issue domains and, as such, of
the structure and content of the issue space in which they compete. Steenbergen
and Scott (2004, p.179) argue that the emphasis a party places on a specific issue
is to some extent a function of the salience of this issue to other parties. Parties
are constrained in determining the emphasis they want to place on an issue by
the salience other parties attach to it. A similar logic is explicated by the concept
of the party system agenda, which consists of a set of issues that, in any given
election, is so important to the party system as a whole that individual parties
cannot simply ignore it (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010). Based on these
considerations, it seems reasonable to expect that the systemic salience of groups
of issues affects the salience that individual parties allocate to these issues in their
programs. This leads to the first hypothesis:
H1: Parties increase the salience of an issue domain in their manifesto
if the systemic salience of that issue domain increases
However, it is unlikely that all parties are equally responsive. I argue that dif-
ferences in the degree of issue responsiveness to competitors depend on a party’s
relative position in the competitive party system, captured by the distinction be-
tween mainstream and challenger parties. The mainstream-challenger framework
has been introduced by de Vries and Hobolt (2012). In this view, party compe-
tition in multi-party settings occurs between mainstream parties that regularly
participate in coalition governments (but are sometimes also excluded from of-
fice) and challenger parties that have never held office (see also Hobolt and Karp,
2010). As such, in any given election, three types of parties compete: challenger
parties, mainstream opposition parties and mainstream government parties. There are
two reasons why these different types of parties differ with regard to their issue
responsiveness to rivals.
3Public opinion polls do provide parties with information. The ‘problem’ with polls is, as Budge
(1994) argues, that they do not provide information on what drives voting behavior. Thus, polls
”may in general terms identify certain issues as important to electors, but leave it open as to
whether these will necessarily affect their vote” (Budge, 1994, p.455).
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First, opposition parties are usually perceived to be more ‘flexible’ in their
issue strategies as compared to government parties. They have no record in office
to which they are tied. Voters judge incumbent parties by their performance in
government; for example, it has been shown that voters tend to discount their
manifesto pledges since they take into account that government parties have to
accept policy compromises (Bawn and Somer-Topcu, 2012; Cho and Endersby,
2003). Incumbents are thus constraint in their issue strategies. In their study
of issue competition in Denmark, Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2010, p.273)
find that opposition parties focus more on issues that are advantageous to them
whereas parties in government “are compelled to respond to issues brought up
on the party system agenda.” Seeberg (2013) likewise emphasizes the opportu-
nities that opposition parties have to politicize issues while government parties
only passively respond to the issues that are being brought up in the system. I
formalize these considerations in the following hypothesis:
H2: Mainstream government parties are more responsive to the issue
agendas of their competitors than are mainstream opposition parties
Second, challenger parties should, because of their lack of experience in
government and their incentive to propose new agendas, be less concerned with
the issue strategies of their rivals than mainstream parties. Challengers have no
governmental experience with other parties which makes them less ‘sensitive’ to
their competitive environment. Mainstream parties, on the other hand, regularly
deal with other parties in coalition governments, and therefore it seems reasonable
to expect that they respond more strongly to the issue appeals of their competitors.
Moreover, mainstream parties are the political winners in the current sys-
tem whereas challengers occupy disadvantageous positions (de Vries and Hobolt,
2012). Following ‘issue evolution’ theories (Carmines and Stimson, 1986), chal-
lengers have an incentive to change the system by proposing agendas that deviate
from the political status quo (see also Riker, 1982, 1986, 1993b). Studies show, in
this regard, how political losers seek to politicize issues that are being neglected
by the political mainstream, such as European integration (de Vries and Hobolt,
2012; Hobolt and de Vries, 2015). Challengers lack experience in government and
have very limited opportunities to join future governments. As a result, they are
likely to adopt more risky policy platforms than do mainstream parties. Indeed,
their ability to offer a clear alternative to the political mainstream underpins, to
a large extent, their appeal among voters (Hobolt and Tilley, 2016). Such issue
strategies also entail that challengers are less responsive to the agendas of their
competitors.
Mainstream parties, the winners in the system, do not have an incentive to
propose new agendas. They seek to reinforce existing patterns of political compe-
tition. Mainstream parties’ agendas are influenced by their prior participation in
coalition government as well as by their desire to join future governments. A party
of this kind is “cautious in mobilising around new issues or adopting positions far
from other parties, since both would make it more difficult to enter into coalition
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government” (Hobolt and Tilley, 2016, p.974). Tavits (2008) demonstrates, in this
respect, how parties use cues based on the past behaviour of their competitors
when engaged in coalition negotiations. Mainstream parties choose policy agen-
das that approximate those of likely coalition partners. They are, hence, more
concerned with the platforms of their competitors than are challengers. These
arguments lead to the following hypothesis:
H3: Challenger parties show less issue responsiveness to competitors
than do mainstream parties
Party behavior is, however, not only determined externally by party system
dynamics; internal party politics also plays a role. There is an extant literature that
links party strategy to intra party politics (Kitschelt, 1989, 1994; Pedersen, 2010,
2012; Ceron, 2012; Ware, 1992; Schumacher, de Vries and Vis, 2013; Wagner and
Meyer, 2014). These studies build on the premise that there are two crucial groups
of actors within parties that have diverging strategic goals. Party leaders mainly
seek to satisfy their office-seeking motivations, even if this means they have to be
more ‘pragmatic’ in electoral competition. After all, they enjoy the spoils associate
with being in office. Party activists are usually portrayed as being more ‘policy
rigid’; they are mainly motivated by policy seeking objectives (i.e. pulling public
policy in their preferred direction) (Panebianco, 1988; Strøm, 1990; Mu¨ller and
Strøm, 1999; Schlesinger, 1975; Aldrich, 2011).
Building on these propositions, I argue that party leaders should perceive
the need for their party to respond to its competitive environment more strongly
than activists. The motivation for a party to connect its issue profile to that of
competitor parties is likely driven by vote- and ultimately office-seeking incen-
tives. The party system agenda provides parties with information on the relative
importance of issues. By connecting its issue profile to that of their rivals, a party
can make sure it “rides the wave” (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1994) of the issues
that are being discussed in the party system – that is, addressing the issues that
are currently the focus of political contest in the party system. Parties may want
to do this as to signal to voters that they address the major political issues of the
day. Wagner and Meyer (2014, p.10122) argue, in this respect, that “parties can
improve their image if they address those issues that currently dominate the pub-
lic debate.” In a similar way, Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1994, p.337) posit that
political candidates are more likely to be perceived as concerned, responsive, and
informed if they “campaign on the major issues of the day.” Issue responsive-
ness to competitors is thus driven by a party’s vote- and office-seeking incentives.
Therefore, party leaders should be especially tempted to pursue such a strategy,
and are likely to prioritise it over a focus on the party’s ‘own’ issues.
Party activists, on the other hand, are less convinced of the party’s need to
exhibit a certain degree of ‘sensitivity’ to competitors. Activist would like to see
their investment in the party be rewarded with changing public policy. Hence,
they would like to see the party keep its focus on its own program and issues.
These issues are, in many cases, the main reason why they joined the party and
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why they invest time and effort in the party. Activists want the party to remain
its focus on the issues that are of central concern to them. As a result, “parties
dominated by activists will find it harder to orient the party towards currently
salient policy concerns” (Wagner and Meyer, 2014, p.1023). Therefore, I posit the
following hypothesis:
H4: Parties in which the leadership is powerful exhibit more issue
responsiveness to competitors than parties in which activists are pow-
erful
3.2.2 The Cultural and the Economic Issue Domain
This chapter examines parties’ responsiveness to competitors on two general issue-
domains: the economic and the cultural issue domain. Although economic issues
tend to dominate politics in advanced democracies (Benoit and Laver, 2006), issues
not pertaining to this dimension have over time become increasingly apparent in
policy agendas (Green-Pedersen, 2007b). Recent studies have investigated when
non-economic issues become more salient for citizens’ vote choices (De La O and
Rodden, 2008; Lefkofridi, Wagner and Willmann, 2014) and under which circum-
stances parties are more likely to publicize these issues (Tavits and Potter, 2015;
Ward et al., 2015).
Here, I assume that parties compete on both issue domains. As such, this
chapter builds on an expanding body of literature that acknowledges the presence
of both an economic and a cultural issue domain in political conflict (Kitschelt,
1994; Kriesi et al., 2006; Marks et al., 2006; Flanagan and Lee, 2003; Laver and
Hunt, 1992; Tavits, 2007; Spies and Franzmann, 2011; Rohrschneider and White-
field, 2012).4 The first issue domain is generally associated with distributional
conflicts and issues that are interpreted in material terms, and centers on the ques-
tion of the adequate degree of government intervention in the economy, whereas
the latter domain refers to social, moral and cultural issues usually interpreted
in terms of values (cf. Tavits, 2007). The operationalization of these two issue
domains is explained in more detail in the following section.
3.3 Data & Operationalization
I employ data from the Manifesto Project (MRG-CMP-MARPOR) (Volkens et al.,
2014; Klingemann et al., 2006; Budge et al., 2001) to infer parties’ issue emphases
on both the economic and the cultural issue domain as well as to assess the sys-
temic salience of these domains. The MRG-CMP-MARPOR dataset allows for
such measurement since it’s coding scheme offers 56 issue categories in which
quasi sentences in party manifestos are categorized by hand. To date, the MRG-
CMP-MARPOR project provides the only data set available that is suitable for
4But compare Mair (2007) and van der Brug and van Spanje (2009) for studies maintaining the
assumption of one-dimensionality in political issue spaces in Europe.
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measuring parties’ issue salience strategies over a long period of time across a
large number of parties.
The hypotheses on issue responsiveness, as derived above, require the con-
struction of both an economic and a cultural issue domain. One way of extracting
the dimensionality of the political space from the MRCG-CMP-MARPOR data is
by using data reduction techniques such as principal component analysis. Gabel
and Huber (2000) argue in favor of such an approach when estimating general left-
right positions of parties. When examining specific issue domains, however, such
an approach can be problematic (Laver and Hunt, 1992).5 Benoit and Laver (2012)
argue that ex post inductive approaches to estimating policy dimensions come with
serious methodological challenges, and they recommend researchers to “leverage
[their] de facto knowledge of [policy] dimensions as part of the estimation pro-
cess” (Benoit and Laver, 2012, p.216). Therefore, and following common practice
in the literature (see for example Meguid, 2005; Meyer and Wagner, 2013), the two
issue domains are constructed a-priori and on the basis of substantive considera-
tions.
For the economic issue domain, I select issue categories from the MRG-
CMP-MARPOR data that relate to distributional conflicts, state intervention in
the economy and social protection. To construct the cultural domain, moral and
cultural issues, as well as immigration and environmental issues, were selected.
The specific variables that are included in the domains are listed in table 3.1.
The identification of the issue categories follows previous research. The
MRG-CMP-MARPOR variables chosen for the economic issue domain largely
overlap with Stoll’s (2010) “socio-economic” dimension, Spies and Franzmann’s
(2011) “economic dimension”, Meyer and Wagner’s (2013) “economic subject area”,
Wagner’s (2012) “economic policy topic” and the items Green-Pedersen (2007b) de-
fines as “economic and distributional issues”. Moreover, it includes all the issues
Tavits (2007) selected for her “economic domain” and most issues used by Lowe
et al. (2011) to construct their policy scales describing “free market economy”,
“state involvement in the economy” and “planned vs market economy.”
While the economic issue domain tends to be relatively uniform, studies
show that the content of the cultural issue domain varies significantly over time
and across countries (Benoit and Laver, 2006; Marks et al., 2006). The cultural issue
domain might consist of issues that form a coherent ‘second dimension’ of politics
mapping onto an ideological continuum ranging from ‘libertarian’ to ‘authoritar-
ian’ policy beliefs (cf. Kitschelt, 1994; Flanagan and Lee, 2003). At times, however,
it also includes a broader set of non-economic issues that do not necessarily relate
to each other in terms of a coherent policy dimension (Ward et al., 2015). There-
fore, the issue domain as defined in this study includes a rather broad set of issues:
moral and cultural issues as well as issues related to immigration and the envi-
ronment. Issues relating to European integration are left out since these do not
seem to ‘fit’ one of the issue domains (Green-Pedersen, 2012; Hooghe, Marks and
5For a similar argument, see Tavits (2007, p.156).
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Table 3.1 – Variables Included in the Economic and Cultural Issue
Domains
Economic Issue Domain
Variable Description
Per401 Free Enterprise: Positive
Per402 Incentives: Positive
Per403 Market Regulation: Positive
Per404 Economic Planning: Positive
Per406 Protectionism: Positive
Per407 Protectionism: Negative
Per408 Economic Goals
Per409 Keynesian Demand Management: Positive
Per410 Productivity: Positive
Per411 Technology and Infrastructure: Positive
Per412 Controlled Economy: Positive
Per413 Nationalisation: Positive
Per414 Economic Orthodoxy: Positive
Per415 Marxist Analysis: Positive
Per504 Welfare State Expansion: Positive
Per505 Welfare State Limitation: Positive
Per701 Labour Groups: Positive
Per702 Labour Groups: Negative
Cultural Issue Domain
Variable Description
Per103 Anti-Imperialism: Positive
Per104 Military: Positive
Per105 Military: Negative
Per106 Peace: Positive
Per107 Internationalism: Positive
Per109 Internationalism: Negative
Per201 Freedom and Human Rights: Positive
Per202 Democracy: Positive
Per305 Political Authority: Positive
Per416 Anti-Growth Economy: Positive
Per501 Environmental Protection: Positive
Per601 National Way of Life: Positive
Per602 National Way of Life: Negative
Per603 Traditional Morality: Positive
Per604 Traditional Morality: Negative
Per605 Law and Order: Positive
Per606 Social Harmony: Positive
Per607 Multiculturalism: Positive
Per608 Multiculturalism: Negative
Per705 Underprivileged Minority Groups: Positive
Note: Variables are taken from the MRG-CMP-MARPOR data (Volkens
et al., 2014). For a more extensive description of the variables, see the
manifesto project coding scheme at https://manifestoproject.wzb.
eu/coding_schemes/1.
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Wilson, 2002); perhaps because (potential) political conflicts originating from the
process of European integration can be approached in both cultural and economic
frames (Kitschelt, 2007, p.543).
The cultural issue domain constructed in this study overlaps with the “non-
economic issue dimensions” defined by Spies and Franzmann (2011) and Rovny
(2012) and uses similar categories as the “social domain” and the “social liberal-
conservative policy scale” as put forward by Tavits (2007) and Lowe et al. (2011),
respectively. The categories that relate to environmental and immigration issues
are chosen following recent studies (Spoon, Hobolt and de Vries, 2014; Abou-
Chadi, 2014; Alonso and Fonseca, 2011).
Figure 3.1 displays the distribution of the salience of the issue domains by
time period and by party type using box plots. Figure 3.1(a) shows the salience
of the economic and cultural issue domain for all parties. It shows how the politi-
cization of cultural issues lagged behind economic issues until the 1980s. The
cultural issue domain became especially important to parties in the 1990s, even
surpassing economic issues in importance. In recent years, economic issues have
become more apparent again. This general pattern of issue importance over time
is in accordance with most descriptions of the rise of ‘second dimension politics’
(Kitschelt, 1994; Flanagan and Lee, 2003; Green-Pedersen, 2007b).
Figure 3.1(b) and 3.1(c) present the salience of the economic and cultural
issue domain, respectively, broken down by party type. For mainstream parties,
economic issues tend to be more important; while challengers focus more on the
cultural issue domain.
The dependent variables in this study are the issue emphases of individual
parties of the economic and the cultural issue domain. Salience is measured by
summing up the degree of attention in party manifestos to the individual issue
categories.
Turning to the predictors, I follow Steenbergen and Scott (2004) and Green-
Pedersen and Mortensen (2014) in their operationalization of systemic salience as
the mean salience all parties in a given country in a given election put on an
issue domain, excluding the party under analysis. Hence, in a three-party system
for example, the systemic salience of an issue domain for party A is defined as
the mean salience level of parties B and C. Like Steenbergen and Scott (2004)
and Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2014), I refrain from using a vote-weighted
measure of systemic salience since this would assume that parties influence the
systemic salience of issues proportional to their vote share, a strong assumption in
European multi party system where smaller parties often enjoy significant agenda-
setting power. However, I re-estimate all models using a vote-weighted measure
of systemic salience. In this case, the salience parties put on an issue domain is
weighted by their vote share at election t− 1. The substantive results are robust to
this alternative operationalization of the systemic salience variable. Tables B.2, B.3
& B.4 in appendix B present the results of these analyses.
I distinguish between challenger and mainstream parties based on past expe-
rience in government (de Vries and Hobolt, 2012; Hobolt and de Vries, 2015). A
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Figure 3.1 – Salience of the Economic and Cultural Issue Domains in
Party Manifestos, 1950-2013
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Note: Figure (a) shows the salience of the economic and cultural issue domain
for all parties. Figure (b) displays the salience of the economic issue domain
for mainstream and challenger parties. Figure (c) displays the salience of the
cultural issue domain for mainstream and challenger parties
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challenger party is a party that has not previously held political office and turns
into a mainstream party once it enters a government coalition (see also van de
Wardt, de Vries and Hobolt, 2014; van de Wardt, 2015). Further, I distinguish be-
tween mainstream opposition and mainstream government parties: the first type has
governed in the past (and is, hence, a mainstream party) but was condemned to
opposition status in the period preceding the election at hand whereas the latter
type enters the election as an incumbent party.
The third independent variable, finally, concerns the intra party balance of
power. In line with other recent studies (Schumacher, de Vries and Vis, 2013; Wag-
ner and Meyer, 2014; Pedersen, 2012), I use two questions from the Laver and
Hunt (1992) expert survey6 that tap the power of party activists and party leaders
over party policy.7 The answers to both questions are scored on a scale ranging
from 0 (no influence at all) to 20 (a very great influence).8 I subtract the score indi-
cating the power of the activists from the score indicating the power of the party
leadership. This results in a intra party balance of power scale measuring to what
extent the leadership is unconstrained in deciding on the party’s policy course. I
rescale the index to run from 0 to 30, with higher scores indicating more power
for the leadership. The measure is time-invariant, so the assumption is that par-
ties do not change their organizational features dramatically over time. Harmel
and Janda (1994) have argued, in this respect, that parties are generally conserva-
tive organizations that are hesitant to change their internal rules and structures.
Moreover, intra-party rules for candidate selection, an important feature of party
organization, exhibit remarkable stability over time (Bille, 2001).9
Turning now to the control variables, all models include a variable measur-
ing vote change since past election results, especially vote losses at previous elec-
tion cycles, often induce parties to change their issue profiles (Somer-Topcu, 2009;
Budge, 1994; Budge, Ezrow and McDonald, 2010). The variable is operational-
ized as the difference between vote shares in successive elections and is lagged,
thus indicating vote differences between election t − 2 and t − 1.10 Information
about vote shares is taken from the Manifesto Project data. I also add party size
(a party’s vote share at the previous election) as a control variable.
Further, I control for ideological extremity, since parties that take relatively
extreme issue positions are likely to be less responsive to other parties. Studies
show how parties that are relative outliers on issue dimensions tend to emphasize
these issues as to publicize their extreme position more strongly (Rovny, 2012;
Wagner, 2012). Hence, they should be less concerned with changes in the sys-
temic salience of issues. I use Franzmann and Kaiser’s (2006) transformation of
6Harmel and Janda’s (1996) party change project is an alternative frequently used data source that
includes information on intra party politics. However, data is available for only four countries.
7The exact wording of the questions is: “assess the influence that party leaders have over the
formation of party policy” and “assess the influence that party activists have over the formation
of party policy”.
8The correlation between the two scales is −.72
9For a similar argument see Schumacher, de Vries and Vis (2013, p.470).
10Parties draft their election manifestos before election (t), their information on vote changes in
previous elections concerns the differences in vote shares between election t− 2 and t− 1.
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Table 3.2 – Operationalization of the Variables
Dependent variables Indicator Data source
Issue emphasis Sum of attention to cultural issue categories Own calculation
cultural issue domain (see table 3.1) Volkens et al. (2014)
Issue emphasis Sum of attention to economic issue categories Own calculation
economic issue domain (see table 3.1) Volkens et al. (2014)
Independent variables Indicator Data source
Systemic salience All other parties’ emphases on cultural issues, Own calculation
cultural issues excluding party under analysis Volkens et al. (2014)
Systemic salience All other parties’ emphases on economic issues, Own calculation
economic issues excluding party under analysis Volkens et al. (2014)
Challenger party Never in government before electiont , Data on government participation
otherwise 0 taken from Volkens et al. (2014)
Mainstream party Has been in government before electiont , Data on government participation
otherwise 0 taken from Volkens et al. (2014)
Mainstream government party Has been in government before electiont , Data on government participation
and in government in period taken from Volkens et al. (2014)
preceding electiont , otherwise 0
Mainstream opposition party Has been in government before electiont , Data on government participation
and not in government in period taken from Volkens et al. (2014)
preceding electiont , otherwise 0
Intra party balance of power Two expert survey questions: Laver and Hunt (1992)
(q1) influence party activists over party policy
(q2) influence party leaders over party policy
q2− q1+ lowest value
Control variables Indicator Data source
Party size Vote share electiont−1 Volkens et al. (2014)
Vote difference Vote share electiont−1 − Vote share electiont−2 Volkens et al. (2014)
Ideological extremity Extremity party position on left-right dimension Franzmann and Kaiser (2006)
|party position−midpoint o f scale|
GDP GDP growth rate one year before electiont the World Bank (2015)
the MRG-CMP-MARPOR data to infer parties’ ideological positions. It is beyond
the scope of this chapter to engage with the extensive debates on how to use the
Manifesto Project data to correctly infer party policy positions (see for example
Budge and Meyer, 2013; Lowe et al., 2011). It suffices to say that the Franzmann-
Kaiser method attempts to incorporate such arguments that the meaning of policy
positions, for example in terms of left and right, differs across time and space
(Benoit and Laver, 2006); and offers time- and country-specific estimates. The
Franzmann-Kaiser data set includes parties’ ideological positions on an economic
and on a socio-cultural dimension, with scores running from 0 to 10. Ideological
extremity is then estimated as the absolute difference between a party’s position
and the midpoint of the scale. The new measure thus runs from 0 to 5, with higher
scores indicating more extreme positions. For the models predicting the salience
of the economic issue domain, I use the ideological scores on the economic dimen-
sion while the models examining the cultural issue domain include, accordingly,
positional scores on the socio-cultural dimension.
All models also control for GDP growth, serving as a proxy for the degree
of post-materialism in a society. The higher the degree of post-materialism, the
more parties should focus on non-economic concerns. Drawing on data from the
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Table 3.3 – Descriptive Statistics
All Parties n Mean Sd Min Max
∆Salience cultural issues 1,636 −0.053 11.840 −73.289 57.120
∆Salience economic issues 1,636 0.723 12.278 −75.000 54.440
∆Systemic salience cultural issues 1,636 0.342 6.971 −26.550 28.998
∆Systemic salience economic issues 1,636 0.441 6.666 −20.683 27.350
Party sizet−1 1,636 15.808 13.528 0.000 54.373
Ideological extremity (cultural) 1,417 1.690 1.145 0.004 5.000
Ideological extremity (economic) 1,514 2.044 1.257 0.001 5.000
Vote difference 1,433 −0.059 4.030 −18.595 22.731
Intra party balance of power 1,408 18.306 5.357 0.000 29.630
GDP 1,547 2.815 2.625 -5.185 13.561
Dichotomous variable %
Challenger party (cp/mainstream) 1,895 43.06%
Mainstream Parties n Mean Sd Min Max
∆Salience cultural issues 1,040 0.348 11.985 −73.289 55.700
∆Salience economic issues 1,040 0.375 12.816 −75.000 54.440
∆Systemic salience cultural issues 1,040 0.478 7.214 −26.550 28.419
∆Systemic salience economic issues 1,040 0.479 6.703 −20.300 27.350
Party sizet−1 1,040 20.533 13.921 0.712 54.373
Ideological extremity (cultural) 852 1.439 1.034 0.004 5.000
Ideological extremity (economic) 914 1.831 1.155 0.006 5.000
Vote difference 985 −0.213 4.406 −18.595 22.731
Intra party balance of power 926 18.593 4.502 4.080 27.430
GDP 1,547 2.815 2.625 -5.185 13.561
Dichotomous variable %
Mainstream opposition party (opp/gov) 1,079 42.08%
World Bank (2015), I use the the percentage of change in GDP growth rate one
year before the election.
The data set includes information on 259 political parties in 18 European
democracies between 1950 and 2013.11 Table 3.3 presents descriptive statistics; an
overview of the operationalization of the variables is shown in table 3.2.
3.4 Model Specification
I estimate a series of models in first differences, which allow for analyzing the direct
association between shifts in issue emphases of individual parties and changes in
the systemic salience of issue domains. This model specification is similar as in
Steenbergen and Scott (2004), who assess the association between the salience in-
dividual parties attach to European integration matters and the systemic salience
of the issue. The dependent variable is the change in the degree of attention to an
issue domain at the current election compared to the previous election. I label this
11The following countries are included: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Great-Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
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variable
[
∆Salience cultural [economic] issues
]
. The key predictors are
[
∆Systemic
salience cultural [economic] issues
]
, denoting changes in the systemic salience of
issue domains between election t and election t − 1, [Challenger party (CP)],[
Mainstream opposition party (MOP)
]
and
[
intra party balance of power (IPBP)
]
. I
estimate three models. The first model includes all parties and serves to exam-
ine the difference between mainstream and challenger parties. The second model
includes mainstream parties only in order to examine the differences between
mainstream government and mainstream opposition parties. The third model as-
sesses the role of the intra party balance of power, and includes all parties. The
specification of the three core models is as follows:
∆Salience cultural [economic] issuesi,t =
β0 + β1
[
∆Systemic saliencei,t
]
+ β2
[
CPi,t
]
+ β3
[
CPi,t × ∆Systemic saliencei,t
]
+
[
controls
]
+ ei,t
(3.1)
∆Salience cultural [economic] issuesi,t =
β0 + β1
[
∆Systemic saliencei,t
]
+ β2
[
MOPi,t
]
+ β3
[
MOPi,t × ∆Systemic saliencei,t
]
+
[
controls
]
+ ei,t
(3.2)
∆Salience cultural [economic] issuesi,t =
β0 + β1
[
∆Systemic saliencei,t
]
+ β2
[
IPBPi
]
+ β3
[
IPBPi × ∆Systemic saliencei,t
]
+
[
controls
]
+ ei,t
(3.3)
where subscript i denotes parties and t indicates time (election year). To illustrate
the dependent variables in the models, figure 3.2 depicts their distributions.
The normal distributions of the dependent variables allow for model spec-
ifications building on the use of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. How-
ever, due to the time-series-cross-sectional (TSCS) structure of the data (the data is
treated as pooled time-series with parties being the cross-sectional units that vary
over time), several problems related to dependencies in the error terms might
arise. Specifically, it is likely that variances in error terms differ across parties
(‘panel heteroskedasticity’); the errors terms of different parties in the same elec-
tion year might correlate (‘contemporaneous correlation’); and there is possible
correlation between the error terms of subsequent election years within the same
party (‘serial correlation’). Several tests indeed indicate the presence of these types
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Figure 3.2 – Distribution of Changes in Salience of the Economic and
Cultural Issue Domains
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Note: Figure (a) shows the distribution of changes in the salience of the economic issue domain.
Figure (b) displays the distribution of changes in the salience of the cultural issue domain. The
shaded area under the solid line indicates the Kernel density plot.
of correlation in the data.12 Accounting for panel heteroskedasticity and con-
temporaneous correlation, panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs) are calculated
(Beck and Katz, 1995, 1996). Further, a Prais-Winsten feasible generalized least
squares (FGLS) procedure is used. Recent studies tend to prefer this solution to
address the panel specific AR(1) error structure over the inclusion of a lagged
dependent variable, as the latter is likely to introduce biases in the estimates
(Plu¨mper, Troeger and Manow, 2005; Achen, 2000). Fisher-type Phillips-Perron
unit root tests (Choi, 2001) ensure that the dependent and independent variables
are stationary.13 Finally, I add country dummies to the right-hand side of the
equation to eliminate country specific heterogeneity.14
12A Wooldridge test (Wooldridge, 2002; Drukker, 2003) was used to detect the presence of serial
correlation in the data and a modified Wald test (Greene, 2000; Baum, 2001) suggested rejection of
the null-hypothesis of no groupwise heteroskedasticity. The panels in the data are too unbalanced
to perform a Pesaran test for contemporaneous correlation (Pesaran, 2004; de Hoyos and Sarafidis,
2006). Nevertheless, the estimation technique addresses this type of autocorrelation.
13I resort to the Fisher-type tests since conventional unit root tests (for example the augmented
Dickey-Fuller test) are unavailable for unbalanced panel data structures
14I refrain from including party-level fixed effects since the theoretical interest of the chapter is to
examine differences across party types within countries.
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3.4.1 Reverse Causality & Omitted Variable Bias
Two potential problems arise with this design. The first relates to reverse causal-
ity. As noted by Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009), the statistical modelling of
interaction in party competition comes with methodological challenges because
of parties’ reciprocal influence on one another. Green-Pedersen and Mortensen
(2014, p.7) explain: “how does one determine that attention to issue i of party
A at time t is influenced by attention to issue i of party B at time t and not the
other way around?” Both Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2014) and Adams and
Somer-Topcu (2009) opt for a model specification in which only lagged explana-
tory variables are included. However, the hypotheses put forward in this chapter
explicate associations between changes in the issue attention of individual par-
ties and changes in the systemic salience of issue domains. Green-Pedersen and
Mortensen (2014), by contrast, deal with levels of issue attention and not with
change variables. Lagging the change variables would imply that changes in the
systemic salience of issue domains between t− 2 and t− 1 affect changes in indi-
vidual parties’ issue attention from t− 1 to t. Since we are dealing with election
years, time t − 2 will usually be around 6 to 8 years prior to time t, which will
make an association between the two rather unlikely.
Therefore, I follow Steenbergen and Scott (2004) in their choice of model
specification and refrain from including lagged explanatory variables. Instead, I
model the direct association between changes (from t − 1 to t) in parties’ issue
emphases and the systemic salience of issue domains. I address the possibility of
reverse causality – that is, the possibility that a shift in the issue emphasis of an
individual party leads to a response of all the other parties in the system, thereby
increasing the systemic salience of an issue domain – by running a simple Granger
reverse causality model (Sargent, 1976). This involves using the dependent vari-
able at t − 1 to predict the independent variable at t.15 Table B.1 in appendix B
presents the results of these analyses. In five cases, the dependent variable at t− 1
has a statistically significant effect on the independent variable at time t, which
would imply reverse causality. However, the models denote in these cases, as in all
cases, a negative estimated coefficient. This weakens the case of reverse causality,
since the hypotheses derived above explicate a positive effect of systemic salience
on individual party issue emphasis. Hence, if the empirical analysis confirms the
hypotheses (i.e. exposes positive effects of systemic salience), reverse causality
constitutes a bias against the results.
A second problem concerns omitted variable bias. A possible positive rela-
tionship between individual parties’ issue emphases and the systemic salience of
issue domains might, in fact, be driven by exogenous influences such as political
crises (i.e. an economic crisis) or, most notably, by changes in public opinion. With
regard to the latter, this would mean that an increase in attention to economic or
cultural issues among voters might cause parties to change their issue agendas.
Studies show, in this respect, how especially mainstream parties respond to shifts
15See Abou-Chadi (2014, p.13-14), who follows a similar procedure to assess reverse causality.
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in voters’ attitudes (Adams et al., 2004, 2006; Ezrow et al., 2011). One possible way
to alleviate this problem is to include a measure of the salience of economic and
cultural among voters as a control variable. Spoon, Hobolt and de Vries (2014)
opt for such an approach when investigating the salience of environmental issues
in party platforms.16 Here, I follow Abou-Chadi (2014) and refrain from includ-
ing such a variable since the salience of policy issues among voters is highly en-
dogenous to the process under investigation: changes in parties’ issue emphases.
Indeed, as Abou-Chadi (2014) argues, the issue emphases of political elites de-
termine to a large extent which policy issues are regarded as pressing among
electorates. This does not rule out the possibility that other exogenous influences,
such as economic crises, have an impact on both changes in the systemic salience
of (economic) issue domains and parties’ issue attention, although the inclusion
of the GDP growth variable captures, at least partially, such effects.
3.5 Results
The hypotheses posit expectations regarding the differences between challenger
and mainstream parties and between mainstream parties in- and out-of-office. In
the first step of the analysis, therefore, I estimate models predicting party issue
emphases including all parties (models 1-4) and including mainstream parties
only (models 5-8). Table 3.4 reports the results of the regression analyses for
models 1-4.
Models 1 and 2 predict parties’ emphases on issues pertaining to the cultural
issue domain. Because of the inclusion of the interaction terms, the coefficients for
the variables indicating changes in systemic salience denote the effects for main-
stream parties. The models suggest support for the hypothesis that there is an
association between mainstream parties’ issue appeals and the systemic salience
of issue domains: the estimated coefficients (β = 0.38; β = 0.46) are positive and
statistically significant. Model 2 implies that a 1 percentage point increase in the
systemic salience of cultural issues is associated, on average and all else equal,
with a .46 percentage point increase in the importance of these issues in a main-
stream party’s election manifesto. Model 3 and 4, predicting economic issue em-
phasis, yield similar results: the coefficients for the systemic salience variables
(β = 0.45; β = 0.52) are positive and statistically significant.
The interaction terms between the systemic salience variable and the chal-
lenger party variable are included in order to evaluate the hypothesis that chal-
lengers are less responsive to rival parties than are mainstream parties. The neg-
ative sign of the estimated coefficients indicates support for this hypothesis. The
effects are robust to the inclusion of the control variables, although the interactive
term in model 2 is only significant at the 10% level.
Table 3.5 reports the results of the regression analyses for models 5-8, includ-
ing mainstream parties only. Because of the inclusion of the interaction terms, the
16Spoon, Hobolt and de Vries (2014, p.377, footnote 11) note that excluding this variable from the
models results in virtually similar results.
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Table 3.4 – Pooled Time Series Regressions of Changes in Parties’ Issue
Emphases, 1950-2013
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
cultural cultural economic economic
issues issues issues issues
(Constant) −0.1191 0.1944 −0.3228 0.6079
(0.4951) (0.8404) (0.3641) (0.8818)
∆Systemic salience 0.3824∗∗∗ 0.4601∗∗∗ 0.4477∗∗∗ 0.5183∗∗∗
(0.0281) (0.0362) (0.0365) (0.0346)
Challenger Party (CP) −0.9333∗∗∗ −0.3504 0.7283∗∗∗ 0.4775
(0.2164) (0.2177) (0.2340) (0.4218)
CP×∆Systemic salience −0.0884∗∗ −0.0912∗ −0.2756∗∗∗ −0.3576∗∗∗
(0.0397) (0.0536) (0.0444) (0.0540)
Party size 0.0037 −0.0060
(0.0134) (0.0151)
Ideological extremity −0.4418∗∗∗ 0.0191
(0.1356) (0.1407)
Vote change −0.0143 0.0703
(0.0383) (0.0462)
GDP 0.1312∗∗∗ −0.1608∗∗
(0.0456) (0.0697)
N 1636 937 1636 1003
Wald 713.4413 4107.5688 381.9127 708.8637
Note: Prais-Winsten regression coefficients with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses
and country dummies (not shown in table). ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests).
coefficients for the variables indicating changes in systemic salience denote the
effects for mainstream parties in government. The models indicate that adjust-
ments in the issue profiles of mainstream parties in government are associated
with shifts in the systemic salience of issue domains. The estimated coefficients
for the systemic salience variable across all four models are positive and statisti-
cally significant. The interaction terms denote negative estimated effects, in line
with the expectation that mainstream parties in opposition are less responsive
to issue salience shifts in the party system agenda than are incumbent parties.
The effects with regard to the cultural issue domain are statistically significant
(β = −0.11; β = −0.16). Regarding the economic issue domain, the effects are
negative (β = −0.06; β = −0.04) but fail to reach statistical significance.
Figure 3.3 summarizes the estimated coefficients for the interaction terms
graphically by plotting the marginal effect of the systemic salience variable across
the different party types. Plots (a) and (b) show the effects for mainstream and
challenger parties. As becomes clear from figure 3.3(a), the difference between
mainstream and challenger parties concerning the effect of systemic salience on
the cultural issue domain is not statistically significant at the 95% level. This dif-
ference is, however, statistically significant at the 90% level, as can be inferred
from table 3.4. The models suggest a statistically significant difference (at the 95%
level) between challengers and mainstream parties with regard to the economic
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Table 3.5 – Pooled Time Series Regressions of Changes in Mainstream
Parties’ Issue Emphases, 1950-2013
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
cultural cultural economic economic
issues issues issues issues
(Constant) −0.6917 −0.2331 −0.1381 1.9676
(0.5158) (1.1138) (0.3336) (1.5598)
∆Systemic salience 0.4005∗∗∗ 0.5086∗∗∗ 0.4742∗∗∗ 0.5115∗∗∗
(0.0286) (0.0415) (0.0231) (0.0523)
Mainstream Opposition Party (MOP) 0.4856 1.2659∗∗ −0.2313 −0.9237∗
(0.3456) (0.5097) (0.3409) (0.4978)
MOP×∆Systemic salience −0.1125∗∗ −0.1566∗∗ −0.0624 −0.0375
(0.0488) (0.0620) (0.0486) (0.0818)
Party size −0.0053 −0.0065
(0.0149) (0.0180)
Ideological extremity 0.1797 −0.1079
(0.1996) (0.1976)
Vote difference −0.0380 0.0800
(0.0544) (0.0555)
GDP 0.1649∗∗ −0.3002∗∗∗
(0.0790) (0.1028)
N 1040 647 1040 696
Wald 44528.3920 422.8901 2500.3455 242.6774
Note: Prais-Winsten regression coefficients with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses
and country dummies (not shown in table). ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests).
issue domain. Although there is a positive association between issue emphases
and an increase in systemic salience for both types of parties, that is: they both
increase their emphases on economic issues when the systemic salience of the
issue domain increases, the magnitude of the effects is different. The models sug-
gest that the association between mainstream parties’ issue attention and systemic
salience shifts is more than three times as strong when compared to the association
between systemic salience shifts and challenger parties’ issue salience.
Turning to the different effects for mainstream parties in- and out of office,
as presented by plots (c) and (d), the models suggest a small difference on the
cultural issue domain. The association between mainstream government parties’
(MGPs) issue attention and increases in the systemic salience of cultural issues
seems to be more pronounced as compared to the association between systemic
salience changes and mainstream opposition parties’ (MOPs) shifts in issue at-
tention. The difference is significant at the 95% level. The models do not find
differences between the two types of parties with respect to the economic issue
domain.
In the second step of the analysis, I evaluate the intra party politics hypoth-
esis. To that end, a series of models is estimated including, again, all parties and
the variable measuring the intra party balance of power. Table 3.6 presents the
results of the regression analyses.
Models 9-12 offer support for the notion that parties in which activists are
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Figure 3.3 – Marginal Effects of Changes in Systemic Salience of Issue
Domains for Challenger vs Mainstream parties and
Mainstream Opposition vs Mainstream Government Parties
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(b) Economic issues
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(d) Economic issues
Note: The figures show marginal effect plots with 95% confidence intervals. The marginal
effect plots (a) and (b) are constructed using coefficient estimates from table 3.5, model 2 & model
4. Plots (c) and (d) are based on coefficient estimates from table 3.5, model 6 and model 8. The
y-axes depict the marginal effect of the systemic salience variables, the x-axes depict the different
party types: mainstream vs challenger, plots (a) and (b); and mainstream opposition party (MOP)
vs mainstream government party (MGP), plots (c) and (d).
powerful (i.e. with a score of ‘0’ on the intra party balance of power scale) make
salience adjustments in their issue profiles in accordance with shifts in systemic
salience, as the estimated coefficients for the systemic salience variables are posi-
tive and statistically significant across the models.
To examine the expectation that parties in which leaders are dominant are
more responsive to the issue appeals of rival parties than are parties in which
activists are dominant, an interaction term between the systemic salience variable
and the intra party balance of power variable is included. With regard to the
models predicting issue emphasis on the cultural issue domain (models 9-10), the
estimated coefficients of the interaction terms are negative, implying that parties
in which leaders are powerful are less responsive to competitors than parties in
which activists have more of a say. With regard to the economic issue domain,
this seems to be the other way around. Models 11-12 imply a positive interactive
effect: leadership-dominated parties are more responsive to systemic salience shifts
than activist-dominated parties.
Examining the significance and the direction of the interaction term alone is,
however, likely to result in an incorrect assessment of the interactive relationship
between variables (Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006). Hence, the marginal effects
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Table 3.6 – Pooled Time Series Regressions of Changes in Parties’ Issue
Emphases, 1950-2013
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
cultural cultural economic economic
issues issues issues issues
(Constant) −0.3483 0.3961 −0.9445 0.5248
(0.9333) (1.1150) (1.1369) (1.5538)
∆Systemic salience 0.4904∗∗∗ 0.8076∗∗∗ 0.3914∗∗∗ 0.2397∗∗
(0.1250) (0.1559) (0.0984) (0.1132)
Intra Party Balance of Power (IPBP) 0.0599∗ 0.0266 −0.0161 0.0197
(0.0347) (0.0381) (0.0294) (0.0364)
IPBP×∆Systemic salience −0.0028 −0.0158∗ 0.0020 0.0108∗
(0.0066) (0.0082) (0.0055) (0.0062)
Challenger Party (CP) −1.1729∗∗∗ −0.1021 0.6415∗ 0.9397∗
(0.3583) (0.5043) (0.3653) (0.5343)
Party size 0.0085 −0.0062
(0.0178) (0.0180)
Ideological extremity −0.1437 −0.0635
(0.1894) (0.1760)
Vote difference −0.0216 0.0797
(0.0501) (0.0513)
GDP −0.0408 −0.2126∗∗
(0.1039) (0.1042)
N 1293 816 1293 874
Wald 218.3708 258.2656 184.4954 166.0660
Note: Prais-Winsten regression coefficients with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses and
country dummies (not shown in table). ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests).
plots in figure 3.4 graphically illustrate how the marginal effects of the systemic
salience variable change across different values of the intra party balance of power
scale.
Figure 3.4 displays how the effects of systemic salience across the intra party
balance of power scale differ for the two issue domains. The decreasing slope of
the marginal effects plot in figure 3.4(a) indicates that parties become less respon-
sive to systemic salience shifts as leaders become more powerful. By contrast, the
increasing slope of the marginal effects plot in figure 3.4(b) indicates that the es-
timated effect of systemic salience increases for parties in which the leadership is
more powerful. For activist-dominated parties (i.e. a score of ‘0’ on the intra party
balance of power scale), a 1 percentage point shift in the systemic salience of the
economic issue domain corresponds with about a 0.2 percentage point shift in the
emphasis such a party places on economic issues, on average and all else equal.
The magnitude of the effect for parties in which the leadership is dominant (i.e.
the maximum score on the intra party balance of power scale) is, on average and
ceteris paribus, about 0.5 percentage point.
Turning to the control variables, the effects of the GDP growth variable are
worth mentioning. In all models, except for model 10, it has a positive and sta-
tistically significant effect on parties’ attention to cultural issues. Hence, if the
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Figure 3.4 – Marginal Effects of Changes in Systemic Salience on
Parties’ Issue Salience across Different Levels of Intra Party
Balance of Power
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(a) Cultural issues
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(b) Economic issues
Note: The marginal effects plots are constructed using coefficient estimates
from table 3.6, model 10 & model 12. The y-axis depicts the marginal effect
of the systemic salience variable on issue emphasis across different levels
of intra-party balance of power, the shaded areas reflect 90% and 95% confi-
dence intervals. The tick marks on the x-axis indicate individual observations
for the intra party balance of power variable.
economy is doing well, parties shift focus and highlight cultural issues. With re-
gard to the economic issue domain, the effects are the other way around: parties
increase the salience they attach to economic matters when GDP growth rates are
decreasing. These findings are in line with other recent work that shows how
parties increase their emphasis on economic issues when the economy is doing
poorly (Williams, Seki and Whitten, 2016).
All in all, the empirical analyses offer some degree of support for the core
expectations as put forward in this chapter. Parties that have not been in gov-
ernment before (i.e. challenger parties) respond less strongly to changes in the
systemic salience of issue domains than do parties that have experience in gov-
ernment. However, this effect seems to be most pronounced with regard to the
economic issue domain. Further, the evidence presented here seems to suggest
that mainstream parties in government are somewhat more responsive to com-
petitor parties than are mainstream opposition parties, although this is mainly the
case on the cultural issue domain. In addition, intra party politics is suggested
to have, indeed, a conditioning effect on issue responsiveness: if party leaders are
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powerful, parties respond stronger to the growing importance of economic issues
in the party system, if activists are powerful the response is less pronounced. With
regard to the cultural issue domain, this effect seems to be the other way around.
3.6 Discussion
This chapter argues that the extent to which political parties respond to the issue
appeals of competitors is affected by their competitive position in the party system
and by the internal balance of power between leaders and activists. The findings
presented here have several implications.
First, the findings as presented in this chapter offer support for the thesis
that issue competition in European party systems is, to a large extent, character-
ized by issue engagement. This study suggests that the systemic salience of issue
domains is associated with individual parties’ issue attention. This result is in line
with accounts describing the emergence of party system agendas. Green-Pedersen
and Mortensen (2010, 2014) have shown that, in Denmark, parties’ issue profiles
exhibit a strong ‘common agenda component’. Likewise, Steenbergen and Scott
(2004, p.188) argue that “systemic salience [...] serves as an important constraint
on parties” when it comes to the salience they attach to European integration is-
sues. Here, it is shown that parties take into account the degree of salience that
other parties allocate to broader issue categories when devising their own salience
strategies. Hence, the argument that parties’ systemically respond to the issue at-
tention of their competitors is shown to hold beyond the Danish case and beyond
the issue of European integration. Moreover, previous work on party interaction in
issue competition focused mainly on the distinction between opposition and gov-
ernment parties (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2014). This chapter maintains
that is important to distinguish between opposition parties that have previously
been in office and opposition parties that have never gained access to office (chal-
lenger parties). As such, it adds the insight that the threefold distinction between
challenger, mainstream opposition and mainstream government parties captures
differences in the extent to which parties respond to the issue appeals of their
rivals.
The argument that issue engagement characterizes issue salience strategies
represents an important theoretical innovation. Traditional theories have long fo-
cused on parties’ incentives to differentiate themselves from their competitors by
selectively emphasizing issues on which they dominate while downplaying the
importance of issues that might benefit competitors. By going beyond the in-
centives for individual parties to campaign on selected issues, important new
questions come to the fore, a crucial one being related to variation in the de-
gree of responsiveness across parties. This chapter’s findings indicate that party
type (challenger versus mainstream) and internal organizational structures (lead-
ers versus activists) affect the extent to which parties respond to one another, and
they represent, as such, a first attempt to address such questions.
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The finding that parties systematically respond to the issue attention of com-
petitors also has normative implications. Issue engagement in election campaigns
should help voters reach informed electoral decision (Damore, 2005; Sigelman and
Buell, 2004; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2014). If parties ‘talk about the same
issues’ it should, for exampe, become easier for voters to observe differences be-
tween their proposed policy solutions. Hence, the results presented here suggest
that parties’ strategic position in the party system – as being a mainstream or chal-
lenger party – and parties’ internal organizational structures affect the probability
that election campaigns are characterized by issue engagement.
Moreover, the findings presented in this chapter have implications for our
understanding of the politicization of non-economic issues. Although such issues
have generally been on the rise in western European party systems over the last
couple of decades, there is considerable variation across time and space in the ex-
tent to which the ‘second dimension of politics’ has been politicized. As Tavits and
Potter (2015, p.1) note: “our understanding of why this second dimension might
be more salient on the agendas of some parties rather than others – or in some
elections rather than in others – lags behind our understanding of party position
taking on a generalized left-right dimension.” The evidence in this chapter cor-
roborates other studies that perceive challenger parties to be the initiators of issue
politicization (de Vries and Hobolt, 2012; Hobolt and de Vries, 2015). Challengers,
it is suggested in this chapter, push forward their own agenda, which tends to be
more focused on cultural issues, and largely ignore shifts in the systemic salience
of the economic issue domain.
Further, this chapter relates to a literature on the role of intra party poli-
tics. Increasingly, empirical studies of party behaviour go beyond the restrictive
assumption that party leaders are unconstrained in setting party policy decisions,
and acknowledge that parties are political coalitions in which diverging opinions
and preferences are united (see also Hertner, 2015). The results in this chapter
suggest that party organization mediates the degree of responsiveness to shifts in
the systemic salience of issue domains. As such, it speaks to other recent work that
consider party organization to be a conditional variable when explaining (changes
in) issue agendas (Schumacher, de Vries and Vis, 2013; Wagner and Meyer, 2014;
de Sio and Weber, 2014).
The findings here also give rise to several questions, a crucial one being
related to the fact that some of the effects differ across issue domains. How to
explain, for example, the diverging effects of intra party politics when compar-
ing the economic and the cultural issue domain? Previous research implies, in
this respect, that parties are generally hesitant to politicize issues that fall outside
of the main dimension of political contest, which is in western Europe mainly
based on economic issues (Benoit and Laver, 2006). The potential political costs
of politicizing non-economic issues are significant since parties’ electorates tend
to be divided on these issues (van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008; Bale et al.,
2010), giving parties an incentive to de-emphasize those issues (van de Wardt,
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2014b). Moreover, politicizing non-economic issues risks parties’ coalition poten-
tial (Green-Pedersen, 2012) and might benefit issue entrepreneurs promoting such
issues (Meguid, 2005). As such, promoting the cultural issue domain is likely to
negatively impact parties’ vote- and office-seeking motivations, which especially
compromises the positions of party leaders. This could explain why parties in
which leaders are powerful seem to respond less strongly to shifts in the systemic
salience of the cultural issue domain, and more strongly to shifts in the importance
of the economic issue domain. Future research on the important topic of party in-
teraction in issue competition should further develop this line of argumentation.
4Appealing Broadly or Narrowing Down?
Explaining the Scope of Parties’ Issue Agendas
?Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the European Graduate Network Conference (2015, Flo-
rence) and at the Joint Sessions of Workshops of the European Consortium for Political Research (2015, War-
saw). I thank Nicolas Sauger, Laura Stephenson, Lawrence Ezrow, Hans Keman, Michael Marsh, Christoffer
Green-Pedersen, Daniel Bischof, Gijs Schumacher, Tarik Abou-Chadi, Ruth Dassonneville, Fabio Wolkenstein,
Ann-Kristin Ko¨lln, Nicolas Merz, Holger Do¨ring, Koen Damhuis, Denis Cohen, Julia Partheymu¨ller, Thomas
Maruhn & Jelle Koedam for their valuable comments.
?A revised version of this chapter has been published as:
Van Heck, Sjoerd (2016) “Appealing Broadly or Narrowing Down? The Impact of Government
Experience and Party Organization on the Scope of Parties’ Issue Agendas”
Party Politics, Published Online before Print July 5, 2016.
doi: 10.1177/1354068816657374
58
Chapter 4. Appealing Broadly or Narrowing Down? 59
“ Forget about those on the left who say I shouldn’t talk about Europe,crime or lower taxes or those on the right who say I shouldn’t talk about
the NHS, the environment or wellbeing. That is a false choice and one I
will note make. ”
David Cameron, Leader of the British Conservative Party, 2007
In September 2007, David Cameron addressed an audience of party candidates and activists
in London. He responded to critics from both wings of his party, arguing that he would not
make a “false choice” between talking about traditional party issues and issues that would
modernize the party. He insisted on his strategy of increasing the scope of the Conservative
Party’s agenda by emphasizing both traditional and new issues in order to move the party
back to the center ground of British politics.1
4.1 Introduction
What explains the dynamics of parties’ issue attention strategies? Moststudies examine increases or decreases in the salience of specific (groupsof) issues (see for example Meguid, 2005; van de Wardt, 2015). This
chapter takes a different approach and considers parties’ entire issue profile. It
explores how the dynamics of issue attention diversity can be explained. Issue at-
tention diversity refers to the scope of parties’ policy agendas: do parties present
a rather broad and encompassing agenda to voters, or do they narrow down their
attention focusing on a few issues they deem important? This is an important
question since the shape of an agenda influences the choices made from it (Riker,
1993a).
Nevertheless, there has been only limited attention for issue attention diver-
sity in empirical studies of party competition. Hobolt, Klemmensen and Pickup
(2008) have studied ‘issue diversity’ in speeches of political leaders, but only in
two countries (Britain and Denmark). Other studies consider ‘issue diversifica-
tion’ a vote-seeking strategy. Thus, by increasing the scope of their agenda, par-
ties aim at appealing to a broader electorate and hope to become more ‘catch all’
1The quote is taken from Bale (2011, p.349). In September 2007, Cameron was leading the Conser-
vative Party in its opposition to the Labour government. One newspaper described his efforts to
modernize his party by “bringing gay rights, the environment and a more emotional tone to the
Tory agenda” (the Economist, 2015). For accounts of Cameron’s strategy of moving his party to
the center by combining new and traditional issues, see Bale (2011, chapter 7) and Green (2011).
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(Somer-Topcu, 2015; Lacewell, 2013). However, in some instances it might be ra-
tional for parties to decrease their issue diversity and pursue core vote strategies
(Green, 2011). Hence, an assessment of the dynamics of issue attention diversity
should take into account movement in both directions: increasing and decreasing
the scope of the agenda. Greene (2015) presents evidence that issue diversity is
linked to the state of the economy: government parties present, generally speak-
ing, broader agendas than do opposition parties as to defend their record in office;
but when the economy is performing well they narrow down their agenda in order
to emphasize their performance.
This chapter aims to contribute to our understanding of the dynamics of par-
ties’ issue attention diversity by employing Greene (2015) concept of the effective
number of manifesto issues (ENMI). It departs from previous studies by high-
lighting two aspects. First, it argues that the crucial distinction is not between op-
position and government parties, but rather between challenger and mainstream
parties, as this latter distinction more adequately describes parties’ relative com-
petitive positions in multi-party systems. Second, intraparty politics, specfically
the balance of power between party activists and party leaders, affects the scope
of parties’ issue agendas.
This first argument reflects the assumption that political losers, understood
here as challenger parties, want to change the status quo of politics by actively
seeking and promoting new lines of conflict (i.e. new issues) (Carmines and Stim-
son, 1986). As they need to focus most of their attention on these issues as to
move them to the top of the party system agenda, they will present confined
and specific policy agendas. Previous research has demonstrated how challenger
parties adopt issue entrepreneurial strategies and seek to politicize European in-
tegration issues (de Vries and Hobolt, 2012; Hobolt and de Vries, 2015; van de
Wardt, 2015). This chapter considers a party’s platform as a whole and argues
that non-governing challenger parties also respond to their unfavourable position
by presenting narrow issue agendas. Mainstream parties, on the other hand, seek
to reinforce existing patterns of competition and distribute their issue attention
broadly.
The second argument highlights the notion that there is a struggle over issue
strategies within parties. Party activists want the party to focus on its core issues.
The leadership of the party, however, is tempted by the potential electoral gains of
a strategy of issue diversification that reaches out to many different constituencies
(Somer-Topcu, 2015). Thus, parties in which leaders are dominant should have a
broader issue profile than parties in which activists have more of a say. Pooled
time series analyses of the issue attention diversity of parties from 18 European
countries between 1950 and 2013 lend support to these theoretical propositions.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, the literature on
issue-competition and party organization is briefly discussed after which hypothe-
ses on issue attention diversity are derived. Second, data sources, operationaliza-
tion of the variables of interest and the estimation technique are discussed. After
Chapter 4. Appealing Broadly or Narrowing Down? 61
presenting and discussing the empirical results the chapter closes with highlight-
ing the implications of its findings and sketching possible avenues for further
research.
4.2 The Politics of Issue Attention Diversity
Not only what positions to take on issues, but also which issues to emphasize
and which to ignore, and how many issues to address, are key decisions for parti-
san elites in election campaigns. Adjusting the salience of issues might even be a
more attractive strategy for parties since positional changes come with costs: party
supporters might be alienated, activists might disagree with the new policy course
and voters might perceive it as opportunistic flip-flopping.2 Increasing or decreas-
ing the importance of issues in parties’ communication to the public seems more
straightforward and less likely to endanger a party’s reputation. Studies indeed
show how parties downplay the salience of an issue if, for example, the party’s
base is divided on that issue (van de Wardt, 2014b; Steenbergen and Scott, 2004).
Issue salience decisions are as much a part of the strategic toolkit of parties as
issue positioning (see for example Meguid, 2005; Wagner and Meyer, 2014; Meyer
and Wagner, 2013).
The process of issue selection goes at the core of such salience strategies. It
implies that parties must decide (1) how many issues to select for the campaign
and (2) which issues that will be (Aragone`s, Castanheira and Giani, 2015). These
questions are, arguably, interrelated and the literature suggests two alternative
issue selection strategies.
First, parties may choose to present a specific and focused agenda, confining
their attention to a few issues on which they have a clear advantage. This view is
informed by salience theory, which argues that politicians ‘selectively emphasize’
issues that are favorable to them while deemphasizing issues that might harm
them (Budge and Farlie, 1983; Robertson, 1976) – a logic Riker (1993b) formalized
in the principles of dominance and dispersion.3 A party stands to gain from a certain
issue (it can dominate on an issue) when it succeeds to establish ‘ownership’, for
example because it has a track record of successfully handling the issue when in
government (Petrocik, 1996). An idea that is closely related to this is the ‘core vote
strategy’, which in terms of issue salience implies that parties focus on issues of
interest to the party base rather than the electorate at large (Green, 2011, p.736).
Second, parties may broaden their focus and present a diverse agenda in-
cluding many different issues, as they face incentives to go beyond addressing
their core issues. Issue ownership is not fixed; it is a dynamic process rather than
a stable condition (Seeberg, 2014; Walgrave, Lefevere and Nuytemans, 2009) and
2Moreover, a debate has emerged as to what extent voters actually perceive parties’ positional
changes; see Adams, Ezrow and Somer-Topcu (2011) and Fernandez-Vazquez (2014).
3According to Riker (1993b, p.81-82), the principles of dominance and dispersion guide the rhetor-
ical efforts of politicians. The dominance principle holds that when one side successfully wins
the argument, the other side ignores the issue whereas the winner continues to exploit it. The
principle of dispersion states that when both sides fail to win the argument on an issue, both sides
will cease to discuss it and search for another issue.
Chapter 4. Appealing Broadly or Narrowing Down? 62
politicians might thus attempt to ‘steal’ ownership from their competitors (Holian,
2004) or try to claim newly politicized issues. More generally, a ‘broad appeal’
strategy, reaching out to diverse groups of voters, is attractive to parties insofar as
it is likely to bring electoral advantages (Kirchheimer, 1966; Somer-Topcu, 2015).
One way of achieving this goal is for parties to moderate their policy positions as
to approach the median voter position (Downs, 1957); another, less risky strategy,4
is to add more issues to the party agenda. In the latter case, the party diversifies
in the hope of appealing to a broader electorate.
Issue salience strategies are thus characterized by a trade-off for parties be-
tween ‘speaking to the base’ by presenting a confined, focused and specific agenda
that is limited in scope and reaching out to a wider electorate by presenting a
broad and diversified agenda (cf. de Sio and Weber, 2014). A similar trade-off has
been observed by Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012), who argue that parties
struggle to reconcile the demands of party voters and non-aligned independents.
Panagopoulos (2015, p.1) likewise speaks of a ‘mobilization versus persuasion’
trade-off as there is a tension for parties between “speaking to the base” and “per-
suading independents.”
The extent to which parties prefer one strategy to the other depends, I argue,
on two things. First, the competitive position that a party occupies in the party
system matters. In a two-party system, this reflects the difference between parties
in and out of office; in a multi-party setting the crucial distinction is between main-
stream parties and challenger parties. Second, intra-party politics, specifically the
balance of power between party activists and the party leadership, informs agenda
scope strategies. In the following I develop these two arguments in more detail.
4.2.1 Experience in Government and Issue Attention Diversity
I assume that party competition in multi-party settings can be described as an
iterative strategic game between challenger and mainstream parties, following the
framework proposed by de Vries and Hobolt (2012). The basic insight is that multi-
party system consist of mainstream parties that regularly participate in coalition
governments, but that are sometimes also excluded from office, and challenger
parties, that have not previously held office (and might never hold office in the
future) (see also Hobolt and Karp, 2010). As such, one can, at any given election,
distinguish between challenger parties, mainstream opposition parties and mainstream
government parties based on their different roles in the party system (de Vries and
Hobolt, 2012, p.250). There are two reasons why these different types of parties
would pursue different issue diversity strategies.
First, incumbent parties are tied to their record in office, which they need to
defend as they are being held responsible for policy solutions by voters (Green-
Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010). Government parties are expected to have stances
on all the important issues of the day. They have to come up with solutions for the
4For arguments stressing the electoral costs of moderating policy positions, especially the risk for
parties to alienate their core supporters and party activists, see Aldrich (1983); Karreth, Polk and
Allen (2013).
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many policy problems that face contemporary societies, and an incumbent party
that ignores issues for which it was (at least partly) responsible in office runs the
risk of being perceived as trying to avoid accountability for its actions. To some
extent, the same holds for opposition parties with office aspirations, as they need
to show that they present credible alternatives for government. On the other hand,
empirical studies show that opposition parties are less constrained in their pro-
grammatic issue strategies than government parties, and that they pick specific
issues to attack incumbents on (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010; Seeberg,
2013; Meyer and Wagner, 2013; Bevan and John, 2016). Klingemann, Hofferbert
and Budge (1994, p.28) likewise grasp the distinction between government and op-
position parties: “incumbents have a record, the opposition has only its words.”
Out-of-office parties are not forced to respond to all issues in the same way gov-
ernment parties are and instead focus strongly on selected issues that they deem
strategically favourable. Hence, we would expect opposition parties to present
policy agendas that are narrower in scope than the agendas of incumbents.
Second, the distinction between challenger parties and mainstream parties
corresponds to the divide between political losers and winners in multiparty sys-
tems (de Vries and Hobolt, 2012). According to theories of ‘issue evolution’ and
‘issue entrepreneurship’, politicians who occupy losing positions in the system
seek to advance their situation by promoting conflict on new issues while po-
litical winners aim at maintaining the status quo (Carmines and Stimson, 1986;
de Vries and Hobolt, 2012). ‘Heresthetics’ is Riker’s (1986) label to describe the
effort of political losers to select issues as to strategically manipulate the environ-
ment in which political preferences are coordinated into collective outcomes.5 In
a multiparty setting, this implies that mainstream parties, who regularly alternate
between opposition and government status, want to reproduce existing patterns
of competition. As de Vries and Hobolt (p.250 2012) put it: “owing to their over-
all advantageous position in the system, mainstream parties have an incentive to
reinforce existing patterns of political competition and the policy issues underly-
ing them”. They shy away from mobilizing around new issues, since this would
make it more difficult to enter into coalition government (Hobolt and Tilley, 2016,
p.974). Rather, mainstream parties seek to stabilize the structure of the political
issue space. Therefore, they appeal broadly, distributing their attention across a
wide range of issues.
Challenger parties, on the other hand, attempt to upset the political sta-
tus quo and confine their issue appeals. They focus, for example, strongly on
issues that are largely neglected by mainstream parties, such as European inte-
gration (de Vries and Hobolt, 2012; van de Wardt, de Vries and Hobolt, 2014). As
a result, the diversity in these parties’ issue appeals is reduced. They alter their
issue strategies once their relative position within the party system has improved.
Hence, challengers abandon issue entrepreneurial strategies – and broaden their
issue appeals – after they have been rewarded with access to office. This is because
5Riker (1986) makes an analytical distinction between ‘rhetoric’, as the art of arguing about politi-
cal issues using persuasion, and ‘heresthetics’, as the art of selecting issues.
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their ‘reference point’ has now changed (van de Wardt, 2015). The experience of
many green parties is telling in this regard. Staying in power, after the experi-
ence of attaining power, has increasingly become an end in itself for these parties.
Rihoux and Ru¨dig (2006, s20-21) argue that green parties’ strategic goals have
been “significantly modified by their participation in power.” To give an exam-
ple, the German green party, during their first period in office, adopted a political
programme that outlined a new ideological direction for the party (Rihoux and
Ru¨dig, 2006, s20). Similar to many other green parties, it sought to broaden its
issue profile beyond environmental matters (Bischof, 2015, p.5). I formalize these
considerations about the impact of experience in government on issue attention
diversity in the following hypotheses:
H1a: Mainstream government parties present broader policy agendas
than mainstream opposition parties
H1b: Challenger parties present more confined policy agendas than
mainstream parties
4.2.2 Intra Party Politics and Issue Attention Diversity
So far, I have assumed that the behaviour of political parties is uniformly informed
by a similar goal (i.e. gaining access to office), and I have considered the extent to
which they are likely to succeed in achieving that goal (captured by the distinction
between challenger and mainstream parties). This is a restrictive assumption, as
parties have different, and mutually conflicting, strategic goals (Mu¨ller and Strøm,
1999).
Parties differ in the extent to which they, in fact, seek access to office. A
party’s motivation to adopt a broad issue profile is likely driven by vote-seeking
and office-seeking incentives. If parties present diverse issue agendas, they aim
to reach out to voters beyond their core supporters, seeking to represent large
and diverse shares of the electorate. These ‘catch-all’ strategies may convince
different groups of voters that the party will represent their interests when in
office. In the literature, such issue strategies are often associated with vote gains.
Somer-Topcu (2015, p.842), for example, calls a broad appeal strategy a “recipe for
electoral success.” Larger vote shares suggest greater coalition bargaining power
and, hence, increased chances of participating in coalition government. As such,
adopting a broad issue profile likely serves parties’ office-seeking motivations.
However, parties differ in the extent to which they favour these objectives
over other strategic goals. Parties’ optimal vote- and office-seeking strategies of-
ten conflict with the pursuit of policy goals (Harmel and Janda, 1994; Pedersen,
2012). Parties that mainly seek to satisfy policy goals will strongly emphasize
issues that are of central importance to them (Wagner and Meyer, 2014). Parties
are commonly associated with specific issues in voters’ minds (Walgrave, Lefevere
and Tresch, 2012), and often these are issues that ‘define’ the party and played
an important role in its emergence. A policy-seeking party is likely to priori-
tise advancing these issues over adopting a broad issue profile. A party of this
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kind focuses strongly on a few core issues. This implies presenting a specific and
confined policy agenda. As a result, policy-oriented parties are expected to nar-
row down their issue profiles while office-oriented parties are expected to appeal
broadly.
But what, then, determines how parties resolve the trade-off between pol-
icy and office objectives? The goal structure of political parties is shaped by
the considerations of actors within parties and the balance of power between
them. Internal organizational structures thus affect party behaviour (Kitschelt,
1989, 1994; Pedersen, 2010, 2012; Ceron, 2012; Ware, 1992; Schumacher, de Vries
and Vis, 2013; Wagner and Meyer, 2014). The key actors here are party leaders and
party activists. Leaders are pragmatic ‘office-seekers’ whereas activists are ‘policy-
motivated’ and less pragmatic (Strøm, 1990; Mu¨ller and Strøm, 1999; Schlesinger,
1975; Aldrich, 2011). Panebianco (1988) refers to activists in this context as ‘be-
lievers’. They prefer the party not to deviate too much from its original agenda.
Leaders have wider “policy limits” (Pedersen, 2012, p.901) than activists and are
tempted by the possible electoral gains of the ‘appeal broadly’ strategy. Never-
theless, to secure their survival, even pragmatic office-seeking leaders will have to
cater to an internally powerful activist base. Activist-dominated parties are there-
fore “under pressure to maintain the party’s focus on its key traditional areas of
strength” (Meyer and Wagner, 2013, p.1023). Summing up, I expect parties whose
leaders are less constrained to have a broader issue focus than parties in which
activists are more dominant. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H2a: Activist-dominated parties present more confined agendas than
leadership-dominated parties
In addition to having a direct effect, party organization is also likely to condi-
tion the extent to which parties respond to external stimuli (Schumacher, de Vries
and Vis, 2013). Given the incentives for office-oriented parties to appeal broadly,
and for policy-oriented parties to narrow down their issue appeals, it is not likely
that both types of parties will respond in the same way to experience with gov-
ernment participation. Specifically, out-of-government parties in which activists
dominate are likely to pursue core vote strategies and present narrow issue agen-
das while non-governing leadership-oriented parties are likely to give in to vote-
and office-seeking pressures. As such, party organizational features should have a
conditioning impact on the differences in issue diversity between mainstream gov-
ernment parties (MGPs) and mainstream opposition parties (MOPs) (H1a) and
between challenger and mainstream parties (H1b). This leads to the following
conditional hypotheses:
H2b: The effect of MGP status on issue attention diversity is greater for
activist-dominated parties than for leadership-dominated parties
H2c: The effect of challenger status on issue attention diversity is greater
for activist-dominated parties than for leadership-dominated parties
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4.2.3 External Shocks and Issue Attention Diversity
When do parties change the scope of their agenda? Generally speaking, parties
introduce changes in their policy platforms after experiencing negative ‘external
shocks’, reflecting the assumption that parties do not just change their strategies
for the sake of change but only when there is good cause (Harmel and Janda,
1994). This includes, most notably, losing elections (Somer-Topcu, 2009; Budge,
1994; Budge, Ezrow and McDonald, 2010) and losing access to office (Schumacher,
de Vries and Vis, 2013). In terms of issue attention diversity, parties have after such
a shock two possible options: decreasing or increasing the scope of their agenda.
The first refers to a strategy of mobilizing the party’s base, for example
after a bad show at the polls or after losing access to office, to energize party
supporters and lock in their vote. The British Conservative Party, condemned to
a role in opposition in 1997 after eighteen years of governing , sought to ‘go back’
to its core vote base in the 2001 and 2005 election campaigns, focusing on issues
of interest to conservative voters rather than to the electorate at large (Bale, 2011,
p.11). This strategy ended with the leadership of David Cameron, who changed
“the Conservative party’s image by focusing on new issues” (Green, 2011, p.737).
The second strategy refers to parties’ attempts to increase its electoral sup-
port by appealing to a more diverse electorate. When the Christian-Democrats
in the Netherlands, another ‘natural party of government’, were in 1994 excluded
from office for the first time in their history, the party set up an internal strategic
advice group to draft a new programmatic manifest, which put more emphasis
on previously neglected issues such as crime and security (Duncan, 2007, p.80).
Thus, I put forward the following hypothesis:
H3a: Mainstream parties change the scope of their agenda after loosing
votes and after being excluded from office
Note that I do not explicate a directional shift, but rather an absolute shift
in agenda scope. Both increasing (as in the example of the Dutch Christian-
Democrats) and decreasing (as in the example of the British Conservatives) the
scope of the agenda represent rational responses for mainstream parties after ex-
periencing external shocks. As such, I expect parties to change their issue atten-
tion diversity without explicating the direction of the change. Thus, the theoretical
framework developed here allows for explaining different levels of issue attention
diversity across parties as well as absolute changes therein.
Further, this part of the theoretical framework focuses on mainstream par-
ties. External shocks only function as stimuli for parties to change their strategy
if it impacts their primary goal (Harmel and Janda, 1994). In the mainstream-
challenger framework, challenger parties’ main goal is to change the structure
of political conflict by concentrating on the issues neglected by the mainstream.
Therefore, the external shocks as explicated above should not impact their agenda,
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as their narrow and confined issue strategy is already a response to their unfavor-
able position in the political system.6 Moreover, it seems reasonable to expect the
impact of vote loss and office exclusion to be greater for parties that are driven by
vote- and office-seeking motivations. Therefore, I explicate a conditional relation-
ship:
H3b: Mainstream parties are more likely to change the scope of their
agenda after loosing votes and after being excluded from office if the
internal balance of power favors the leadership
Departing from traditional issue salience theories, recent work has empha-
sized how parties’ issue strategies are conditional upon other parties’ strategies
(Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009; Meguid, 2005) (see also chapter 3). The liter-
ature tends to focus on the incentives for mainstream parties to respond to the
issue appeals as put forward by so-called ‘issue entrepreneurs’ (Spoon, Hobolt
and de Vries, 2014; Rooduijn, de Lange and van der Brug, 2014; Bale et al., 2010;
Schumacher and van Kersbergen, 2014) (see also chapter 5). If mainstream parties
indeed engage in political competition on the new issue dimensions promoted by
issue entrepreneurs, their issue focus becomes broader.
However, mainstream parties have to take into account that their response
may further legitimize an issue, as such boost electoral support for the challenger
and unintentionally backfire at the party (Bale, 2003). Ignoring the challenge is
thus an alternative strategy (Meguid, 2005; Abou-Chadi, 2014). If a mainstream
party chooses this latter strategy, then it needs to find another way to neutralize
the electoral threat posed by the challenger. In such a scenario, mainstream par-
ties, enjoying relative advantages over challenger parties because they are usually
perceived by voters as being more credible and because they have better access
to the media (Meguid, 2005), can use their agenda setting power to try to influ-
ence the political agenda by diverting attention away from the challenger party’s
issue. One way to do this is to confine their own agenda and focus on the issues
on which they traditionally have had an advantage. This implies decreasing the
scope of the agenda.
Taken together, it seems reasonable to expect that mainstream parties change
their issue strategies in response to electoral successes of challenger parties. Since
vote gains of competitor parties compromise a mainstream party’s vote- and ulti-
mately office-seeking objectives, the impact of the electoral success of challengers
on agenda scope should be more pronounced for parties in which leaders are
especially powerful. Hence, similar to hypothesis 3b, I explicate a conditional
hypothesis as well:
H3c: Mainstream parties change the scope of their agenda when chal-
lenger parties gain more electoral strength
6Moreover, challenger parties cannot respond to the ‘shock’ of office exclusion as they never en-
joyed the spoils of office.
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H3d: Mainstream parties are more likely to change the scope of their
agenda when challenger parties gain more electoral strength if the in-
ternal balance of power favors the leadership
4.3 Data and Methodology
To test the hypotheses spelled out above, I use a data set covering 259 political
parties in 18 European democracies7 in the period 1950-2013.8
To assess parties’ issue attention diversity, the dependent variable in this
study, I use data from the Manifesto Project (MRG-CMP-MARPOR) (Volkens et al.,
2014; Klingemann et al., 2006; Budge et al., 2001). The MRG-CMP-MARPOR
project uses codings of party manifestos to categorize quasi-sentences in 56 is-
sue categories. This allows for assessing parties’ relative emphasis on issues in
their election manifesto. To date, the MRG-CMP-MARPOR project provides the
only data set available that is suitable for measuring parties’ issue salience strate-
gies over a long period of time across a large number of parties. The manifesto
data has been subject to a vivid methodological debate, but this mainly concerns
inferring policy positions from the data (Gemenis, 2013). For the purpose of this
study, I am only interested in the distribution of attention, that is: that is, how
narrowly or widely attention is distributed across issues in manifestos.
There are two ways to calculate issue attention diversity in party manifestos.
First, one could calculate the ‘effective number of issues’ in a manifesto, similar
to the calculation of the effective number of parties (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979).
Lacewell (2013) opts for this approach. Likewise, Hobolt, Klemmensen and Pickup
(2008) use the inverse (normalized) Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, on which the
formula for the effective number of parties is based, to measure issue diversity in
political speeches. Here, I follow Greene (2015) who uses Shannon’s H to capture
issue attention diversity.9 Shannon’s H is calculated as follows:
Shannon′s H = −
n
∑
i=1
(p(xi))× ln p(xi) (4.1)
where xi represents an item; p(xi) is the proportion of total attention the item re-
ceives; and ln(xi) is the natural log of the proportion of attention the item receives.
Shannon’s H, developed in information- and communication theory (Shan-
non and Weaver, 1949), has been increasingly applied in political science liter-
ature, especially in studies of policy agendas (Jennings et al., 2011; Halpin and
7The following countries are included: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Great-Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden and Switzerland; I select parties operating in western European party systems since
varying patterns of issue diversification have been observed in these systems (Green-Pedersen,
2007b).
8For countries that have not been democratic during the entire period, the data starts with the first
democratic election.
9The inverse Herfindahl-Hirschman Index index and Shannon’s H as measures of attention diver-
sity correlate strongly: Hobolt, Klemmensen and Pickup (2008, p.13) report a correlation of “above
.9” between both indicators and Greene (2015, footnote 22) finds a correlation coefficient of .975
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Thomas III, 2012; Sheingate, 2006; McCombs and Zhu, 1995). In contrast to the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, Shannon’s H increases along with the number of
items via the ln(xi). As such, it takes into account rising uncertainty associated
with an increase in the number of possible outcomes (Sheingate, 2006, p.847). To
put it simply: the measure distinguishes between the use of, for example, four out
of five possible items and four out of ten possible items (see also Boydstun, Bevan
and Thomas, 2014, p.183).
Moreover, using a series of simulations, Boydstun, Bevan and Thomas (2014)
compared the Herfindahl-Hirschman to Shannon’s H and found that the latter
better captures changes in diversity at (already) high and low levels of diversity.
As such, they concluded that Shannon’s H is a more ‘sensitive’ measure, such that,
compared to the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, “equal increases and decreases in
diversity have relatively equally sized effects on the diversity measure, regardless
on where on the range of diversity they occur” (Boydstun, Bevan and Thomas,
2014, p.180). For these reasons, I refrain from using the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index and instead opt for Shannon’s H to capture issue attention diversity. Fol-
lowing Greene (2015) I transform Shannon’s H into a measure of issue attention
diversity as follows:
Issue Attention Diversity = exp(−
n
∑
i=1
(p(xi))× ln p(xi)) (4.2)
Consider the following example, assuming a manifesto with four equally salient
issues:
Issue Attention Diversity =
exp(−
42
∑
i=1
(.25(x1))× ln .25(x1) + (.25(x2))× ln .25(x2)
+ (.25(x3))× ln .25(x3) + (.25(x4))× ln .25(x4)
+ (0(x5))× ln 0(x5) + ...+ (0(x42))× ln 0(x42))
= 4
(4.3)
Equation 4.3 shows that the formula yields 4 in this hypothetical case.10 The MRG-
CMP-MARPOR coding scheme includes 28 so-called ‘paired policy dimensions’,
such as ‘European Integration: Positive (per108)’ and ‘European Integration: Neg-
ative (per110)’. In order not to overestimate issue attention diversity, and count
similar issues twice, I collapse these 28 categories into 14 paired issues, following
the recommendations by Lowe et al. (2011). Hence, the theoretical range of the
issue attention diversity is between 1 and 42. The empirical range is 1.5-31.2.
Figure 4.1 displays the distribution of issue attention diversity by party type
and by time period using box plots. It shows that parties seem to have increased
their issue attention diversity over time (cf. Greene, 2015). This supports analyses
of parties’ tendencies to become more ‘catch all’ (Kirchheimer, 1966) as well as
10The natural logarithm of zero is treated as 0.
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Figure 4.1 – Issue Attention Diversity by Party Type, 1950-2013
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descriptions of political agendas becoming more diverse (Green-Pedersen, 2007b).
Moreover, challenger parties consistently exhibit more narrow issue profiles than
do their mainstream counterparts.
Turning to the independent variables, I distinguish between challenger and
mainstream parties based on past experiences in government, following the oper-
ationalization by de Vries and Hobolt (2012). Thus, a challenger party is defined
as a party that has not previously held political office; a challenger party turns
into a mainstream party once it enters a government coalition (see also van de
Wardt, de Vries and Hobolt, 2014; van de Wardt, 2015). Furthermore, I distinguish
between mainstream government parties and mainstream opposition parties; the first
type has governed in the past and enters the election as an incumbent whereas
the latter type did govern in the past but is currently (i.e. the period previous to
the election) in opposition. To assess the strength of challenger parties in a given
election, I weigh these parties by their vote share in the previous election.11
The intra party balance of power between the party leadership and party
activists is less straightforward to measure as a result of data availability. Two
frequently used data sources that include information on intra party politics are
Laver and Hunt’s (1992) expert survey and Harmel and Janda’s (1996) party
change project. The latter project includes only four countries, and thus I rely
on data from the Laver and Hunt (1992) expert survey, which covers 25 coun-
tries. Specifically, I use the items from the expert survey that tap the power of
the party leadership over party policy and the power of party activists over party
11Parties draft their manifestos before an elections. Hence, they have to rely on past information
when doing so, for example on the electoral strength of challenger parties in the previous election.
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policy.12 Schumacher, de Vries and Vis (2013) as well as Wagner and Meyer (2014)
use these two questions to construct their measure of parties’ internal distribution
of power and Pedersen’s (2012) ‘intra party democracy’ variable is also based on
these items. The answers to both questions are scored on a scale ranging from
0 (no influence at all) to 20 (a very great influence).13 I subtract the score indi-
cating the power of the activists from the score indicating the power of the party
leadership. This results in a intra party balance of power scale measuring to what
extent the leadership is unconstrained in deciding on the party’s policy course. I
rescale the index to run from 0 to 30, with higher scores indicating more power for
the leadership. The measure is time-invariant, so the assumption is that parties
do not change their organizational features dramatically over time. This seems a
plausibe assumption as parties are conservative organizations that generally resist
changing their rules and structures (Harmel and Janda, 1994). Moreover, other as-
pects of party organization, such as the rules for candidate selection, also exhibit
stability over time (Bille, 2001).14 Kernell (2015, p.1824), surveying party organi-
zations over the past 40 years, concludes that internal party rules remain stable
“even as parties are swept in or out of office, undergo significant turnover in lead-
ership, and at times dramatically change their policy positions.” Hence, although
the measure is a constant, there are good reasons to believe that it is a reasonable
proxy for parties’ organizational structures.
I control for vote loss as it is likely that parties that have suffered electoral
defeat in previous election cycles present broader issue agendas as to make up
for those losses and improve their electoral performance. The variable vote loss
measures electoral defeat, and is estimated as the differences between vote shares
in successive elections; positive differences (denoting electoral gains) are rewritten
to 0, indicating that parties did not suffer vote losses. Information about vote
shares is taken from the Manifesto Project data.
I also add party size (operationalized as a party’s vote share at the previous
election) as a control variable since larger parties are expected to have a greater
issue attention diversity in their manifesto. Large parties have more resources and
are, as such, better able to pursue and maintain a broad issue profile, distributing
their attention broadly over multiple issues (Wagner and Meyer, 2014).
Further, I control for ideological extremity. Parties that take relatively ex-
treme issue positions have an incentive to emphasize these issues as to strongly
publicize their stances and to differentiate themselves from competitors (Rovny,
2012; Wagner, 2012). As such, parties on the fringes of the ideological spectrum
are expected to be less diverse in their issue attention; they rather emphasize heav-
ily the few issues on which they take extremist positions. I use Franzmann and
Kaiser’s (2006) transformation of the MRG-CMP-MARPOR data to infer parties’
ideological positions on the general left-right dimension. Debates on how to infer
12The exact wording of the questions is: “assess the influence that party leaders have over the
formation of party policy” and “assess the influence that party activists have over the formation
of party policy”.
13The correlation between the two scales is −.72
14For a similar argument see Schumacher, de Vries and Vis (2013, p.470).
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Table 4.1 – Operationalization of the Variables
Dependent variables Indicator Data source
Issue attention diversity Transformation of Shannon’s H Own calculation
(see equation 4.2) Volkens et al. (2014)
Change in issue attention diversity |IADt − IADt−1| Own calculation
(IAD) Volkens et al. (2014)
Independent variables Indicator Data source
Challenger party Never in government before electiont , Data on government participation
otherwise 0 taken from Volkens et al. (2014)
Mainstream party Has been in government before electiont , Data on government participation
otherwise 0 taken from Volkens et al. (2014)
Mainstream government party Has been in government before electiont , Data on government participation
and in government in period taken from Volkens et al. (2014)
preceding electiont , otherwise 0
Mainstream opposition party Has been in government before electiont , Data on government participation
(office exclusion ) and not in government in period taken from Volkens et al. (2014)
preceding electiont , otherwise 0
Intra party balance of power Two expert survey questions: Laver and Hunt (1992)
(q1) influence party activists over party policy
(q2) influence party leaders over party policy
q2− q1+ lowest value
Control variables Indicator Data source
Party size Vote share electiont−1 Volkens et al. (2014)
Vote loss Vote share electiont−1 - Vote share electiont−2, Volkens et al. (2014)
if negative, otherwise 0
Ideological extremity Extremity party position on left-right dimension Franzmann and Kaiser (2006)
|party position−midpoint o f scale|
valid left-right estimates from the Manifesto Project data have been documented
elsewhere (see for example Budge and Meyer, 2013). Here, it suffices to say that
the Franzmann-Kaiser method represents a sophisticated attempt to estimate time-
and country-specific positional data, incorporating arguments that the meaning of
for example ‘left’ and ‘right’ varies across time and space (Benoit and Laver, 2006).
The left-right scores, as taken from the data provided by Franzmann and Kaiser
(2006), run from 0 to 10. Ideological extremity is then estimated as the absolute
difference between a party’s position and the midpoint of the scale. The new
measure runs accordingly from 0 to 5, with higher scores indicating more extreme
left-right positions. Table 4.1 provides an overview of the operationalization of the
variables used in this chapter while table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics.
I treat my data as pooled time-series data with political parties being the
cross-sectional units that vary over time (election years). Hence, the estimation
technique should deal with the cross-sectional structure of the data as well as
with the time-series structure. I use a party-election year set-up and add country
dummies to the right hand side of the equation to absorb unobserved differences
between countries. Further, given the panel structure of the data, it is likely that
problems arise related to panel heteroskedasticity (‘groupwise heteroskedasticity’)
(i.e. variances in error terms differ across parties), serial correlation (i.e. the errors
in subsequent election years within parties are dependent) and contemporaneous
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Table 4.2 – Descriptive Statistics
All parties n Mean Sd Min Max
Issue attention diversity 1,895 15.457 6.025 1.532 31.234
Vote loss 1,433 1.368 2.491 0.000 18.595
Intra party balance of power 1,408 18.306 5.357 0.000 29.630
Party sizet−1 1,636 15.808 13.528 0.000 54.373
Ideological extremity 1,527 1.600 1.140 0.002 5.000
Dichotomous variable %
Challenger party (cp/mainstream) 1,895 43.06%
Mainstream Parties n Mean Sd Min Max
|∆Issue attention diversity| 1,040 3.612 3.191 0.000 18.359
Vote loss 985 1.616 2.729 0.000 18.595
Intra party balance of power 926 18.593 4.502 4.080 27.430
Strength challenger partiest−1 1,079 13.040 12.525 0.000 63.446
Dichotomous variable %
Office exclusion (opp/gov) 1,079 42.08%
correlation (‘cross-sectional dependence’) (i.e. the errors of different parties in the
same election year are dependent). A Wooldridge test (Wooldridge, 2002; Drukker,
2003) indeed indicates the presence of serial correlation in the data and a modified
Wald test (Greene, 2000; Baum, 2001) suggests rejection of the null-hypothesis of
no groupwise heteroskedasticity. To deal with the panel heteroskedasticity and
possible cross-sectional dependence,15 I calculate panel-corrected standard errors
(PCSEs). To deal with serial correlation, Beck and Katz (1995) recommend adding
a lagged dependent variable to the equation. Here, however, I address the AR(1)
error structure of the panels by using a Prais-Winsten feasible generalized least
squares (FGLS) procedure. Plu¨mper, Troeger and Manow (2005) prefer this option
over the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable, as the latter can bias estimates
(see also Achen, 2000). I use Fisher-type Phillips-Perron unit root tests (Choi, 2001)
to ensure that the dependent and independent variables are stationary.16
4.4 Results
The hypotheses posit expectations regarding both the level of issue attention di-
versity as well as changes therein. The first step of the empirical analysis covers
models predicting levels of issue attention diversity while in the second step mod-
els predicting changes in issue attention diversity are put forward.
In the first step of the analysis I run two main models. The first model
includes all parties in order to examine the differences between mainstream parties
15The panels in the data are too unbalanced to perform a Pesaran test for contemporaneous cor-
relation (Pesaran, 2004; de Hoyos and Sarafidis, 2006). Nevertheless, the estimation technique
addresses this type of autocorrelation.
16I resort to the Fisher-type tests since conventional unit root tests (for example the augmented
Dickey-Fuller test) are unavailable for unbalanced panel data structures.
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and challenger parties. The second model includes mainstream parties only and
explores the differences between MOPs and MGPs. These models thus serve to
test the first set of hypotheses about the differences between party types in terms
of issue attention diversity (H1a and H1b). The models also include the variable
capturing the intra party balance of power as to examine the unconditional effect
of intra party politics on issue attention diversity (H2a). The core models are
specified as follows:
Issue Attention Diversityi,t =
β0 + β1
[
CPi,t
]
+ β2
[
Vote lossi,t
]
+ β3
[
Intra party balance o f poweri
]
+ β4
[
Party sizei,t
]
+ β5
[
Ideological extremityi,t
]
+ ei,t
(4.4)
Issue Attention Diversityi,t =
β0 + β1
[
MGPi,t
]
+ β2
[
Vote lossi,t
]
+ β3
[
Intra party balance o f poweri
]
+ β4
[
Party sizei,t
]
+ β5
[
Ideological extremityi,t
]
+ ei,t
(4.5)
where subscript i denotes parties and t indicates time (election year).The analysis
then proceeds with the inclusion of interaction terms between the party type vari-
ables (challenger party and mainstream government party) and the intra party
balance of power variable in order to test the conditional hypotheses (H2b and
H2c). Table 4.3 reports the results of the regression analyses.
The variables vote loss, party size and ideological extremity are right-skewed
and therefore I reestimate models 1-4 with logged transformations of these vari-
ables (Gelman and Hill, 2007). These models are reported in table C.1 in ap-
pendix C. Since the results do not change substantively, I report the analyses of
the original variables here as these are easier to interpret.
Model 1 and model 2 include all parties whereas model 3 and model 4 in-
clude mainstream parties only. Model 1 suggest support for the hypothesis that
challenger parties’ issue agendas are more narrow in scope than the agendas put
forward by mainstream parties: the estimated coefficient (β = −1.15) is negative
and statistically significant. The hypothesis that leadership-dominated parties ap-
peal more broadly is not supported by model 1, as the estimated coefficient of the
intra party balance of power variable is very small (β = .0004) and statistically not
significant.
Model 2 includes an interaction term between the intra party balance of
power variable and the challenger party variable. The inclusion of the interaction
term does not alter the effects of the covariates in the model However, the effect
of challenger party status now increases. Model 2 suggests that when the intra
party balance of power favours activists (i.e. when the variable denotes a score of
zero), the difference between challenger and mainstream parties is about -2.5 in
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Table 4.3 – Pooled Time Series Regressions of Political Parties’ Issue
Attention Diversity, 1950-2013
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
mainstream mainstream
parties parties
(Constant) 15.9524∗∗∗ 16.7571∗∗∗ 15.6132∗∗∗ 15.7601∗∗∗
(0.9571) (1.0724) (1.0201) (1.2203)
Challenger Party (CP) −1.1519∗∗∗ −2.5224∗∗∗
(0.3024) (0.7950)
Mainstream Government Party (MGP) 0.1775 −0.3324
(0.2157) (0.9081)
Vote loss 0.0527 0.0527 −0.0201 −0.0176
(0.0369) (0.0368) (0.0407) (0.0409)
Intra party balance of power (IPBP) 0.0004 −0.0459 0.0698∗∗∗ 0.0622
(0.0204) (0.0352) (0.0260) (0.0458)
Party size 0.0250∗∗ 0.0255∗∗ −0.0091 −0.0098
(0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0106) (0.0107)
Ideological extremity −0.7025∗∗∗ −0.6978∗∗∗ −0.4346∗∗∗ −0.4365∗∗∗
(0.1077) (0.1084) (0.1572) (0.1590)
CP×Intra party balance of power 0.0777∗
(0.0426)
MGP×Intra party balance of power 0.0287
(0.0487)
N 999 999 717 717
Wald 4408.04 3791.80 4954.75 8638.76
Note: Prais-Winsten regression coefficients with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses and coun-
try dummies (not shown in table). ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests).
issue attention diversity, on average and all else equal. It should be noted that the
issue attention diversity variable has a standard deviation (SD) of around 6, and
the estimated coefficient thus constitutes an effect of nearly half the SD. In sum,
models 1 and 2 offer support for the hypothesis that challenger parties present
more confined policy agendas than do mainstream parties.
The positive, and statistically significant, estimated coefficient on the inter-
action term suggest that when we compare activist-dominated parties to those in
which the leadership is more dominant, the difference between challenger and
mainstream parties become less pronounced. This is in line with the conditional
hypothesis (H2c) explicated above. Figure 4.2(a) depicts the interaction effect for
model 2 graphically as to aid its substantive interpretation (Brambor, Clark and
Golder, 2006).
Figure 4.2(a) shows the effect of challenger party status on issue attention
diversity for different levels of the intra party balance of power variable. When
activists constrain party leaders in setting the party’s strategic course, there is
a negative, and statistically significant effect of challenger status on issue atten-
tion diversity. This effect dwindles for higher values of the intra party balance of
power. For parties with a score of about 22 or higher on the intra party balance
of power variable, indicating strong dominance of leaders, the effect of challenger
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Figure 4.2 – Marginal Effects of Challenger Party and Mainstream
Government Party Status on Issue Attention Diversity across
Different Levels of Intra Party Balance of Power
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Note: The marginal effect plots are constructed using coefficient
estimates from table 4.3, model 2 and model 4, respectively. The
y-axis depicts the marginal effects of the challenger party variable
(a) and the mainstream government party variable (b) on issue
attention diversity across different levels of intra party balance of
power. The shaded areas reflect 90% and 95% confidence intervals.
The tick marks on the x-axis indicate individual observations for
the intra party balance of power variable.
party status is no longer statistically significant. Hence, if leaders are dominant,
challenger status has no longer an impact on issue attention diversity, in line with
hypothesis 2c. It should be noted that the balance of power variable varies within
the category of challenger parties as well as across mainstream parties. For main-
stream parties, the average value is 18.59 (SD: 4.50), for challengers this is 17.75
(SD: 6.67).
To give an example, the Swedish Green Party (MP) has a leadership domi-
nance score of 8.29, indicating that it is an activist-centred party. Its average issue
attention diversity score between 1988 and 1998, when it was a challenger party,
was 5.97. The Swedish Left Party (V) is like many former communist parties
much more leadership-centred (with a score of the leadership dominance variable
of 16.05). The party, also a challenger party in the same 10-year period, presented
issue agendas with an average diversity score of 10.38.
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Evaluating the control variables, model 1 and 2 denote positive and signif-
icant, albeit small, estimated coefficients for party size (β = .03), indicating that
larger parties are somewhat more likely to present broad agendas. An increase
in party size of 1 SD is associated with an increase in issue attention diversity
of about 2.6. Moreover, ideological extremity seems to be negatively related to
agenda scope (β = −.7): for each 1-point deviation from the center of the ideo-
logical 0-10 left-right scale, parties decrease the scope of their agenda with .70, on
average and all else equal.
Models 3 and 4, which include mainstream parties only, find no support for
the notion that mainstream parties in government present broader agendas than
mainstream parties in opposition, in contrast to hypothesis 1a. The estimated co-
efficients for the mainstream government party variable (β = .18 & β = −.33) are
indistinguishable from zero. Experience in government indeed impacts parties’
issue diversity strategies. However, the crucial difference seems not be between
government and opposition parties, but rather between those parties that reg-
ularly participate in coalition governments (mainstream parties) and those that
have never been rewarded with access to office (challenger parties).
Model 3, further, suggest some degree of support for the hypothesis that
leaders, when unconstrained, direct their parties towards broader issue profiles
(H2a): the estimated coefficient is positive and statistically significant, but rather
small (β = .07). Comparing mainstream parties in which activists are most pow-
erful (with a value of 4.1 on the intra party balance of power scale) to leadership-
dominated mainstream parties (with a value of 27.4 on the intra party balance of
power scale), the model predicts an average difference of 1.6 in issue attention
diversity. However, the estimated coefficient fails to reach statistical significance
in model 4.
In model 4, an interaction term between the mainstream government party
variable and the intra party balance of power is introduced. The interaction term is
positive (β = .03) which suggests that the difference between mainstream parties
in government and in opposition becomes more pronounced as leaders have more
of a say. However, the interaction term is not statistically significant. Figure 4.2
(b) displays the marginal effects plot. It shows the effect of MGP status on issue
attention diversity for different levels of the intra party balance of power variable.
Contrary to hypothesis 2b, no conditioning effect of intra party politics is found.
The differences between mainstream parties in and out of government remain
statistically insignificant across the intra party balance of power scale.
Taken together, models 3 and 4 provide no support for the expectation that
MGPs and MOPs present agendas that differ in scope. Model 3 does offer some
support for an unconditional effect of intra party politics on issue attention diver-
sity.
With regard to the control variables in models 3 and 4, the negative effect of
ideological extremity (β = −.43; β = −.44) indicates that mainstream parties that
are relatively extreme in terms of left-right positioning put forward more confined
issues agendas. The effect is smaller compared to models 1 and 2, which included
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all parties, but statistically significant. The analysis thus provides support for the
notion that moderate parties appeal broadly while more extreme parties confine
their issue appeals. The insignificant effects of the vote loss variable across all
models suggests no support for the argument that parties that had a bad showing
at the polls broaden their issue appeals. Party size does no longer denote a statis-
tically significant effect in models 3 and 4: differences in size across mainstream
parties do not seem to impact the scope of their agendas.
Turning now to the second step of the analysis, I estimate a series of models
predicting absolute changes in mainstream parties’ issue attention diversity, as to
evaluate hypotheses 3a – 3d. The models are specified as follows:
|∆Issue Attention Diversityi,t| =
β0 + β1
[
O f f ice exclusioni,t
]
+ β2
[
Vote lossi,t
]
+ β3
[
Strength challengersi,t
]
+ β4
[
IPBPi
]
+ ei,t
(4.6)
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IPBPi ×O f f ice exclusioni,t
]
+ ei,t
(4.7)
|∆Issue Attention Diversityi,t| =
β0 + β1
[
O f f ice exclusioni,t
]
+ β2
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]
+ β4
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]
+ ei,t
(4.8)
|∆Issue Attention Diversityi,t| =
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]
+ β2
[
Vote lossi,t
]
+ β3
[
Strength challengersi,t
]
+ β4
[
IPBPi
]
+ β5
[
IPBPi × Strength challengersi,t
]
+ ei,t
(4.9)
The first model serves to test the expectation that external ‘shocks’ in the form
of office exclusion, vote loss and increasing electoral support for challenger par-
ties have an impact on changes in mainstream parties’ issue attention diversity. I
then add interaction terms between the intra party balance of power (IPBP) vari-
able and, respectively, the variables indicating office exclusion, vote loss and the
strength of challenger parties. This allows for testing the conditional hypotheses
that parties in which the leadership is dominant respond more strongly to these
events by changing the scope of their agenda than do parties in which activists
are powerful.
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Table 4.4 – Pooled Time Series Regressions of Absolute Changes in
Mainstream Parties’ Issue Attention Diversity, 1950-2013
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
(Constant) 4.7224∗∗∗ 5.1130∗∗∗ 4.9215∗∗∗ 4.3785∗∗∗
(0.5475) (0.5118) (0.5565) (0.5733)
Office exclusion 0.1836∗ −0.6085∗∗∗ 0.2082∗∗ 0.2330∗∗
(0.1007) (0.0609) (0.1018) (0.0961)
Vote loss −0.0556∗∗∗ −0.0379∗∗∗ −0.1135∗∗ −0.0520∗∗∗
(0.0201) (0.0112) (0.0499) (0.0190)
Strength challengers −0.0076 −0.0111∗ −0.0074 0.0272
(0.0066) (0.0057) (0.0066) (0.0197)
Intra party balance of power (IPBP) −0.0322∗ −0.0536∗∗∗ −0.0442∗∗ −0.0145
(0.0172) (0.0132) (0.0181) (0.0191)
IPBP×Office exclusion 0.0424∗∗∗
(0.0061)
IPBP×Vote loss 0.0034
(0.0026)
IPBP×Strength challengers −0.0020∗
(0.0011)
N 864 864 864 864
Wald 219.64 1762.52 225.77 405.78
Note: Prais-Winsten regression coefficients with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses
and country dummies (not shown in table). ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests).
Table 4.4 displays the results of the regression analyses. Because of the skew-
ness of several variables, I reestimate models 5-8 using log transformations (see
table C.2 in appendix C).
Model 5 reports the results of the model without interaction terms. In model
6, 7 and 8, the interaction terms are introduced. The interactions between the intra
party balance of power variable and, respectively, office exclusion (model 6) and
the electoral strength of challenger parties (model 8) denote statistically significant
coefficient estimates (β = .04, β = −.002 ). The interaction term including the vote
loss variable (model 7) is not statistically significant (β = .003). Figure 4.3 depicts
these marginal effects graphically.
Figure 4.3(a) shows the marginal effect of office exclusion on absolute changes
in issue attention diversity across different levels of the intra party balance of
power variable. Mainstream parties in which activists are powerful do not re-
spond to the ‘shock’ of office exclusion, as the estimated effect is negative. If
leaders are more powerful, however, office exclusion seems to have a positive im-
pact on absolute changes in mainstream parties’ agenda scope. If the balance of
power variable exceeds the value of 18, the effect of office exclusion on issue atten-
tion diversity turns positive. Although small, the effect is statistically significant,
suggesting support for hypothesis 4b.
I also hypothesized that vote loss would make mainstream parties change
agenda scope, especially when the leadership is unconstrained in deciding on
the strategic course of the party. Figure 4.3(b) offers tentative support for this
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Figure 4.3 – Marginal Effects of Vote Loss, Office Exclusion and the
Strength of Challenger Parties on Mainstream Parties’ Issue
Attention Diversity across Different Levels of Intra Party
Balance of Power
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Note: The marginal effects plots (a), (b) and (c) are constructed
using coefficient estimates from table 2, models 6,7 and 8, respec-
tively. The y-axis depicts the marginal effect of office exclusion (a),
vote loss (b) and the strength of challenger parties (c) on changes
in mainstream party issue attention diversity across different levels
of intra party balance of power. The shaded areas reflect 90% and
95% confidence intervals. The tick marks on the x-axis indicate in-
dividual observations for the intra party balance of power variable
for mainstream parties.
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expectation. It shows the marginal effect of vote loss on issue attention diversity
across the balance of power measure. If activists are powerful, vote loss has a
negative effect on absolute changes in agenda scope. If leaders dominate, vote loss
seems not to have a significant impact. Still, the variation in the impact of vote loss
across activist-oriented parties (a negative and statistically significant effect) and
leadership-oriented parties (no statistically significant effect) offers some degree
of support for the hypothesis that vote loss influences mainstream parties’ shifts
in issue attention diversity conditional upon their intra party balance of power.
Model 8 explores the impact of the strength of challenger parties on main-
stream parties’ issue agenda scope (hypothesis 5), with the interaction depicted
by figure 4.3(c). Contrasting hypothesis 3d, the coefficient on the interaction term
is negative, which would indicate that parties are less inclined to change agenda
scope in response to increasing electoral strength of challengers when leaders be-
come more powerful. However, as figure 4.3(c) shows, the effect is not statistically
significant.
Taken together, the analysis supports the core expectations of this chap-
ter regarding the difference between challenger and mainstream parties and the
conditional impact of intra-party politics. Government experience impacts the
scope of issue agendas; the crucial difference is, however, not between parties cur-
rently in and out of office, as is suggested by other studies (Green-Pedersen and
Mortensen, 2010; Greene, 2015). The evidence presented here seems to suggest
that mainstream government parties and mainstream opposition parties present
issue agendas similar in scope whereas challenger parties appeal more narrowly.
Moreover, intra party politics is suggested to have a conditioning effect: chal-
lenger parties in which leaders dominate are not more confined in their issue
appeals than mainstream parties. Mainstream parties present, in general, broad
agendas but introduce changes after negative shocks, most notably vote loss and
office exclusion; the extent to which these ‘shocks’ affect changes in agenda scope
is however conditional upon the internal balance of power.
4.5 Discussion
I have argued that parties’ issue attention diversity, that is: how narrowly or how
broadly parties distribute attention across policy issues, is influenced by their
experience with government participation and by the internal balance of power
between the party leadership and the activist base. The findings have several im-
plications for the study of issue competition and issue diversity, as well as for the
study of party behaviour more generally.
First, the findings suggest that the distinction between challenger and main-
stream parties matters when it comes to differences in issue diversity across par-
ties. Previous work mainly focuses on the distinction between government and
opposition parties (Greene, 2015). This chapter goes beyond this dichotomy and
applies the mainstream-challenger logic. This latter typology more adequately
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captures the competitive structure in multiparty systems and incorporates the no-
tion that some parties regularly switch between government and opposition sta-
tus whereas other parties have never governed. Mainstream opposition parties as
well as mainstream government parties, it is argued here, seek to reinforce exist-
ing patterns of competition and present issue agendas that are similar in scope.
Challengers, on the other hand, devise their issue strategies as to upset the politi-
cal status quo and present confined agendas. As such, this chapter contributes to
the literature by applying insights from previous work on mainstream and chal-
lenger parties (de Vries and Hobolt, 2012; van de Wardt, de Vries and Hobolt, 2014;
van de Wardt, 2015) and connecting it to the emerging literature on issue diversity
(Greene, 2015; Somer-Topcu, 2015).
Second, the results make a specific contribution to the literature on issue
entrepreneurship in multiparty competition. Most studies examine the extent to
which challenger parties pursue issue entrepreneurial strategies by emphasizing
European integration issues in an attempt to increase the dimensionality of the
political issue space (de Vries and Hobolt, 2012; Hobolt and de Vries, 2015; Mei-
jers, 2015; van de Wardt, de Vries and Hobolt, 2014). This chapter adds the insight
that non-governing challengers respond to their unfavourable political position by
campaigning on a confined issue agenda, narrowing down their attention to a few
issues. However, the extent to which challengers present narrow issue appeals
depends, as the indicative findings presented above suggest, on internal party
organizational structures. As such, this chapter relates to a literature that con-
siders party organization to be an important conditional variable when it comes
to parties’ issue strategies in election campaigns (Schumacher, de Vries and Vis,
2013; Wagner and Meyer, 2014). Most studies consider the diverging preferences
of leaders and activists regarding party positioning. This chapter contributes to
this literature by highlighting that party leaders and activists also have different
preferences regarding the scope of parties’ issue appeals.
Moreover, this chapter contributes to our understanding of patterns of is-
sue diversification. Most research has focused on parties’ tendencies to become
evermore ‘catch-all’ by diversifying their issue appeals (Kirchheimer, 1966; Somer-
Topcu, 2015). As a result, aggregated policy agendas in modern democracies have
become more diverse (Green-Pedersen, 2007b). This chapter does not only ex-
amine differences in levels of issue attention diversity but also considers changes
therein. As such, it acknowledges that sometimes it is rational for parties to de-
crease the scope of their agenda and confine their issue appeals (Green, 2011).
This should inform our understanding of the dynamics of issue diversity in elec-
tion campaigns.
Finally, the results presented in this chapter relate to the ongoing debate
on how mainstream parties respond to the electoral success of challenger parties
(Abou-Chadi, 2014; van de Wardt, 2015; Spoon, Hobolt and de Vries, 2014). The
results presented here suggest that mainstream parties do not change the scope of
their agenda when confronted with increasingly strong challengers. This implies
that the political mainstream does not “accommodate” (Meguid, 2005) challengers
Chapter 4. Appealing Broadly or Narrowing Down? 83
by diversifying its agenda, but, for example, by dropping issues and replacing
them with the issues as put forward by challengers. The net result, then, being
stability in issue attention diversity. As such, the issue attention diversity perspec-
tive opens up new avenues for research on the impact of challenger parties on
patterns of party competition and on the politicization of new issues in advanced
democracies.
5Adaptation or Dismissal?
The Impact of Green, Far Right and Eurosceptic
Issue Entrepreneurs on the Agendas of Other Parties
?Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the Comparative Politics Colloquium of the Humboldt Uni-
versity Berlin (2015, Berlin); at the Work in Progress Workshop of the Berlin Graduate School of Social Sciences
at the Humboldt University Berlin (2015, Berlin) and at the 74th annual conference of the Midwest Political
Science Association (2016, Chicago). I thank Zachary Greene, Gijs Schumacher, Alina Vranceanu, Matthias
Orlowski, Tarik Abou-Chadi, Saara Inkinen, Philippe Joly and Sybille Luhmann for their constructive feedback.
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“ The central political fact in a free society is the tremendous contagious-ness of conflict. ”
Elmer E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People. A Realist’s View of
Democracy in America, 1960 (p.2)
5.1 Introduction
Dominant approaches to the study of political competition tend to focuson responsiveness, as ‘political markets’ are usually considered to func-tion properly when the promises and actions of political elites match the
preferences of the citizenry. As such, studies assess whether demand- and supply-
side preferences are ‘ideologically congruent’ (Dalton, 2015) and examine to what
extent elites ‘dynamically adapt’ to changes in political demand (Stimson, MacK-
uen and Erikson, 1995). However, innovation, although somewhat overlooked in
theoretical and empirical accounts, is equally important for healthy (political) mar-
kets (Franzmann, 2011).
But how do innovations in political issue markets occur? Traditional theories
of issue evolution (Carmines and Stimson, 1986), issue manipulation and heres-
thetics (Riker, 1982, 1986, 1993a) have focused on the initiators of change, as they
posit that politicians in disadvantageous positions seek to change the terms of
competition by introducing new issues. Building on these theories, studies show
how political losers in multiparty systems engage in ‘issue entrepreneurial’ strate-
gies by mobilizing previously ignored issues (Hobolt and de Vries, 2015) or issues
that drive a wedge in governing coalitions (van de Wardt, de Vries and Hobolt,
2014).
Identifying issue entrepreneurs is, however, only one side of the story; the
other being the response of their competitors. After all, a successful innovation, i.e.
whether a new issue becomes politicized and comes to feature prominently on the
‘party system agenda’ (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010), crucially depends
on whether other parties adapt to the new agenda or rather ignore it. As such, a
literature has emerged investigating whether parties ‘accommodate’ or ‘dismiss’
(Meguid, 2005) the promoted issues of issue entrepreneurs.
This chapter aims to contribute to our understanding of the impact of issue
entrepreneurs on other parties’ issue agendas by examining the consequences of
electoral support for green, far right and Eurosceptic parties on the evolution of
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green, immigration and European Union (EU) issues in western European party
systems. Previous studies have identified a contagious effect of the far right (van
Spanje, 2010; Abou-Chadi, 2014; Han, 2015) but dispute the impact of green par-
ties (Spoon, Hobolt and de Vries, 2014; Abou-Chadi, 2014). Moreover, studies on
the consequences of Eurosceptic party support have been limited to specific coun-
tries (van de Wardt, 2015) or have conceptualized contagion effects solely in terms
of positional shifts (Meijers, 2015). Here, the focus is on salience effects: do parties
adapt and shift attention to the issues brought forward by issue entrepreneurs, or
do they try to keep these issues off the agenda by downplaying their importance?
This is an important question as political agendas have become increasingly di-
verse and the competition between parties over which issues should dominate the
agenda has become more prominent (Green-Pedersen, 2007b).
Relying on data from both the Manifesto Project and the Chapel Hill expert
surveys, this chapter demonstrates how contagion effects vary across different
types of issue entrepreneurial strategies. First, it presents findings corroborating
previous work which argued that green and far right challengers have diverging
impacts on the salience strategies of other parties. Far right parties pressure other
parties in picking up their promoted issues while support for green parties leads
to de-emphasizing effects (cf. Abou-Chadi, 2014).
Second, this chapter maintains that Eurosceptic party support poses a dif-
ferent challenge to parties than does the electoral success of green and far right
challengers. These latter parties predominantly mobilize on the basis of environ-
mental and immigration issues and regard them as highly important. By contrast,
Eurosceptic parties do not uniformly regard EU issues as being exceptionally im-
portant to their party. As a result, their impact on the issue salience strategies
of other parties is conditioned by the salience they themselves attach to the EU
issue: if Eurosceptic parties regard EU issues to be important, a contagion effect
is observed.
As such, this chapter underlines that issue entrepreneurial strategies consist
of two aspects: (1) the issue entrepreneur should take a position that deviates from
the status quo, and (2) the issue entrepreneur should strongly publicize this po-
sition to the electorate (Carmines and Stimson, 1986; de Vries and Hobolt, 2012).
Only when these two conditions are met, this chapter argues, will electoral sup-
port for Eurosceptic parties have a contagious effect on the salience strategies of
other parties. This argument builds on recent studies that find Eurosceptic party
support only capable of influencing other parties’ policy positions on European
integration when the Eurosceptic challenger regards EU issues to be important
(cf. Meijers, 2015). This chapter extends this conditional logic and finds it to hold
for salience effects as well. Since green and far right parties uniformly regard
‘their’ issues as very important to the party, a conditional effect is in their cases
not observed. These results have important implications for our understanding of
patterns of issue evolution in European multiparty systems.
This chapter unfolds as follows. First, theories of issue evolution and issue
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entrepreneurship are briefly discussed and it is highlighted why EU, environmen-
tal and immigration issues are the focus of the analysis. Second, the literature
on party competition is examined as to derive hypotheses of the strategies parties
choose when confronted with issue entrepreneurs. Data, operationalization and
the empirical approach are subsequently introduced. After discussing the results,
the chapter closes with discussing its implications.
5.2 Issue Entrepreneurial Strategies
In classical theories of ‘issue evolution’ (Carmines and Stimson, 1986, 1989), po-
litical elites occupying losing positions on the extant dimension of conflict play
a crucial role. They have an incentive to change the status quo of politics and
shift attention to new issue dimensions, seeking “some alternative that beats the
current winner” (Riker, 1982, p.209). The ultimate goal of the political loser is
to create mass realignment, but for this to succeed two conditions must be met:
positional differences between parties on the new issue must be visible to voters
and voters should, in fact, care about these differences. As Carmines and Stim-
son (1986, p.903) phrase it; the new issue dimension should entail “clarified mass
cognitive images of the parties and then polarized affection toward them.”
The issue evolution model has been applied to describe the dynamics of
racial- (Carmines and Stimson, 1986, 1989), abortion- (Adams, 1997) and ‘culture
war’ issues (Lindaman and Haider-Markel, 2002) which have, indeed, come to de-
fine the party system in the United States and led to mass realignment. In a bit
more modest fashion, de Vries and Hobolt (2012) (see also Hobolt and de Vries,
2015) have applied these insights to their theory of issue entrepreneurship in mul-
tiparty systems, which involves the mobilization of a new issue dimension by par-
ties through addressing previously non-salient issue dimensions or by adopting
a deviant position on an already existing issue dimension (de Vries and Hobolt,
2012, p.250).
This chapter focuses on the European integration, environmental and im-
migration issue areas. Figure 5.1 depicts the rising importance of these issues to
parties. In the 1950s, these three issue areas combined made up less than 5 per
cent of an average election program. By 1990, the average attention to EU, green
and immigration issues in party programs had risen to over 15 per cent.
Why focus on these three issues? Previous work has outlined European in-
tegration as a case ‘par excellence’ to study the dynamics of issue entrepreneurial
strategies. Although most western European countries have been subject to simi-
lar integration pressures, politicization patterns of the issue in domestic political
systems exhibit remarkable variation (Kriesi et al., 2006; de Vries, 2007). Gener-
ally speaking, though, mainstream parties have shied away from addressing the
issue (van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004; Green-Pedersen, 2012); perhaps because it
does not fit the traditional left-right dimension (Kriesi et al., 2006; Hooghe, Marks
and Wilson, 2002) or because mainstream party voters are divided over questions
on European integration (van de Wardt, 2014b). As a result, politicization at the
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Figure 5.1 – Attention to European integration, Environmental and
Immigration Issues in Party Manifestos, 1950-2013
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Note: Based on data from the Manifesto Project (MRG-CMP-MARPOR). For the operationalization
of the EU, green and immigration issue dimensions, see section 5.4.
party level has been mainly driven by Eurosceptical fringe parties (de Vries and
Edwards, 2009; Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 2002) as European voters are respon-
sive to their issue entrepreneurial strategies (de Vries and Hobolt, 2012; Hobolt
and de Vries, 2015).
The patterns of the evolution of immigration and environmental issues in
European party systems are, to a certain extent, similar. Immigration issues have
always been of ideological concern for mainstream right parties (Bale, 2008) and
have been politicized, in some cases, before the electoral rise of the far right
(Alonso and Fonseca, 2011). At the same time, however, immigration issues have
been proven to be internally divisive and, hence, risky to address for mainstream
parties (van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008; Dahlstro¨m and Esaiasson, 2011; Bale,
2008). Across Europe, far right parties have successfully mobilized voters, primar-
ily, but not solely, on the basis of their stances on the immigration issue dimension
(Mudde, 2007; Norris, 2005; Meguid, 2005). Finally, green parties have succeeded
to reach out to ‘left-libertarian’ constituencies (Kitschelt, 1988), predominantly by
emphasizing environmental issues, on which they are now widely regarded as
‘issue owners’ (Spoon, Hobolt and de Vries, 2014; Abou-Chadi, 2014).
In order to fully understand innovations in political issue markets, however,
the identification of issue entrepreneurial strategies is only the first step. Crucial
for processes of politicization is the strategic response of other parties in the sys-
tem. Do they adapt to the new agenda; i.e. engage in competition with the issue
entrepreneur on the new issue dimension, or do they dismiss it, aiming to keep the
issue off the agenda? Green-Pedersen (2012) has argued, in this context, how the
relative absence of competition on EU issues in the Danish party system should
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be understand in light of the incentives for (de)politicization the issue offers for
mainstream parties. In the following, therefore, this chapter theorizes on parties’
issue strategies when confronted with issue entrepreneurs.
5.3 Issue Entrepreneurs & their Impact on Rival Parties
How do parties respond to the issue entrepreneurial strategies of Eurosceptic, far
right and green parties? Considering spatial conceptions of electoral competition
(Downs, 1957), parties should re-position themselves following the electoral suc-
cess of issue entrepreneurs. Indeed, studies have found that parties shift towards
more restrictive positions on immigration issues in response to increasing far right
support (van Spanje, 2010; Abou-Chadi, 2014; Han, 2015) and towards more Eu-
rosceptic positions when pressured by Eurosceptic party support (Meijers, 2015).
From an issue salience perspective, parties’ strategic options are more com-
plex. On the one hand, parties benefit from selectively emphasizing issues that are
beneficial to them (Budge and Farlie, 1983; Robertson, 1976; Dolezal et al., 2014),
for example because the electorate perceives them to be competent on the issue
(Petrocik, 1996). As such, when confronted with a successful issue entrepreneur,
parties might be tempted to drop the issue from the agenda, consistent with
Riker’s dominance principle, which holds that politicians have a strategic incen-
tive to cease from discussing an issue when ‘the other side’ dominates it (Riker,
1993a, p.81). By keeping the issue off the agenda, parties signal to voters that it is
not important. In the long run, such dismissive strategies can erode electoral sup-
port for the issue entrepreneur (Meguid, 2005; Dahlstro¨m and Esaiasson, 2011).
Bale et al. (2010, p.413) refer to this as a strategy of defusing new issues, as parties
seek to decrease the relevance of the issue in an attempt to “‘heresthetically’ [...]
reset the political agenda.”
On the other hand, parties cannot always simply ignore issues they would
not like to see discussed. Although salience theories predict politicians to talk
past each other in election campaigns (Riker, 1993a), empirical studies have ex-
posed significant overlap in the issues parties address (Sigelman and Buell, 2004;
Damore, 2004, 2005; Green-Pedersen, 2007b). Apparently, there is a strong ‘com-
mon agenda’ component to parties’ issue profiles (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen,
2010) (see also Chapter 3). Pressured by increasing support for issue entrepreneurs,
parties might feel compelled to pick up their promoted issues.
Taking into account the electoral risks and opportunities associated with
strategies of accommodation and dismissal, parties face a delicate trade-off when
confronted with successful issue entrepreneurs. An accommodative strategy is
likely to legitimize the promoted issue of the issue entrepreneur in the eyes of
the voters (Bale, 2003; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006) and establish the issue promi-
nently on the ‘party system agenda’ (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010). As
such, it might cause voter movements towards the issue entrepreneur (Meguid,
2005).
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However, parties might also benefit from further politicization of the pro-
moted issues of the issue entrepreneur. Accommodating the far right’s immigra-
tion appeals by centre-right parties is often understood as a deliberate strategy to
reach out to left-authoritarian voters (cf. Abou-Chadi, 2014). These voters make
up a substantial share of European electorates (van der Brug and van Spanje, 2009)
and are tempted to desert centre-left parties when immigration issues are primed
(Lefkofridi, Wagner and Willmann, 2014). Even if these voters turn to support the
far right, the ‘right bloc’ profits and finds itself in a situation to form right-wing
governments (Bale, 2003). As such, an accommodative strategy in this case might
undermine electoral support for one established party (the centre left) and create
an advantageous situation for another (the centre right), even if voters turn to the
issue entrepreneur (the far right).
As Abou-Chadi (2014) has convincingly argued, parties take into account
the type of issue and the type of issue entrepreneur when calculating the expected
benefits and costs that are likely to result from the politicization of an issue. Envi-
ronmental issues have a high valence component (Stokes, 1963) and green parties
clearly ‘own’ the issue (Spoon, Hobolt and de Vries, 2014; Abou-Chadi, 2014). By
contrast, immigration issues have a higher positional component to them and far
right parties are not issue owners. Moreover, the environment, as an issue, is eas-
ily integrated into the dominant left-right dimension (Kriesi et al., 2006) and, thus,
does not offer the same cross-cutting electoral opportunities as do immigration
issues. Taking this into account, the risk of partisan realignment towards the issue
entrepreneur is much higher when green issues are concerned, and much lower
when it comes to immigration issues. As a result, Abou-Chadi (2014) argues, par-
ties will dismiss green parties’ agendas but increase the salience of immigration
issues when confronted with far right challengers.
Building on this logic and taking into account the type of issue and the type
of issue entrepreneur, I argue that it is likely that increasing Eurosceptic party sup-
port pressures other parties in taking up EU issues. First, European integration is
a clear example of a positional issue, with both political elites and voters taking
pro-EU and anti-EU stances, ensuring great potential for contestation in domestic
politics (van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004; de Vries, 2007; Taggart and Szczerbiak,
2008). Second, Eurosceptical parties do not enjoy ownership on EU issues; if
anything, centre-right parties dominate the issue (Seeberg, 2014, p.22-23). Third,
EU issues are orthogonal to the left-right dimension (Kriesi et al., 2006; Hooghe,
Marks and Wilson, 2002) and can be approached in both cultural and economic
frames (Kitschelt, 2007, p.543). This opens up possibilities for cross-cutting elec-
toral appeals; right of centre parties, for example, can exploit Euroscepticism to
appeal to the support base of the far right (Werts, Scheepers and Lubbers, 2012).
Finally, partisan elites have, over the last decades, shifted towards more Euroscep-
tic positions pressured by, indeed, Eurosceptic party support (Meijers, 2015). It is
unlikely that these positional shifts are not accompanied by corresponding shifts
in issue salience, as parties need to explain and defend their new position (cf.
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Meguid, 2005). Hence, I expect parties to shift salience to EU issues in response to
increasing support for Eurosceptic parties.
In sum, the discussion above leads to different expectations on how parties
adjust their issue salience strategies when confronted with different types of issue
entrepreneurial strategies. I summarize these in the following hypothesis:
H1: Salience Contagion Hypothesis:
Parties increase their emphasis on EU and immigration issues when
confronted with increasing electoral support for Eurosceptic and far
right parties, and decrease emphasis on green issues when confronted
with increasing electoral support for green parties
In addition, I argue that the impact of Eurosceptic party support on the
agendas of other parties is conditional, depending upon the importance the chal-
lengers themselves attach to EU issues. As highlighted above, parties pursue issue
entrepreneurial strategies by taking a deviant position on an issue dimension and
by strongly publicizing this position to the electorate. The second point is where
Eurosceptic parties differ from green and far right parties. These latter parties
regard ‘their’ issues as highly important. By contrast, Eurosceptic parties do not
perceive EU issues to be unequivocally important to their party. Figure 5.2 serves
to illustrate this difference.
Figure 5.2 – Importance of EU, Green and Immigration Issues to Parties
EU Issues
Eurosceptic Parties
Other Parties
Green Issues    
Green Parties
Other Parties
0 1 2 3 4
Importance of Issue to Party (0=no importance, 4=extremely important)
Immigration Issues
Far right Parties
Other Parties
Note: Based on data from several CHES rounds. The question on EU issues was available for
1984-2010, the green issue item was only asked in the 2010 round and the immigration question
was available for 2006 and 2010. For the classification of Eurosceptic, green and far right parties,
see table 5.1.
Chapter 5. Adaptation or Dismissal? 92
Using data from the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES) (Bakker et al., 2015),
figure 5.2 shows how green and far right parties consider environmental and im-
migration issues as particularly important to their party. Parties that take Eu-
rosceptic positions, however, are more divided; some parties perceive European
integration to be of great significance, others as hardly of any importance. In fact,
figure 5.2 depicts no considerable differences between Eurosceptic parties and all
other parties when it comes to the salience of EU issues. This should not come
as a surprise since parties that oppose the EU form a rather heterogeneous group,
including peripheral parties on the far left and far right (Taggart, 1998; Hooghe,
Marks and Wilson, 2002; de Vries and Edwards, 2009) and single-issue parties that
were, at least initially, formed solely to mobilize opposition to the EU (e.g. the UK
Independence Party; see Usherwood (2008)).
If Eurosceptic parties do not regard EU issues as important, it is unlikely
that their electoral success will pressure other parties in adapting to their agenda
(cf. Meijers, 2015). Indeed, the salience Eurosceptic parties attach to EU issues de-
termines the degree to which they actually pursue issue entrepreneurial strategies
and, in turn, conditions the impact they have on the agendas on other parties. In a
similar vein, de Vries (2007) has argued that EU issue voting in national elections
is only likely to occur when partisan conflicts over European integration is accom-
panied by increasing salience of the issue. I formalize this conditional expectation
in the following hypothesis:
H2: Conditional EU Salience Hypothesis:
Parties increase the salience of EU issues in response to Eurosceptic
party support only if Eurosceptic parties regard EU issues as important
5.4 Data & Operationalization
To test the hypotheses explicated above, I run three models predicting party em-
phasis on environmental, immigration and EU issues. I employ data from both the
Manifesto Project (MRG-CMP-MARPOR) (Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al.,
2006; Volkens et al., 2014) and from several rounds of the Chapel Hill Expert Sur-
veys (CHES). Specifically, I use the 1999-2010 CHES trendfile (Bakker et al., 2015)
and combine it with the Ray dataset which covers the years 1984-1996 (Ray, 1999).1
For the models predicting party emphasis on environmental and immigra-
tion issues, I rely on the MGRG-CMP-MARPOR data. The dataset includes infor-
mation on almost all parties that are classified in this chapter as green and far right
parties and has been used in other studies on the contagion effects of green and
far right parties (Spoon, Hobolt and de Vries, 2014; Abou-Chadi, 2014; Han, 2015).
Unfortunately, most of the parties that are classified as Eurosceptic parties are not
included in the MRG-CMP-MARPOR dataset (cf. Meijers, 2015, p.4). Therefore,
1The combined Ray-CHES dataset includes information on the following years: 1984, 1988, 1992,
1996, 1999, 2002, 2006 and 2010.
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for information on party issue emphasis on EU issues, I rely on the Ray-CHES
data.2
Both datasets do not come without criticism. Several methodological de-
bates are associated with the MRG-CMP-MARPOR data, but for the large part
these have to do with inferring party policy positions from the data (Gemenis,
2013). Here, I am only interested in issue salience strategies. The data allows for
such measurement as quasi-sentences in party manifestos are coded by hand and
categorized into one of the 56 issue categories, enabling researchers to infer the
relative importance of issues to parties. Expert surveys are sometimes criticized
for measuring party reputations on issues instead of actual positions. Moreover, it
is not always clear on which exact criteria experts evaluate parties (Budge, 2000).
However, Steenbergen and Marks (2007) have addressed these issues and point
out, for example, that cross-expert variation is limited. In addition, the reliability
of the CHES data has also been demonstrated elsewhere (Hooghe et al., 2010).
5.4.1 Dependent Variables
The dependent variables in this chapter are party emphases on environmental,
immigration and EU issues. To measure environmental issue emphasis, I use the
items from the MRG-CMP-MARPOR data representing pro-environmental state-
ments (per501 ‘Environmental Protection: Positive’) and the item representing anti-
growth economy statements (per416 ‘Anti-Growth Economy: Positive’), which in-
cludes favourable mentions of anti-growth politics, ecologism, green politics and
sustainable development. This operationalization of the green issue dimension
follows Green-Pedersen (2007b) and Stoll (2010). In order to create a positional
dimension, some studies also include an item measuring favourable mentions of
productivity, as this can be regarded as being opposed to statements stressing en-
vironmental protection and sustainable growth (Abou-Chadi, 2014; Lowe et al.,
2011; Carter, 2006). Since the hypotheses in this chapter explicate salience shifts
rather than positional shifts, I refrain from including this item and only use items
that directly refer to environmental politics (cf. Green-Pedersen, 2007b).
Parties’ emphasis on immigration issues is captured using items represent-
ing positive and negative statements regarding multiculturalism (per607 ‘Multicul-
turalism: Positive’ and per608 ‘Multiculturalism: Negative’), items representing pos-
itive and negative statements regarding the national way of life, which includes
statements on patriotism and nationalism (per601 ‘National Way of Life: Positive’
and per602 ‘National Way of Life: Negative’) and item per705 ‘Underprivileged Mi-
nority Groups: Positive’, which includes references to immigrant groups. Since the
MRG-CMP-MARPOR data does not include items that directly measure immigra-
tion statements, scholars have used different items to gauge the importance of the
immigration issue dimension to parties. The above mentioned items are, although
2I note that the Ray-CHES data does not include information on environmental and immgration
issue emphases in every round. The question on the salience parties attach to environmental
issues was only included in the 2006 round and the immigration issue item is only available for
2006 and 2010.
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in varying combinations, used frequently in recent studies (Abou-Chadi, 2014;
Alonso and Fonseca, 2011; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Stoll, 2010). Some studies
also include items capturing references to traditional morality and law and order
(Meguid, 2005). Altough these issues are part of the larger agenda of the far right
(Mudde, 1999), this chapter seeks to explain the impact of far right support on the
evolution of immigration issues (which are usually seen as their ‘primary issues’
(Mudde, 2007)), and therefore it excludes these items from the operationalization.
The third dependent variable, finally, captures the importance of the EU
issue to parties using the item in the Ray-CHES data asking experts to indicate
the relative importance of the EU issue in the party’s public stance. To ensure
comparability, I rescale all three dependent variables to 0-4 scores, with higher
values indicating greater emphasis on the respective issue.
5.4.2 Independent Variables
Electoral support for issue entrepreneurs constitutes the main predictor in this
chapter. Parties are classified as green and far right issue entrepreneurs following
recent studies (Abou-Chadi, 2014; Spoon, Hobolt and de Vries, 2014; Mudde, 2007;
Norris, 2005). For the classification of Eurosceptic parties, I rely on the concep-
tual distinction between ‘hard Euroscepticism’ and ‘soft Euroscepticism’ as put
forward by Szczerbiak and Taggart (2000). Building on an earlier contribution by
Taggart (1998), who distinguishes between ‘outright and unqualified opposition’
and ‘contingent and qualified opposition’ to the process of European integration;
‘hard’ Eurosceptic parties are those parties that voice principled opposition to
the EU while ‘soft’ Euroscepticism is there where concerns on policy areas exist.
Since over the last decades the ‘permissive consensus’ on European integration
shifted towards a ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2009), contingent
opposition on some policy areas hardly constitutes a ‘new’ issue-stance. There-
fore, following the conceptualization of issue entrepreneurs used in this chapter
as those parties that seek to innovate the political issue market by bringing ‘new’
issues to the fore, I consider only hard-Eurosceptic parties to be genuine issue
entrepreneurs. The classification of parties is consequently based on Taggart and
Szczerbiak (2008, p.11).
Vote shares of the issue entrepreneurs are taken from the MRG-CMP-MARPOR
and the Ray-CHES data, and updated using information from the ParlGov database
(Do¨ring and Manow, 2015). If multiple issue entrepreneurs of the same fashion
(e.g. more than one far right party) were present in a given election year, vote
shares are summed as to capture the combined pressure that is exercised on par-
ties as to respond to their issue appeals. A list of all the parties classified as issue
entrepreneurs is shown in table 5.1.
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Table 5.1 – Green, Far Right & Eurosceptic Issue Entrepreneurs
Country Party First Election
Green Parties
Austria The Greens 1986
(Die Gru¨nen — Die Gru¨ne Alternative)
Belgium Ecologists 1981
(Ecolo)
Live Differently — Green! 1981
(Agalev — Groen!)
Denmark Greens 1987
(De Grønne)∗∗∗
Finland Green League 1983
(Vihrea¨ Liitto)
France Greens 1983
(Les Verts)
Germany Greens 1983
(Bu¨ndins 90 — Die Gru¨nen)
Greece – –
Iceland Left-Green Movement 1999
(Vinstri Græn)
Ireland Green Party 1989
(Comhaontas Glas)
Italy Green Federation 1987
(Federazione dei Verdi)
Luxembourg The Greens 1984
(De´i Gre´ng)
The Netherlands GreenLeft 1989
(GroenLinks)
Norway – –
Portugal Greens 1983
(Os Verdes)
Spain Initiative for Catalonia Greens 2000
(Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds)∗∗∗
Sweden Greens 1988
(Miljo¨partiet de Gro¨na)
Switzerland Greens 1979
(Gru¨ne – E´cologiste)
United Kingdom Green Party∗∗∗ 1987
Far Right Parties
Austria Alliance for the Future of Austria 2006
(Bu¨ndnis Zukunft O¨sterreich)
Freedom Party 1986
(Freiheitliche Partei O¨sterreichs) (since 1986)
Belgium National Front 1991
(Front National)∗∗
Flemish Bloc / Flemish Interest 1978
(Vlaams Blok / Vlaams Belang)
Denmark Danish People’s Party 1998
(Dansk Folkeparti)
Progress Party 1973
(continued)
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(Table 5.1 – continued)
Country Party First Election
(Fremskridtspartiet)
Finland True Finns 1995
(Perussuomalaiset) (since 1995)
France National Front 1986
(Front National)
Germany German People’s Union 1998
(Deutsche Volksunion)∗∗
The Republicans 1990
(Die Republikaner)∗∗
National Democratic Party of Germany 1965
(Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands)∗∗
Greece Popular Orthodox Rally 2004
(Laı¨ko´s Ortho´doxos Synagermo´s)∗∗
Iceland – –
Ireland – –
Italy National Alliance 1996
(Alleanza Nazionale) (since 1995)
Northern League 1992
(Lega Nord)
Social Movement – Tricolour Flame 2008
(Movimento Sociale – Fiamma Tricolore)∗∗
Luxembourg – –
The Netherlands Centre Democrats 1989
(Centrum Democraten)∗∗
List Pim Fortuyn 2002
(Lijst Pim Fortuyn)
Party for Freedom 2006
(Partij voor de Vrijheid)
Norway Progress Party 1973
(Fremskrittspartiet)
Portugal – –
Spain – –
Sweden New Democracy 1991
(Ny Demokrati)
Sweden Democrats 2002
(Sverigedemokraterna)
Switzerland Freedom Party of Switzerland 1987
(Freiheitspartei der Schweiz)
National Action for People and Fatherland / Swiss Democrats 1967
(Nationale Aktion fu¨r Vok und Heimat / Schweizer Demokraten)
Swiss People’s Party (since 1971) 1971
(Schweizerische Volkspartei)
United Kingdom – –
Eurosceptic Parties
Austria – –
Belgium Belgian Labour Party 1974
(Partij van de Arbeid van Belgie¨ – Parti du Travail de Belgique)
Flemish Bloc / Flemish Interest 1978
(Vlaams Blok / Vlaams Belang)
Communist Party 1925
(Kommunistische Partij — Parti Communiste)
(continued)
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(Table 5.1 – continued)
Country Party First Election
Denmark Unity List – Red-Green Alliance 1990
(Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne)
Finland League for Free Finland 1995
(Vapaan Suomen Liitto)∗
Communist Party of Finland 2003
(Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue (Yhtena¨isyys))∗
France National Front 1986
(Front National)
French Communist Party 1924
(Parti Communiste Franc¸aise)
Workers’ Struggle 1973
(Lutte Ouvrie`re)
Revolutionary Communist League 2002
(Ligue Communiste Re´volutionnaire)
National Republican Movement 2002
(Mouvement National Re´publicain)
Germany German People’s Union 1998
(Deutsche Volksunion)
The Republicans 1990
(Die Republikaner)
National Democratic Party of Germany 1965
(Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands)∗
Greece Communist Party 1974
(Kommounistiko´ Ko´mma Ella´das)
Ireland Ourselves Alone 1982
(Sinn Fe´in)
Italy Northern League 1992
(Lega Nord)
Luxembourg – –
The Netherlands Party for Freedom 2006
(Partij voor de Vrijheid)
Portugal – –
Spain – –
Sweden Greens 1988
(Miljo¨partiet de Gro¨na)
Left Party 1920
(Va¨nsterpartiet)
United Kingdom United Kingdom Independence Party 2001
British National Party 2010
∗∗∗ : Green party is not included in CMP data; ∗∗ : Far right party is not included in CMP data; ∗ : Eurosceptic party is not included in CHES data.
To evaluate the conditional hypothesis (h2), I construct a measure of the
salience that issue entrepreneurs attach to the issues they promote. For green and
far right parties, the variable is based on MRG-CMP-MARPOR data and, con-
sequently, indicates to what extent these parties emphasize environmental and
immigration issues in their election manifestos. The salience that Eurosceptic par-
ties attach to EU issues is captured using the Ray-CHES data. If multiple issue
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entrepreneurs were present, the average salience is calculated, similar to Meijers
(2015, p.5)
Turning now to the control variables, all models include controls for party
size (at t − 1) and incumbency status, as larger parties might find it easier to
respond to issue entreprenuers by picking up their promoted issue since they are
generally better capable of maintaining broad issue profiles (Wagner and Meyer,
2014). Parties in government are, compared to opposition parties, considered to
respond stronger to issues brought up in the party system (Green-Pedersen and
Mortensen, 2010). I also control for GDP growth in all models, as increasing
growth rates allow parties to focus their attention on non-economic concerns.3 I
use the percentage of change in GDP growth rates one year before the election
(or 1 year before the expert survey was fielded); the data is taken from the World
Bank (2015).
The models predicting green issue emphasis and EU issue importance in-
clude time dummies indicating the period following the Chernobyl disaster and
the introduction of the Euro. In both cases the salience of the respective issue
is thought to have increased. Finally, the models predicting immigration issue
emphasis include a measure of the actual immigration rate. I take the inflow of
immigrants per capita, one year before the election, combining OECD (2015) data
on the yearly inflow of immigrants and Eurostat (2015) data on population size.
After dropping all parties from the sample classified as issue entrepreneurs,
in order to avoid endogeneity problems, and all parties that contested less than
2 elections, in order to create meaningful time-series, the data sets for the green
and immigration issue models include information on 146 political parties in 18
European democracies.4 The data set for the EU models comprises information on
138 parties in 14 countries (non EU-member states, and Luxembourg since it is not
included in the Ray-CHES data, are dropped from the sample). The time period
under investigation is 1980 onwards. Summary statistics of all the variables can be
found in table 5.2 while table 5.3 provides an overview of the operationalization
of the variables.
5.5 Estimation Technique
I estimate several pooled time-series-cross-sectional models to examine the ef-
fects of electoral support for issue entrepreneurs on the issue agendas of other
parties. Given the structure of the data, several types of dependencies in the
error terms are likely to occur; specifically, the error terms within panels (i.e.
3Conversely, it has also been argued that governing parties seek to divert attention to other issues
when the economy is performing poorly (see Vavreck, 2009; Greene, 2015). In that case, the
expected sign of the coefficient would be positive.
4The following countries are included: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Great-Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
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Table 5.2 – Descriptive Statistics
Models predicting green &
immigration issue emphasis (CMP data) n Mean Sd Min Max
Green issue emphasis 914 0.339 0.329 0.000 4.000
Immigration issue emphasis 914 0.355 0.357 0.000 3.297
Green party supportt−1 814 2.595 3.400 0.000 14.350
Far right party supportt−1 814 4.716 6.913 0.000 27.650
Party sizet−1 814 16.281 13.692 0.000 51.287
GDP growth ratet−1 914 2.211 2.191 −5.185 9.084
Immigration ratet−1 690 6.807 6.032 0.113 30.285
Mean green issue saliece green parties 717 0.676 0.817 0.000 2.865
Mean immigration issue salience far right parties 717 0.310 0.610 0.000 4.000
Dichotomous variables %
Incumbent party (gov/opp) 914 34.42%
Chernobyl (>04.1986) 914 81.73%
Models predicting EU issue emphasis
(CHES data) n Mean Sd Min Max
EU issue emphasis 770 2.418 0.714 0.000 4.000
Eurosceptic party supportt−1 771 3.685 5.410 0.000 24.800
Party sizet−1 757 12.584 13.587 0.000 51.300
GDP growth ratet−1 771 1.836 2.8938 −8.269 9.634
Mean EU issue salience Eurosceptic parties 771 1.160 1.281 0.000 4.000
Dichotomous variables %
Incumbent party (gov/opp) 771 33.20%
Euro (≥2002) 771 31.13%
Table 5.3 – Operationalization of the Variables
Dependent variables Indicator Data source
Green issue emphasis Sum of attention to green issues Own calculation
(per501+ per416) Volkens et al. (2014)
Immigration issue emphasis Sum of attention to immigration issues Own calculation
(per607+ per608+ per601+ per602+ per705) Volkens et al. (2014)
EU issue emphasis Expert-survey item Bakker et al. (2015) &
Salience of European integration in party’s public stance Ray (1999)
Independent variables Indicator Data source
Green party support Vote share green partiest−1 Volkens et al. (2014) &
(for list of green parties see table 5.1) Do¨ring and Manow (2015)
Far right party support Vote share far right partiest−1 Volkens et al. (2014) &
(for list of far right parties see table 5.1) Do¨ring and Manow (2015)
Eurosceptic party support Vote share Eurosceptic partiest−1 Bakker et al. (2015) &
(for list of Eurosceptic parties see table 5.1) Do¨ring and Manow (2015)
Control variables Indicator Data source
Incumbent party 1 if in government in period preceding election Volkens et al. (2014) &
or in year of expert survey wave, otherwise 0 Bakker et al. (2015)
Party size Vote share electiont−1 Volkens et al. (2014) &
Bakker et al. (2015)
GDP Change (%) in GDP growth ratet−1 the World Bank (2015)
Immigration rate Yearly inflow of immigrants per capitat−1 OECD (2015) & Eurostat (2015)
Chernobyl Time dummy, 1 if date > April 1986, 0 otherwise
Euro Time dummy, 1 if date ≥ 2002, 0 otherwise
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parties) might correlate over time (‘serial correlation’) and it is likely that the er-
ror terms are not independently and identically distributed across panels (‘panel-
heteroskedasticity’). Tests indeed indicate the presence of these types of autocor-
relation in the data.5 Adding a lagged dependent variable (LDV) to the right-hand
side of the equation is a solution to absorb the effect of the dependent variable at
t− 1 on the value of the dependent variable at time t. However, this would reduce
the N and it has been argued that adding an LDV to the model can lead to some
estimation problems (Plu¨mper, Troeger and Manow, 2005; Achen, 2000). There-
fore, as an alternative, I rely on a Prais-Winsten transformation for ordinary least
squares (OLS) to account for the panel-specific autoregressive(1) error structure.
Moreover, to account for the fact that parties are nested within countries and years,
the standard errors are clustered by party (the cross-sectional identifier) and are,
as such, robust to panel-heteroskedasticity. Finally, as the hypotheses explicate a
causal effect of support for issue entrepreneurs on the agendas of other parties, I
use party-dummy fixed effects and restrict the analysis to within-party over time
variation (Abou-Chadi, 2014).
The following models are estimated:
Salience Green [Immigration] [EU] issuesi,t =
β0 + β1
(
Green [FarRight] [Eurosceptic] Party Supporti,t−1
)
+
(
controls
)
+ υi + ei,t
(5.1)
Salience Green [Immigration] [EU] issuesi,t =
β0 + β1
(
Green [FarRight] [Eurosceptic] Party Supporti,t−1
)
+ β2
(
Mean Issue Salience Issue Entrepreneursi,t−1
)
+ β3
(
Green [FarRight] [Eurosceptic] Party Supporti,t−1
×Mean Issue Salience Issue Entrepreneursi,t−1
)
+
(
controls
)
+ υi + ei,t
(5.2)
where subscript i denotes parties and t indicates time. The first model serves the
aim to evaluate whether the electoral success of issue entrepreneurs has a direct
effect on the issue agendas of other parties (H1). The second model incorporates
the salience green, far right and Eurosceptic parties attach to ‘their’ issues and
includes an interaction effect of this variable with the electoral support variable as
to evaluate the conditional hypothesis (H2).
5.6 Results
Table 5.4 presents the regression results. It shows how electoral support for issue
entrepreneurs at t− 1 impacts the issue salience strategies of other parties at time
5A Wooldridge test (Wooldridge, 2002; Drukker, 2003) was used to detect the presence of serial
correlation in the data and a modified Wald test (Greene, 2000; Baum, 2001) suggested rejection of
the null-hypothesis of no groupwise heteroskedasticity.
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Table 5.4 – Regression Models Predicting Party Emphases of Green,
Immigration and European Integration Issues
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Green issues Immigration issues EU issues
CMP data CMP data CHES data
Green Party Supportt−1 −0.0167∗∗∗
(0.0040)
Far Right Party Supportt−1 0.0113∗∗
(0.0054)
Eurosceptic Party Supportt−1 0.0211∗∗∗
(0.0073)
Incumbent Party 0.0098 −0.0287 0.0567
(0.0235) (0.040) (0.0565)
Party Size 0.0024 0.0053 −0.0059
(0.0017) (0.0075) (0.0050)
GDP 0.0009 0.0149∗ −0.0148∗∗
(0.0041) (0.0084) (.0058)
Chernobyl 0.1467∗∗∗
(0.0176)
Immigration rate (log) 0.0230∗
(0.0176)
Euro 0.3963∗∗∗
(0.0456)
(Constant) 0.9997∗∗∗ 0.9977∗∗∗ 1.7210∗∗∗
(0.0702) (0.2988) (0.0976)
N 810 609 756
Party Clusters 146 130 135
R2 0.6404 0.5027 0.4684
Note: Prais-Winsten regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by party in paren-
theses and party dummy fixed effects (not shown in table). ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
(two-tailed tests). The dependent variables capture the importance of green, immigration and EU
issues to parties at t0 measured on a 0-4 scale using party manifesto data (model 1 &2) and expert
survey data (model 3).
t, as the three estimated coefficients are statistically significant. The impact differs,
however, across the types of issue entrepreneurs. Green party support leads other
parties to de-emphasize environmental issues, as indicated by the negative sign
of the estimated coefficient. Far right support, on the other hand, leads to further
politicization of the immigration issue on the agendas of other parties. These
results are in line with those reported by Abou-Chadi (2014), who investigated
shifts in mainstream parties’ agendas only and used a different operationalization
of green and immigration issue importance.6 As such, these results offer further
support for the argument that green and far right parties have diverging effects
on the electoral strategies of other parties (Abou-Chadi, 2014).
6Abou-Chadi (2014) used items per607 ‘Multiculturalism: Positive’ and per608 ‘Multiculturalism:
Negative’ to measure immigration issue salience and items per501 ‘Environmental Protection: Posi-
tive’ and per410 ‘Productivity: Positive’ for environemtal issue salience
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Euroscepticism has a contagious effect on the issue salience strategies of
other parties. The estimated coefficient for Eurosceptic party support is positive
and statistically significant (β = .002). An increase in support for Eurosceptic
parties by 1 standard deviation corresponds, ceteris paribus, with a 0.11 increase of
importance of EU issues in the agendas of other parties, measured on a 0− 4 scale.
Thus, Eurosceptic party support is not only capable of changing mainstream party
policy positions on European integration (Meijers, 2015), it also leads other parties
to increase the salience of the issue. This supports findings on the politicization
of European integration matters in Denmark, where it has been shown that fringe
party mobilization of the issue leads other parties to address EU issues more
heavily in their parliamentary questions and speeches (van de Wardt, 2015).
Turning to the control variables, the models find no effect for party size or
governing status. The time dummy coefficients (Chernobyl and the introduction
of the Euro) suggest that parties increased the salience of green and EU issues
following these events. Parties’ emphasis on immigration issues positively corre-
sponds with changes in immigration rates, which supports arguments stressing
the dynamic relationship between societal developments and issue concerns of
political elites (Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson, 1995).
In the second step of the analysis, I estimate the three main models again,
this time including a measure of the average salience issue entrepreneurs attach
to their issues, and interaction terms between this variable and the variable indi-
cating electoral support for issue entrepreneurs. Figure 5.3 presents the marginal
effects plots (Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006), the accompanying regression ta-
bles can be found in Appendix D (table D.1).
Figure 5.3(a) depicts the marginal effect of Eurosceptic party support on the
salience of EU issues in other parties’ agendas across the variable indicating the
extent to which Eurosceptic parties regard EU issues as important for their party.
A conditional effect of Eurosceptic party support is clearly visible: if Eurosceptic
parties find EU issues not to be important, their support at t − 1 has a negative
effect on the issue salience of other parties at time t. If Eurosceptic parties regard
EU issues as important, on the other hand, their electoral success has a contagious
effect. This positive effect is observed at a value of the conditioning variable of 2.6
and higher; a value of 3 in the Ray-CHES data indicates that the EU issue is one of
the most important issues for the party. This result is in line with the conditional
hypothesis (h2) as put forward in this chapter and underscores that, on the EU
issue dimension, contagion effects are only observed when parties are confronted
with issue entrepreneurs that publicize their issues strongly. As such, the con-
ditional impact of Euroscepticism on mainstream party positioning, as found by
Meijers (2015), is suggested to also hold for a broader sample of parties (as in this
chapter also non-mainstream parties are included) and, more importantly, can be
extended to apply to salience models of party competition.
Figure 5.3(b) and 5.3(c) show the conditional effect of support for issue en-
trepreneurs in the case of green and far right parties. Both figures indicate that
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Figure 5.3 – Marginal Effects of Support for Issue Entrepreneurs on
Other Parties’ Issue Emphases
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Note: The figures show marginal effect plots with 95% confidence
intervals. The rug plots indicate individual observations for the
conditioning variable. Tables with the coefficient estimates can be
found in appendix D (table D.1).
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the impact of green and far right party support does not depend upon the impor-
tance these parties attach to ‘their’ issues. Parties de-emphasize environmental
issues in response to green party support and emphasize immigration issues in
response to far right party support, no matter the emphasis green or far right
parties themselves put on their issues. The conditioning variables in these cases
are based on party manifesto data and are more heavily right-skewed than the
conditioning variable in 5.3(a), which is based on the Ray-CHES data. There are
fewer observations for larger values in these cases, which is also indicated by the
large confidence intervals in plots (b) and (c), implying that we should be cautious
when interpreting these results.
Taken together, though, the results suggest support for the main arguments
as put forward in this chapter. First, not only green and far right party support,
but also Eurosceptic party support puts a pressure on other parties to adjust their
issue salience strategies. Second, the contagion effect of Eurosceptic parties is
conditional, depending on whether these parties pursue an issue entrepreneurial
strategy which consists of a strong issue salience aspect, in addition to their de-
viant policy position. Third, such a conditional effect seems to be absent, or at
least limited, in as far as green and far right issue entrepreneurs are concerned.
5.6.1 Robustness Checks
I carry out several sensitivity analyses to test the stability of the results presented
above. First, I run model 3, predicting emphasis on EU issues, using data from
the MRG-CMP-MARPOR dataset. To recall, I employ the Ray-CHES data in the
main analysis since many of the Eurosceptic parties are, in contrast to many of the
green and far right parties, not included in the MRG-CMP-MARPOR data and in-
formation on their issue salience strategies is necessary to evaluate the conditional
hypothesis (h2). However, hypothesis 1 requires only information on vote shares
of the Eurosceptic parties; hence, I can test the unconditional impact of Euroscep-
tic party support on the EU issue salience of other parties using both datasets.
I sum the two items in the MRG-CMP-MARPOR data that include references to
European integration (per108 ‘European integration: Positive’ and per110 ‘European
integration: Negative’) to gauge the importance of EU issues in party manifestos.
Table D.2 in Appendix D presents the results of this analysis, and shows that the
results, both in terms of statistical significance and substantive interpretation, are
highly similar. This should increase confidence in the presented results not simply
being an artefact of different datasets used in different models.
Second, I re-estimate all the models in the main analysis for a subsample
of mainstream parties only. Studies on party response to issue entrepreneurial
strategies tend to focus on mainstream parties (Meijers, 2015; Abou-Chadi, 2014;
Han, 2015) as these parties are considered crucial in policy making. There is,
however, no theoretical reason as to why contagion effects should be limited to
mainstream party agendas only (cf. van Spanje, 2010). Nevertheless, tables D.3
- D.4 and figure D.1 in Appendix D present analyses for a subset of mainstream
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parties (classified on the basis of party family designation).7 The results do not
differ substantially from the results presented above.
Third, the models predicting EU issue salience are re-estimated including
a control variable for intra-party dissent on the issue. Previous research found
that intra-party conflicts over European integration impact parties’ inclination to
put emphasis on the issue. Although parties are generally hesitant to address
issues on which they are internally divided, partisan elites might be unable to
de-emphasize an issue on which heavy intra party divisions have emerged (Steen-
bergen and Scott, 2004; Netjes and Binnema, 2007). Intra-party dissent is measured
using the item in the Ray-CHES data asking experts to rate parties according to
the degree of internal unity or division on the EU issue. To capture the expected
curvilinear relationship, I also include the squared term of the variable (van de
Wardt, 2014b). The results are robust to the inclusion of this control variable (see
table D.5 and figure D.2 in Appendix D). In the main part of the analysis, how-
ever, I present models that do not include this variable as to ensure comparability
with the models predicting green and immigration issue emphasis (for which no
measures of intra-party divisions are available).
Finally, I run sensitivity analyses accounting for the fact that several of the
main variables are right-skewed. Specifically, the conditioning variables in the
interactive models as well as the measures of green and immigration issue salience
based on party manifesto data are skewed. A log-transformation of the variables
in question is sometimes suggested as a way to alleviate this problem (Gelman and
Hill, 2007). Appendix D (tables D.6, D.7 and figure D.3) presents models using
log-transformations; the results are substantially similar to the models presented
in the main analysis, but since log-transformed variables are difficult to interpret,
the main models include the variables on the original scales.
5.6.2 Omitted Variable Bias
A potential problem with the results presented above relates to the possibility of
omitted variable bias. That is: it could be that the association between support for
issue entrepreneurs and issue salience adjustments by other parties is distorted
by shifts in public opinion. If voters are more concerned with the environment,
or the EU, this might cause both increasing support for green or Eurosceptic par-
ties as well as salience shifts at the part of other parties. Previous research has
established, in this respect, that parties adapt to changes in voters’ attitudes, al-
though this mainly concerns mainstream parties (Adams et al., 2004, 2006; Ezrow
et al., 2011). One possibility to deal with this would be to include a measure of
the salience of environmental, immigration and EU issues among voters. Spoon,
Hobolt and de Vries (2014), investigating the impact of green party success on the
salience that other parties attach to environmental issues, indeed control for ‘voter
concern for the environment’, although they note that excluding this variable from
7In accordance with most studies, social democratic, liberal, Christian democratic and conservative
parties are considered mainstream parties.
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the models results in “nearly identical results for the other variables [...], except
for the [GDP] growth variable” (Spoon, Hobolt and de Vries, 2014, p.377, footnote
11). Here, I follow Abou-Chadi (2014) and refrain from including such a measure.
Not only is the measurement of voter concerns, generally based on survey
responses to the ‘most important problem’ question, error-prone (Wlezien, 2005);
it is also highly endogenous to the process under investigation here; parties’ issue
salience shifts (Abou-Chadi, 2014, p.14). The issues that partisan elites prime as
being important determine, at least to a considerable extent, which ‘problems’ are
perceived as pressing among voters (cf. Be´langer and Meguid, 2008).
Further, I re-estimate all models and add a lagged dependent variable (LDV)
to the right-hand side of the equation. The results remained unchanged (see ta-
bles D.8- D.9 and figure D.4 in Appendix D). The LDV absorbs the possible effect
of public opinion at t− 1 on parties’ issue emphasis at t− 1 and, hence, reduces
the possible bias (Abou-Chadi, 2014, p.14). I note, moreover, that several other
studies on the EU salience at the party level refrain from including a measure
of voters’ concerns.8 Taken together, the results should, indeed, indicate a di-
rect causal link between support for issue entrepreneurs and salience shifts in the
agendas of other parties.
5.7 Discussion
This chapter has empirically investigated the impact of electoral support for issue
entrepreneurs on the agendas of other parties. It has been shown that, in addition
to green and far right party success, successful Eurosceptic parties pressure their
competitors to adjust their issue salience strategies. Specifically, parties increase
the salience of EU issues when confronted with increasing electoral support for
Eurosceptic parties. However, this contagion effect is conditional, depending on
the extent to which Eurosceptic challengers themselves regard EU issues to be
important. For green and far right parties, who uniformly perceive ‘their’ issues
of great significance, such a conditional effect seems to be absent. These findings
have several implications for our understanding of issue evolution and politiciza-
tion as well as for the analysis of party competition in modern democracies more
generally.
First, this chapter highlights the role of Eurosceptic parties in the politiciza-
tion of EU issues at the party level. The findings suggest that Eurosceptic party
support does not only induce other parties to adjust their positions on European
integration (Meijers, 2015), but also leads them to attach greater salience to EU
issues. This is in line with evidence from case studies, which have established that
fringe party mobilization of the EU pressures other parties to take up the issue
more strongly (van de Wardt, 2015). Although a wider literature has long focused
on Eurosceptic parties (de Vries and Edwards, 2009; de Vries, 2007; Hooghe and
Marks, 2009; Taggart, 1998), a causal relationship in a broad comparative context
8These include studies by van de Wardt, de Vries and Hobolt (2014); van de Wardt (2014b); Steen-
bergen and Scott (2004); Netjes and Binnema (2007).
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between their electoral success and salience shifts in the agendas of other parties
had previously not been established.
Second, this chapter speaks to an emerging literature on the interaction be-
tween issue entrepreneurs and rival parties. Taking into account both the nature
of EU issues, as having a significant positional component to them as well as be-
ing orthogonal to the general left-right dimension, and the nature of Eurosceptic
parties, as non issue owners, this chapter theorized that adaptation strategies are
likely to prevail. As such, it corroborates the theoretical framework as explicated
by Abou-Chadi (2014), who argued that partisan elites strategically respond to
the influx of new issues in party systems, assessing the possible effects of issue
politicization on their expected electoral performance. Here, it has been shown
that these considerations also seem to play a role when EU issues are concerned.
Third, and related, this chapter highlights that it is important to conceptual-
ize issue entrepreneurial strategies as consisting of two elements: a deviant policy
position on an issue dimension in combination with a strong emphasis on this
issue dimension (cf. Carmines and Stimson, 1986; de Vries and Hobolt, 2012). The
conditional impact of Eurosceptic parties shows how issue entrepreneurship is not
a fixed condition, but that parties can pursue such strategies by allocating salience
to an issue dimension. This should inform our wider understanding of issue en-
trepreneurial strategies, and their effects, in European party systems. Additional
research should, in this regard, focus on the incentives for far left- and far right
parties to highlight their anti-EU position more strongly.
Moreover, whereas the current chapter focused on the average impact of is-
sue entrepreneurs on the agendas of all other parties, it can be important to specify
further and investigate the responsiveness of different types of parties. We know,
for example, that right of centre parties change their positions more strongly in
response to increasing support for the far right than do centre left parties (Abou-
Chadi, 2014), whereas the opposite pattern is observed in the case of Eurosceptic
party support (Meijers, 2015). Future research should address whether such pat-
terns hold for salience shifts as well.
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“ The outcome of the game of politics depends on which of a multitude ofpossible conflicts gains the dominant position. ”
Elmer E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People. A Realist’s View of
Democracy in America, 1960 (p.62)
6.1 Introduction
This dissertation investigates three distinct components of the issue attention strate-
gies pursued by political parties in western European party systems. First, it ex-
amines the extent to which a party’s issue attention is associated with the systemic
salience of issues – that is, the association between the salience individual parties
allocate to an issue and the salience of the issue to all other parties in the system.
Second, this dissertation examines the scope of policy agendas – how narrowly
or how broadly do parties distribute attention across policy issues? Thirdly, it
assesses the degree of innovation in policy platforms. Do parties address new is-
sue dimension more strongly in response to increasing electoral support for issue
entrepreneurs that promote these issues?
The hypothesis guiding this dissertation is that both external party system
pressures and internal party organizational structures crucially affect parties’ is-
sue salience decisions. External party system pressures are conceptualized as
a party’s relative position within the competitive party system, captured by the
challenger-mainstream framework. The expectation is that challenger parties, due
to their lack of experience with government participation and their incentive to
reshape the political landscape, adopt policy platforms that deviate from the po-
litical status quo. They reduce the scope of their issue appeals and focus strongly
a few issues that they deem strategically favourable. Moreover, they neglect shifts
in the system salience of issue domains. Mainstream parties, on the other hand,
are expected to pursue less risky issue profiles, as their programmatic strategies
are affected by their past experience in government and their desire to get into
office again. As a result, it is hypothesized that they present agendas broader
in scope than challenger parties. Moreover, they should be responsive to shifts
in the systemic salience of issue domains. In addition, this dissertation offers a
second conceptualization of external party system pressures as the degree of elec-
toral support for issue entrepreneurs. Issue entrepreneurs are parties that seek to
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politicize a new issue dimension. Increasing support for such a party, then, is ex-
pected to put a pressure on other parties to shift attention and engage in political
competition on new issue dimensions.
With regard to the impact of internal party organizational structures, the
hypothesis is that the balance of power between party leaders and the activist
base within parties determines whether parties are more oriented towards seek-
ing access to office or whether they are more oriented towards satisfying their
policy objectives. A policy-oriented party is expected maintain its focus on the
party’s traditional agenda, which implies putting forward policy platforms that
are confined in scope. Moreover, it is expected that a party of this kind will be less
responsive to shifts in the systemic salience of issue domains. Office oriented par-
ties, the expectation is, present broader ‘catch all’ agendas and are more concerned
with the systemic salience of issue domains.
This concluding chapter evaluates whether the hypotheses guiding this dis-
sertation hold up to empirical scrutiny. Before doing that, however, it summarizes
the findings from the individual empirical chapters. After that, the contributions
to the literature and the implications of the results are discussed. The chapter
closes by elaborating upon possible avenues for future research.
6.2 Summary of the Main Findings
Chapter 3 examines the extent to which a party’s issue attention is associated
with the systemic salience of issues. External party system pressures are in this
chapter conceptualized as a party’s position in the party system as being a main-
stream government, mainstream opposition or challenger party. Four findings are
highlighted in the chapter. First, shifts in the systemic salience of issue domains
are associated with the salience adjustments that individual parties make in their
election platforms. This indicates that there is an agenda component to parties’ is-
sue attention strategies. Second, challenger parties are less responsive to systemic
salience shifts than mainstream parties. Third, mainstream opposition parties are
somewhat less responsive to systemic salience shifts than incumbent parties, al-
though this is mainly the case with regard to the cultural issue domain. Fourth,
the chapter presents indicative evidence that intra party politics has a conditioning
effect. Parties in which leaders are powerful respond more strongly to systemic
salience shifts than parties in which activists are dominant. However, this effect
is only found with regard to the economic issue domain. On the cultural issue
domain, leadership-oriented parties show a less pronounced response to systemic
salience shifts than do activist-oriented parties.
Chapter 4 is concerned with the scope of parties’ issue agendas. External
party system pressures are in this chapter conceptualized as a party’s position
in the party system as being a mainstream government, mainstream opposition
or challenger party. Five findings stand out from the empirical analyses. First,
challenger parties present agendas that are more narrow in scope than do main-
stream parties. Second, the platforms of mainstream oppostion and mainstream
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government parties exhibit a similar level of issue diversity. Third, mainstream
parties change the scope of their agenda in response to office exclusion and in
response to vote losses in the previous election cycle. Fourth, the intra party bal-
ance of power has a conditioning effect on levels of agenda scope: the differences
between challenger and mainstream parties become less pronounced for parties
in which leaders are more dominant. If leaders are completely unconstrained,
there are no differences observed in issue diversity between challenger and main-
stream parties. Fifth, the intra party balance of power has a conditioning effect on
changes in agenda scope: mainstream parties in which the leadership is dominant
respond more strongly to office exclusion and vote losses than mainstream parties
in which activists are powerful.
Chapter 5 assesses the degree of innovation in parties’ issue agendas. Ex-
ternal party system pressures are in this chapter conceptualized as the degree of
electoral support for issue entrepreneurs – that is, support for green, far right and
Eurosceptic parties. The empirical models highlight four findings. First, parties
increase attention to European integration and immigration issues in response to
support for Eurosceptic and far right parties. Second, parties decrease attention to
environmental issues in response to green party success. Third, the effect of Eu-
rosceptic party support is conditional upon the salience the challengers themselves
attach to the issue: only if Eurosceptic parties highlight their position strongly,
other parties respond and shift attention to European integration issues. Fourth,
the effect of green and far right party support is not conditional – that means: the
marginal effect of increasing electoral support for green and far right parties does
not vary dependent upon the salience green and far right parties allocate to their
issues.
Taken together, the results presented in the empirical chapters indicate sup-
port for the core expectations as put forward in this dissertation. External party
system pressures and internal party organizational structures affect the issue at-
tention strategies of political parties. With regard to the external party system
pressures, the findings indicate that challenger parties adopt policy platforms that
attempt to change the political status quo. They are less responsive to the systemic
salience of issue domains and focus on a few issues only. Mainstream parties seek
to stabilize the political status quo, they respond more strongly to the systemic
salience of issue domains and distribute their attention across a wide range of
issues. Moreover, external party system pressures in the form of increasing elec-
toral support for issue entrepreneurs exerts a pressure on parties to adjust their
issue attention strategies. With regard to intra party politics, it is found that the
balance of power between party leaders and the activist base conditions the extent
to which parties respond to external incentives. If the organizational structure of
parties favours activists, parties are more likely to limit agenda scope and ignore
systemic salience shifts. If leaders are more powerful, on the other hand, parties
are more likely to increase agenda scope and respond to systemic salience shifts.
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6.3 Implications & Academic Contributions
This dissertation relates to an expanding body of research on party behaviour
that seeks to ‘bring salience back in’ (Klu¨ver and Spoon, 2015, 2014; Klu¨ver and
Sagarzazu, 2016; Bevan and John, 2016; Froio, Bevan and Jennings, 2016). The
findings have several implications for different streams of literature within politi-
cal science. I begin by discussing its theoretical implications for the study of issue
competition.
A dominant assumption underpinning empirical studies of issue compe-
tition has been that parties emphasize their preferred issues while they down-
play the importance of issues that might benefit their competitors. Recent studies
have criticized salience theory for this one-sighted theoretical perspective (Green-
Pedersen and Mortensen, 2014). This dissertation accommodates such critiques
by highlighting additional components of parties’ issue attention strategies. It
shows that there is a strong agenda component to parties’ salience strategies and
that parties deal with a ‘mobilization – persuasion’ trade-off which, consequently,
leads to systematic differences in the scope of issue agendas. Moreover, it high-
lights that parties innovate their agendas by addressing new issues, and that they
do so strategically by taking into account the expected electoral costs and benefits
of politicization.
This dissertation does, however, not represent the first attempt to study such
additional components of parties’ issue attention strategies. There are several
studies of ‘issue engagement’, but they have mostly focused on election cam-
paigns in the United States (Damore, 2005; Sigelman and Buell, 2004). With re-
gard to the European context, the empirical work has either been of descriptive
nature (Green-Pedersen, 2007b) or it has been limited to specific countries or is-
sues (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010, 2014; van de Wardt, 2015). This dis-
sertation offers a contribution by considering the association between individual
parties’ attention to issue domains and the degree of salience their competitors
allocate to these issue areas, across time and in a wide range of countries. The
findings offer support for the notion that the systemic salience of issues constrains
individual parties’ attention to these issues (Steenbergen and Scott, 2004; Green-
Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010) and highlights that issue salience strategies are
characterized by a common agenda component (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen,
2010).
The finding that there is a strong agenda component to parties’ issue at-
tention represents an important theoretical innovation, as existing theories solely
focus on the incentives for parties to campaign on the issues that give them advan-
tages over their competitors. In addition, it has implications for how voters per-
ceive parties and policies, and reach electoral decisions. The literature on ‘learning
effects’ has generated extensive evidence that the ‘information-rich environment’
of an election campaign reduces voters’ uncertainty about the policy positions and
ideology of political candidates (for an overview see Hillygus, 2010). In the ‘ideal’
political campaign, then, competing candidates focus on the same set of issues,
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enabling voters to gain knowledge of their policy proposals and making it easier
for them to infer which candidate’s policy positions come closest to their own
preferences (Downs, 1957). Issue engagement should help voters reach informed
electoral decisions and is, hence, desirable from a normative perspective. The
findings presented in this dissertation advance our understanding of the factors
that determine whether parties ‘talk about the same things’, which in turn affects
the probability that election campaigns are characterized by issue engagement.
The second component of issue salience strategies that this dissertation in-
vestigates is agenda scope. Research on this topic is relatively scarce. To my
knowledge, Greene (2015) is the first to systemically assess differences in issue
attention diversity across parties. Unlike Greene (2015), however, the present
study argues that differences in agenda scope are explained by the mainstream-
challenger logic, and not by the opposition-government dichotomy. Other studies
do not provide explanations for differences in issue diversity, but rather focus on
the electoral consequences of strategies of issue diversification (Kirchheimer, 1966;
Somer-Topcu, 2015). It is argued that by adding more issues to the agenda, par-
ties become more catch all, which in turn is likely to deliver electoral gains. This
dissertation adds to this literature by assessing changes in agenda scope, thereby
acknowledging that parties sometimes decrease issue diversity in order to pursue
core vote strategies (Green, 2011). Hence, this dissertation offers a contribution by
studying the dynamics of the breadth of policy platforms.
The third component of issue salience strategies this dissertation investi-
gates is the degree of innovation in party agendas. Although being far from the
first study to address such a topic, this dissertation contributes to the literature
by broadening the scope of inquiry. Previous work mainly focusses on parties’
attention to environmental and immigration issues as a result of the pressure that
is exerted by increasing electoral support for green and far right parties (Abou-
Chadi, 2014; Spoon, Hobolt and de Vries, 2014; van Spanje, 2010; Han, 2015). This
dissertation argues that Eurosceptic party support also induces parties to adjust
their issue strategies. Moreover, existing work conceptualizes ‘contagion effects’
predominantly in terms of parties’ positional shifts. A contagious efect, then,
is observed when parties approach the position of the issue entrepreneur. It has
been shown that parties shift towards more restrictive positions on immigration is-
sues when far right parties gain electoral strength (van Spanje, 2010; Abou-Chadi,
2014; Han, 2015) and that they become less supportive of European integration
when pressured by Eurosceptic party support (Meijers, 2015). This dissertation
considers salience effects, and investigates whether support for green, far right
and Eurosceptic leads other parties to adapt and shift attention to environmental,
immigration and European integration issues.
The results highlight that contagion effects in terms of issue salience are ob-
served in the case of far right and Eurosceptic party support, and contribute to
our understanding of issue evolutions in modern democracies. The findings also
have implications for the ongoing debate on the consequences of public support
for far right and Eurosceptic parties on public policy. The direct influence of these
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parties is said to be limited as they have rarely participated in government; and
when in office, these parties find it difficult to implement their radical agendas
(Akkerman, 2012). Mudde (2007) notes, in this respect, that the indirect effect
of such parties, through their impact on the agendas of competitors, is probably
greater. This dissertation offers support for this argument, insofar that is shows
that increasing far right and Eurosceptic party support leads to a further politi-
cization of immigration and European integration issues in the policy platforms
of other parties.
Above, I summarized the first overarching contribution that this disserta-
tion offers: the empirical investigation of additional components of issue attention
strategies that go beyond a party’s tendency to focus on its preferred issues. A
second contribution emerges from advancing a behavioural classification of politi-
cal parties. This dissertation adopts the threefold distinction between mainstream
government, mainstream opposition and challenger parties, and shows how this
classification is relevant for explaining differences in issue attention across parties.
In particular, the mainstream-challenger framework is crucial for understanding
differences between parties in terms of issue attention diversity and in terms of
their responsiveness to the party system agenda.
The challenger-mainstream framework is not new (de Vries and Hobolt,
2012), but this dissertation applies it in order to examine a wider range of is-
sue strategies than previous studies have done. Earlier work has mainly used the
challenger concept to assess the parties’ incentives to campaign on European inte-
gration issues (de Vries and Hobolt, 2012; Hobolt and de Vries, 2015; van de Wardt,
de Vries and Hobolt, 2014; van de Wardt, 2015). The present study offers a specific
contribution to the literature on challenger parties by arguing that challengers also
respond to their unfavourable position in the party system by confining their issue
appeals and by ignoring shifts in the systemic salience of issue domains. In a sim-
ilar vein, this dissertation shows that being a mainstream party implies having a
broader issue profile and responding more strongly to systemic salience shifts. As
such, it advances our understanding of party type classifications and isolates the
impact of prior experience in government as a crucial factor that affects parties’
strategic behaviour.
The findings regarding the programmatic issue strategies of challenger par-
ties have broader implications, especially given the many challenges that face con-
temporary democracies. Electoral research has extensively documented how, over
the past few decades, party identifications weakened and partisan dealignment
increased (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000), party membership declined (Mair and
van Biezen, 2001; van Biezen and Poguntke, 2014), electoral volatility increased
(Mair, 2002); and how citizens have grown more distrustful of politicians and
have become more disillusioned about the functioning of the democratic process
(Dalton, 2004; Hay, 2007). In sum, “western European democracies have suffered
from growing popular withdrawal and disengagement from conventional poli-
tics” (van Biezen and Poguntke, 2014, p.206). Against this backdrop, the popular
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appeal of challenger parties is likely to increase. Indeed, successful new chal-
lengers have emerged in the aftermath of the Euro-crisis (Hobolt and Tilley, 2016),
with examples including such parties as the Alternative for Germany, Podemos
and Ciudadanos (Spain) and the Five Star Movement (Italy). The findings as pre-
sented in this dissertation suggest that it is not likely that such challengers will
connect their issue profiles to that of the mainstream. Parties of this kind ignore
the systemic salience of issue domains and narrow down their focus on a few
issues that they deem strategically favourable. As such, they are capable of of-
fering a clear policy alternative to mainstream politics. This is likely to result in
greater party polarization on issues that were previously considered to be the do-
main of consensus politics, such as European integration. Moreover, challengers
contribute to the increased ‘heterogeneity’ of the supply side of politics. Kitschelt
(1994, p.118) speaks in this context of “product differentiation”; the incentive for
parties to occupy a specific segment in the electoral market in order to differen-
tiate themselves from competitors. A further segmentation of electoral markets,
driven by challenger parties that are not constrained by government responsibility
for policy outcomes, is likely to have destabilizing effects on political systems. For
example, it will likely become more difficult for parties to find common ground
and form coalition governments that have the support of a majority of the legisla-
ture, as has been exemplified in the aftermath of the Spanish national elections in
2015 and 2016.
Third, this dissertation contributes to the literature by highlighting the im-
pact of internal party organizational structures. By doing so, it relaxes the restric-
tive assumption of parties as unitary actors and incorporates behavioural theories
of political parties (Strøm, 1990; Mu¨ller and Strøm, 1999). There is no shortage
of literature on internal party dynamics (Cross and Katz, 2013). It is, for exam-
ple, widely acknowledged that rank-and-file members constrain the autonomy
of party leaders and determine the limits of a party’s strategic and programmatic
flexibility (Scarrow, 2015; Hertner, 2015; Polk and Ko¨lln, 2016). Nevertheless, there
are only few studies of party competition that empirically examine the impact of
internal party politics on parties’ strategic behaviour. This is probably due to the
fact that information on internal processes of parties is relatively hard to acquire
(Polk and Ko¨lln, 2016). The few studies that exist point out that internal organi-
zational structures mediate how parties respond to external stimuli (Schumacher,
de Vries and Vis, 2013). This dissertation adopts a similar line of reasoning, and
adds to the literature by demonstrating how intra party politics is relevant for as-
pects of parties’ programmatic strategies that previous work has left unexplored.
Specifically, it is shown here that when the internal balance of power favours the
leadership, parties behave more ‘office-oriented’ while a dominant activist base
pushes parties towards more ‘policy-oriented’ election platforms.
Intra party democracy is considered crucial in modern democracies as it
shapes and sustains the connection between society and government. Parties that
are internally democratic empower their rank-and-file and provide them with op-
portunities to channel their demands into party policy decisions (Wolkenstein,
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2015). Scholars of party politics have highlighted recent trends towards greater
internal party democracy (Kernell, 2015, p.2). The results as presented in this dis-
sertation suggest that such a reshaping of internal party organizational structures,
in order to give party members and activists more of a say, will affect parties’
programmatic issue strategies. Parties in which activists are powerful, the find-
ings presented here suggest, are less concerned with the party system agenda
than leadership-dominated parties and pursue core-vote strategies by confining
the scope of their policy platforms. Whether policy-seeking or vote-seeking be-
haviour is desirable from a normative perspective, is up to debate. On the one
hand, it is usually argued that parties’ vote-seeking strategies produce optimal
representation. Parties’ responsiveness to preference shifts of the median voter
ensures ‘dynamic representation’: parties adjust their programs in accordance
with (aggregated) public opinion shifts (Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson, 1995).
A contrasting view, however, holds that optimal representation is delivered when
each party seeks to represent the views of its party supporters, because vote-
seeking strategies will ultimately push all parties towards the dead centre of the
political space (Laver, 2001, 2005). This argument implies that internally inclu-
sive and policy-oriented parties outperform vote-seeking parties when it comes to
producing representation for the electorate as a whole. In that case, the “represen-
tativeness of inter party politics is increased by enhancing the representativeness
of intra party politics” (Laver, 2001, p.489).
Fourth, the findings in this dissertation have implications for our under-
standing of patterns of issue politicization. Scholars have increasingly turned
their attention to the politicization of a ‘second dimension’ in politics. Although
economic issues still feature prominently on party agendas in advanced democra-
cies (Benoit and Laver, 2006), issues that belong to a second ‘cultural’ dimension
have become more salient over time. The extent to which this issue domain has
been politicized varies considerably: ‘value-based’ issues are more important to
some parties than to others, and are more important in some election campaigns
than in others. The consequences of the politicization of such issues have been ex-
tensively examined. An important line of argumentation posits that value-based
issues ‘distract’ voters and divert their attention away from their economic in-
terests, creating a situation in which poor people vote against redistributive eco-
nomic policies (De La O and Rodden, 2008; Lefkofridi, Wagner and Willmann,
2014; Frank, 2004). Surprisingly, however, the backdrop against which such issues
are being made salient in politics has received less scholarly attention (Tavits and
Potter, 2015, p.744).
The present study addresses this. It shows that challengers are more likely to
campaign on cultural issues. They do not only put forward value-based agendas,
they simultaneously ignore shifts in the systemic salience of the economic issue
domain. Challenger parties, it is suggested in this dissertation, drive the politi-
cization of non-economic issues. A second contribution, in this regard, emerges
from the fact that this dissertation compares ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ expla-
nations of issue politicization. Although this dissertation locates itself within the
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top-down perspective on politicization, building on the assumption that strategic
politicians play a crucial role in the selection of salient issues, societal bottom-
up explanations are also considered in the empirical models. The results imply
that focusing events (i.e. the introduction of the Euro) and societal developments
(i.e. the inflow of immigrants and GDP-growth) affect parties’ attention to both
cultural and economic issues. At the same time, this dissertation stresses how
top-down factors (i.e. external party system pressures and internal organizational
structures) determine issue salience decisions. The implication that both sets of
explanations are relevant should guide future research on issue politicization.
Fifth, this study has implications for the ongoing debate on how established
parties respond to the influx of new issues in party systems. The scholarly debate
seems to revolve around the question whether established parties ‘accommodate’
or ‘dismiss’ the agendas of new competitors (Meguid, 2005, 2008). Empirical stud-
ies find evidence that parties pursue both strategies (Abou-Chadi, 2014; Spoon,
Hobolt and de Vries, 2014). This dissertation adds to this literature in several ways.
It broadens, first of all, the scope of inquiry by examining how mainstream parties
change the scope of their agenda in response to increasing electoral support for
challenger parties. Second, this dissertation theoretically argues and empirically
shows how parties strategically respond when challenged by Eurosceptic party
support, taking into account the possible effects of issue politicization on their
expected electoral performance. Third, it highlights that it is important to concep-
tualize issue entrepreneurial strategies as consisting of two elements: a deviant
policy position on an issue dimension in combination with a strong emphasis of
that issue dimension. Only when Eurosceptic parties publicize their deviating
stance strongly to voters, a contagious effect on the issue agendas of other parties
is observed.
This latter finding has implications for studies that deal with ‘extreme’ or
‘radical’ parties. Parties that occupy outlying positions on issue dimensions, it is
generally assumed, have an incentive to emphasize these issues in order to dif-
ferentiate themselves and clearly communicate their ‘extreme’ position to voters
(Wagner, 2012; Rovny, 2012). Related to this, this dissertation shows how chal-
lenger parties campaign on a focused and confined policy platform. At least with
regard to the European integration issues, then, it is found that there are quite
some parties that downplay their Eurosceptic position. Not all parties, it seems,
are willing to emphasize outlying issue positions. Many far right parties, for
example, initially campaigned on an anti-immigration platform but have increas-
ingly shifted their focus towards their Eurosceptic position. Examples include the
National Front (France) and the Freedom Party (the Netherlands). The findings
presented here imply that such strategy adjustments on the part of challenger par-
ties have far reaching consequences for patterns issue politicization and political
competition in advanced democracies.
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6.4 Suggestions for Future Research
This dissertation generates several questions that might be considered in future
research on party behaviour and issue attention. Here, I briefly discuss three such
avenues for future research that I believe carry particular weight.
First, this study isolates the effect of experience with government partici-
pation as a crucial factor affecting parties’ programmatic strategies. However, it
is important that we develop a more fine-grained understanding of this effect.
The challenger-mainstream framework uses a rather harsh cut-off point to classify
parties. Once a party has governed for the first time it ceases to be a challenger
and turns into a mainstream party. This party classification captures a lot of the
element that are implicitly assumed in the niche party concept but with greater
parsimony and simplicity. That being said, it is likely that repeated spells in office
have a different impact on parties than does incidental participation in a govern-
ing coalition. One possible way to address this would be to take into account the
number of coalition governments a party has participated in, or the number of
months the party was in government. Future research should specify further at
which point the effect of office experience on policy platforms becomes apparent.
Second, it is crucial that we learn more about the role of intra party politics.
Due to data limitations, this dissertation employs a time-invariant measure of par-
ties’ organizational structures. Future research should take up the challenge to
collect more data on parties’ internal workings. This could be done, for example,
by collecting and coding documents stating party internal regulations. In addi-
tion, it would be insightful to collect more data on the programmatic preferences
of party leaders and rank-and-file members. It is assumed in this study, as is in
many other studies, that activists focus on policy-objectives whereas leaders are
motivated primarily by office-objectives. Empirical evidence substantiating these
claims is, however, relatively scarce. This should be taken up by future research.
Important questions that should guide such an endeavour include the issue di-
versity preferences of both activists and leaders and their awareness of the issue
appeals of competitor parties. This would shed light on the micro-foundations of
the theoretical mechanism that is assumed in this study.
A third suggestion is to broaden the scope of inquire when it comes to the
different components of parties’ issue attention strategies. By going beyond the
idea of selective emphasis of preferred issues, new theoretical and empirical ques-
tions come to the fore. Building on the insights generated in this dissertation,
future research should examine how parties respond to the issue appeals of com-
petitors with regard to other new issues. Examples could include issues related
to privacy and ‘freedom of information’. Several new parties, operating under the
label ‘Pirate Party’, have recently sought to make such issues salient in different
European party systems. Furthermore, this study employs the agenda scope con-
cept in order to grasp the issue attention diversity of individual parties. However,
it would be insightful to assess the issue diversity at the party system level. This
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could help to explain why some election campaigns tend towards issue compe-
tition (i.e. the struggle between parties over which issues should be discussed)
whereas sometimes elections seem to be more about parties advocating different
policy positions on a common set of issues (i.e. positional competition). Likewise,
future research on the agenda component of issue attention strategies should fo-
cus on how aggregated policy agendas differ across party systems, and within
party systems over time, and how this affects the incentives for parties to deviate
from the agenda.
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List of Parties Included in the Empirical Analyses
The table below lists the parties that are included in the empirical analyses, including the
party code as taken from the Party Manifesto data set (Volkens et al., 2014) and the range
of election years (first-last) for which observations are included.
Table A.1 – List of Parties
Country Party code Party name Election years
(first-last)
Austria 42110 Green Alternative 1986-2008
(The Greens)
Austria 42220 Austrian Communist Party 2002-2008
Austria 42320 Austrian Social Democratic Party 1953-2008
Austria 42420 Austrian Freedom Party 1953-2008
(Freedom Movement)
(League of Independents)
Austria 42421 Liberal Forum 1994-1995
Austria 42520 Austrian People’s Party 1953-2008
Austria 42710 Alliance for the Future of Austria 2006-2008
Belgium 21111 Ecologists 1981-2010
Belgium 21112 Live Differently 1981-2010
(Green!)
Belgium 21320 Belgian Socialist Party 1950-1977
Belgium 21321 Flemish Socialist Party 1978-2010
(Socialist Party Different)
Belgium 21322 Francophone Socialist Party 1978-2010
Belgium 21420 Liberal Party 1950-1968
(Party of Liberty and Progress)
Belgium 21421 (Open) Flemish Liberals and Democrats 1971-2010
Belgium 21422 Liberal Reformation Party 1971-1995
(Party of Walloon Reform and Liberty)
Belgium 21424 Liberal Democratic and Pluralist Party 1971-1978
Belgium 21426 Reform Movement 1999-2010
Belgium 21430 List Dedecker 2007-2010
Belgium 21520 Francophone Christian Social Party 1950-1965
(Flemish Christian People’s Party)
Belgium 21521 Christian People’s Party 1968-2010
(Christian Democratic and Flemish)
Belgium 21522 Christian Social Party 1968-2010
Belgium 21911 Walloon Rally 1968-1981
Belgium 21912 Francophone Democratic Front 1965-1991
Belgium 21913 People’s Union 1954-1999
(Flemish Christian Peoples’ Union)
(People’s Union -
Complete Democracy for the 21st century)
Belgium 21914 Flemish Bloc 1978-2010
(Flemish Interest)
Belgium 21916 New Flemish Alliance 2003-2010
(continued)
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(Table A.1 – continued)
Country Party code Party name Election years
Belgium – National Front 1991-2007
Belgium – Belgian Labour Party 1974-2010
Denmark 13001 (New) (Liberal) Alliance 2007-2010
Denmark 13210 Left Socialist Party 1968-1984
Denmark 13220 Danish Communist Party 1950-1984
Denmark 13229 Red-Green Unity List 1990-2011
Denmark 13230 Socialist People’s Party 1960-2011
Denmark 13320 Social Democratic Party 1950-2011
Denmark 13330 Centre Democrats 1973-2005
Denmark 13410 Radical Party 1950-2011
Denmark 13420 Denmark’s Liberal Party 1950-2011
Denmark 13421 Independents’ Party 1953-1968
Denmark 13422 Liberal Centre 1966-1968
Denmark 13520 Christian People’s Party 1971-2005
Denmark 13520 Conservative People’s Party 1950-2011
Denmark 13720 Danish People’s Party 1998-2011
Denmark 13951 Progress Party 1973-1998
Denmark 13952 Justice Party 1950-1984
Denmark – Greens 1987-1988
Finland 14110 Green Union 1983-2011
Finland 14221 Finnish People’s Democratic Union 1951-1987
Finland 14223 Left Wing Alliance 1991-2011
Finland 14310 Social Democratic League of Workers and Smallholders 1958-1966
Finland 14320 Finnish Social Democrats 1951-2011
Finland 14420 Finnish People’s Party 1951-1991
(Liberal People’s Party)
Finland 14520 Finnish Christian Union 1970-2011
(Christian Democrats in Finland)
Finland 14620 National Coalition 1951-2011
Finland 14810 Centre Party 1951-2011
(Finnish Centre)
(Agrarian Union)
Finland 14820 Finnish Rural Party 1966-2011
(True Finns)
Finland 14901 Swedish People’s Party 1951-2011
Finland – League for Free Finland 1995–
Finland – Communist Party of Finland 2003-2007
France 31110 The Greens 1993-2007
France 31220 French Communist Party 1951-2007
France 31320 Socialist Party 1951-2007
(French Section of the Workers’ International)
France 31421 Radical Socialist Party 1951-1968
France 31521 Popular Republican Movement 1951-1962
France 31522 Democratic Centre 1967-1973
(Progress and Modern Democracy)
(Centre, Democracy and Progress)
France 31621 Union for a Popular Movement 1951-2007
(Union for the Presidential Majority)
(Rally for the Republic - Gaullists)
(Union for the New Republic)
(continued)
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(Table A.1 – continued)
Country Party code Party name Election years
France 31622 National Centre of Independents and Peasants 1951-1988
(Union for a New Majority - Conservatives)
France 31624 Union for French Democracy 1978-2007
(Democartic Mouvement)
France 31720 National Front 1986-2007
France – Workers’ Struggle 1973-2002
France – Revolutionary Communist League 2002-
France – National Republican Movement 2002-
Germany 41111 The Greens 1983-2013
(Alliance ‘90 - The Greens)
Germany 41221 The Left 1990-2013
(Party of Democratic Socialism)
Germany 41320 Social Democratic Party of Germany 1953-2013
Germany 41420 Free Democratic Party 1953-2013
Germany 41521 Christian Democratic Union - Christian Social Union 1953-2013
Germany 41620 German Party 1953-1957
Germany – German People’s Union 1998-
Germany – The Republicans 1990-2002
Germany – National Democratic Party 1965-2013
Greece 34210 Communist Party of Greece 1974-2004
Greece 34211 Progressive Left Coalition 1989-2004
(Coalition of the (Radical) Left, Movements and Ecology)
Greece 34313 Panhellenic Socialist Movement 1974-2004
Greece 34510 Centre Union 1974-1977
(Union of the Democratic Centre)
Greece 34511 New Democracy 1974-2004
Greece 34512 Political Spring 1993-1996
Greece – Popular Orthodox Rally 2004-
Iceland 15111 Left Green Movement 1999-2009
Iceland 15220 People’s Alliance 1953-1995
(United Socialist Party)
Iceland 15320 Social Democratic Party 1953-1995
Iceland 15320 Union of Liberals and Leftists 1967-1974
Iceland 15320 The Alliance 1999-2009
Iceland 15420 Liberal Party 1999-2007
Iceland 15620 Independence Party 1953-2009
Iceland 15810 Progressive Party 1953-2009
Iceland 15951 Women’s Alliance 1983-1995
Ireland 53110 Green Party 1989-2011
Ireland 53220 Workers’ Party 1981-1989
Ireland 53221 Democratic Left Party 1992-1997
Ireland 53320 Labour Party 1951-2011
Ireland 53420 Progressive Democrats 1987-2007
Ireland 53520 Familiy of the Irish 1951-2011
Ireland 53620 Soldiers of Destiny 1951-2011
Ireland 53714 Republican Party 1951-1965
Ireland 53810 Party of the Land 1951-1961
Ireland 53951 Ourselves Alone 1982-2011
Italy 32061 People of Freedom 2008-2013
(continued)
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(Table A.1 – continued)
Country Party code Party name Election years
Italy 32110 Green Federation 1987-2006
(Sunflower)
Italy 32210 Proletarian Unity Party for Communism 1976-1983
(The Manifesto - Proletarian Unity Party)
Italy 32211 Proletarian Democracy 1983-1987
Italy 32212 Communist Refoundation Party 1992-2006
Italy 32213 Party of Italian Communists 2001-2006
Italy 32220 Italian Communist Party 1953-2001
(Democratic Party of the Left)
Italy 32310 Radical Party 1976-1996
(Pannella (-Riformatori) (-Sgarbi) List)
Italy 32320 Italian Socialist Party 1953-1994
Italy 32329 Olive Tree 2001-2006
Italy 32330 Italian Democratic Socialist Party 1953-1992
Italy 32410 Italian Republican Party 1953-1992
Italy 32420 Italian Liberal Party 1953-1992
Italy 32440 Democratic Party 2008-2013
Italy 32520 Christian Democrats 1953-1996
(Italian Popular Party)
Italy 32521 Christian Democratic Centre 1996-2001
(White Flower)
Italy 32529 Democratic Alliance 1994-1996
Italy 32530 Union for Christian and Center Democrats 2006-2013
Union of the Center
Italy 32610 Go Italy 1994-2006
Italy 32611 New Italian Socialist Party 2001-2006
Italy 32710 Italian Social Movement 1953-2006
(Italian Social Movement - National Right)
(National Alliance)
Italy 32720 Northern League 1992-2013
Italy 32902 List Di Pietro - Italy of Values 2001-2008
Italy 32951 The Network - Movement for Democracy 1992-1994
Italy – Social Movement – Tricolour Flame 2008-
Luxembourg 23114 Green Alternative 1984-2009
(Green Left Ecological Initiative - Green Alternative)
(The Greens)
Luxembourg 23220 Communist Party 1951-1989
Luxembourg 23320 Socialist Workers’ Party 1951-2009
Luxembourg 23420 Democratic Party 1951-2009
(Democratic Group)
Luxembourg 23520 Christian Social People’s Party 1951-2009
Luxembourg 23951 Action Committee for Democracy and Pension Justice 1989-2009
(Alternative Democatic Reform Party)
The Netherlands 22110 Green Left 1989-2010
The Netherlands 22220 Socialist Party 1994-2010
The Netherlands 22310 Radical Political Party 1971-1986
The Netherlands 22320 Labour Party 1952-2010
The Netherlands 22330 Democrats ‘66 1967-2010
The Netherlands 22330 People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy 1952-2010
The Netherlands 22430 Livable Netherlands 2002-2003
(continued)
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(Table A.1 – continued)
Country Party code Party name Election years
The Netherlands 22521 Christian Democratic Appeal 1977-2010
The Netherlands 22522 Catholic People’s Party 1952-1972
The Netherlands 22523 Anti-Revolutionary Party 1952-1972
The Netherlands 22524 Democratic Socialists ‘70 1971-1977
The Netherlands 22525 Christian Historical Union 1952-1972
The Netherlands 22526 Christian Union 2002-2010
The Netherlands 22720 List Pim Fortuyn 2002-2003
The Netherlands 22722 Party for Freedom 2006-2010
The Netherlands 22951 Party for the Animals 2006-2010
The Netherlands 22952 Reformed Political Party 2006-2010
The Netherlands - Centre Democrats 1989-1998
Norway 12220 Norwegian Communist Party 1953-1957
Norway 12221 Socialist People’s Party 1961-2009
Norway 12320 Norwegian Labour Party 1953-2009
Norway 12420 Liberal Party 1953-2009
Norway 12520 Christian People’s Party 1953-2009
Norway 12620 Conservative Party 1953-2009
Norway 12810 Centre Party 1953-2009
(Farmers’ Party)
Norway 12951 Progress Party 1973-2009
Portugal 35110 Ecologist Party - ‘The Greens’ 1983-2011
Portugal 35210 Popular Democratic Union 1975-1987
Portugal 35211 Left Bloc 1999-2011
Portugal 35220 Portuguese Communist Party 1975-2011
Portugal 35229 Unified Democratic Coalition 1991-2005
Portugal 35310 Popular Democratic Movement 1975-1985
Portugal 35311 Socialist Party 1975-2011
Portugal 35312 Democratic Renewal Party 1975-1985
Portugal 35313 Popular Democratic Party 1975-2011
Portugal 35520 Social Democratic Center Party 1975-2011
(Social Democratic Center - Popular Party)
Portugal 35710 Popular Monarchist Party 1976-1983
Spain 33220 Communist Party of Spain 1977-2011
(United Left)
Spain 33320 Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party 1977-2011
Spain 33430 Union of the Democratic Centre - Centrist Bloc 1977-1982
Spain 33438 Popular Democratic Party 1982-1986
Spain 33512 Centre Democrats 1982-1993
Spain 33610 Popular Alliance 1977-2011
(Popular Party)
Spain 33611 Convergence and Union 1979-2011
Spain 33901 Basque Left 1977-1989
Spain 33902 Basque Nationalist Party 1977-2011
Spain 33903 Basque Solidarity 1989-2008
Spain 33904 Aragonese Regionalist Party 1977-2000
Spain 33905 Catalan Republican Left 1977-2011
Spain 33906 Andalusian Party 1977-2004
Spain 33907 Canarian Coalition 1993-2011
Spain 33908 Galician Nationalist Bloc 1996-2011
Spain 33909 Aragonist Council 2004-2008
(continued)
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(Table A.1 – continued)
Country Party code Party name Election years
Spain 33910 Navarrese People’s Union 2004-2008
Spain – Initiative for Catalonia Greens 2000-2011
Sweden 11110 Green Ecology Party 1988-2010
Sweden 11220 Left (Communist) Party 1952-2010
(Communist Party of Sweden)
Sweden 11320 Social Democratic Labour Party 1952-2010
Sweden 11420 (Liberal) People’s Party 1952-2010
Sweden 11520 Christian Democrats 1985-2010
(Christian Democratic Community Party)
(Christian Democratic Coalition)
Sweden 11620 Moderate Coalition Party 1952-2010
(Right Party)
Sweden 11810 Centre Party 1952-2010
(Agrarian Party)
Sweden 117010 Sweden Democrats 2002-2010
Sweden – New Democracy 1991-1994
Switzerland 43110 Green Party of Switzerland 1979-2007
(Federation of Green Parties)
Switzerland 43220 Swiss Labour Party 1991-2007
Switzerland 43320 Social Democratic Party of Switzerland 1951-2007
Switzerland 43321 Independents’ Alliance 1951-1999
Switzerland 43420 Radical Democratic Party 1951-2007
Switzerland 43520 Christian Democratic People’s Party of Switzerland 1951-2007
(Conservative Christian Social Party)
(Conservative People’s Party)
Switzerland 43530 Protentant People’s Party of Switzerland 1971-2007
Switzerland 43531 Liberal Party of Switzerland 1991-2003
Switzerland 43710 Swiss Democrats 1971-2003
(National Action for People and Fatherland)
Switzerland 43711 Federal Democratic Union 1991-2007
Switzerland 43810 Swiss People’s Party 1951-2007
(Farmers’, Traders’ and Citizens’ Party)
Switzerland 43951 Swiss Motorists’ Party 1987-2003
(Freedom Party of Switzerland)
Switzerland - National Action for People and Fatherland 1967-2007
(Swiss Democrats)
United Kingdom 51210 Ourselves Alone 1997-2001
United Kingdom 51320 Labour Party 1950-2010
United Kingdom 51420 Liberal Party 1950-2010
(Liberal Democrats)
United Kingdom 51420 Ulster Unionist Party 1950-2010
United Kingdom 51621 Conservative Party 1992-2001
United Kingdom 51902 Scottish National Party 1992-2001
United Kingdom 51903 Democratic Unionist Party 1992-2001
United Kingdom – Green Party 1987-2010
United Kingdom – United Kingdom Independence Party 2001-2010
United Kingdom – British National Party 2010–
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Results of Granger Reverse Causality Analyses
The table below reports the results of the reverse Granger causality models. The full models
as presented in chapter 3 (models 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12) are re-estimated using the dependent
variable at t− 1 to predict the dependent variable at time t. The table reports the coefficient
estimates and panel-corrected standard errors for the effect of the dependent variable (party
issue emphasis on the economic or cultural issue domain) at t − 1 on the independent
variable (systemic salience) at t. The negative signs of the estimated coefficients weakens
the case of reverse causality and implies that reverse causality, in fact, constitutes a bias
against the positive estimates as reported in the models in chapter 3.
Table B.1 – Granger Reverse Causality Models
β pcse sig.
Model 2
(DV: ∆Systemic salience cultural issuest)
∆Salience cultural issuest−1 −0.0283 0.0110 ∗∗
Model 4
(DV: ∆Systemic salience economic issuest)
∆Salience economic issuest−1 −0.0336 0.0071 ∗∗∗
Model 6
(DV: ∆Systemic salience cultural issuest)
∆Salience cultural issuest−1 −0.0718 0.0121 ∗∗∗
Model 8
(DV: ∆Systemic economic cultural issuest)
∆Salience economic issuest−1 −0.0575 0.0105 ∗∗∗
Model 10
(DV: ∆Systemic salience cultural issuest)
∆Salience cultural issuest−1 −0.0214 0.0160
Model 12
(DV: ∆Systemic salience economic issuest)
∆Salience economic issuest−1 −0.0286 0.0138 ∗∗
Controls & country fixed effects
Note: Prais-Winsten regression coefficients and panel-corrected standard er-
rors. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests).
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Results of Models with Vote-Weighted Systemic Salience Variable (I)
The tables below report the results of a re-estimation of all the models including a vote-
weighted measure of the systemic salience variable. The substantive results do not differ
from those reported in chapter 3.
Table B.2 – Models 1-4 Re-Estimated with Vote-Weighted Systemic
Salience (w)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
cultural cultural economic economic
issues issues issues issues
(Constant) −0.1767 0.3325 0.0664 1.9001∗∗
(0.4509) (0.7253) (0.1982) (0.9492)
∆Systemic salience (w) 0.0073∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗ 0.0104∗∗∗ 0.0127∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0015)
Challenger Party (CP) −0.9048∗∗∗ −0.6592∗∗∗ 0.2758 0.0619
(0.2291) (0.2243) (0.2058) (0.4449)
CP×∆Systemic salience (w) −0.0053∗∗∗ −0.0135∗∗∗ −0.0094∗∗∗ −0.0121∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0019)
Party size 0.0068 −0.0115
(0.0117) (0.0153)
Ideological extremity −0.4636∗∗∗ 0.1091
(0.1341) (0.1465)
Vote difference 0.0228 0.1366∗∗∗
(0.0309) (0.0523)
GDP 0.1414∗∗∗ −0.2534∗∗∗
(0.0374) (0.0718)
N 1545 937 1545 1003
Wald 92.9795 2922.0098 131.4107 177.0499
Note: Prais-Winsten regression coefficients with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses and
country dummies (not shown in table). ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests).
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Results of Models with Vote-Weighted Systemic Salience Variable (II)
Table B.3 – Models 5-8 Re-Estimated with Vote-Weighted Systemic
Salience (w)
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
cultural cultural economic economic
issues issues issues issues
(Constant) −0.8377∗ 0.4759 0.3757 3.3118∗∗
(0.4866) (1.3467) (0.2806) (1.4893)
∆Systemic salience (w) 0.0074∗∗∗ 0.0121∗∗∗ 0.0123∗∗∗ 0.0136∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0009) (0.0020)
Mainstream Opposition Party (MOP) 0.5787∗ 1.1830∗∗ −0.6203 −0.8924∗
(0.3463) (0.4931) (0.3779) (0.5364)
MOP×∆Systemic salience (w) −0.0011 −0.0017 −0.0028 −0.0021
(0.0020) (0.0028) (0.0019) (0.0027)
Party size −0.0086 −0.0066
(0.0170) (0.0185)
Ideological extremity −0.0446 −0.0697
(0.2031) (0.2088)
Vote difference 0.0303 0.1522∗∗
(0.0558) (0.0631)
GDP 0.1469 −0.4561∗∗∗
(0.0947) (0.1099)
N 993 647 993 696
Wald 101.8073 126.2968 500.8608 150.4690
Note: Prais-Winsten regression coefficients with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses and
country dummies (not shown in table). ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests).
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Results of Models with Vote-Weighted Systemic Salience Variable
(III)
Table B.4 – Models 9-12 Re-Estimated with Vote-Weighted Systemic
Salience (w)
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
cultural cultural economic economic
issues issues issues issues
(Constant) −0.0413 1.0535 −0.1095 1.2206
(1.0973) (1.3282) (0.9336) (1.5304)
∆Systemic salience (w) 0.0107∗∗ 0.0198∗∗∗ 0.0024 0.0018
(0.0046) (0.0055) (0.0030) (0.0031)
Intra Party Balance of Power (IPBP) 0.0508 0.0332 −0.0071 0.0407
(0.0364) (0.0396) (0.0266) (0.0438)
IPBP×∆Systemic salience (w) −0.0002 −0.0004 0.0003∗∗ 0.0004∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Challenger Party (CP) −0.7726∗ −0.2971 0.3260 0.9588∗
(0.4014) (0.5600) (0.3330) (0.5679)
Party size −0.0021 −0.0045
(0.0194) (0.0191)
Ideological extremity −0.1621 −0.0268
(0.2042) (0.1841)
Vote difference 0.0080 0.1241∗∗
(0.0518) (0.0558)
GDP 0.0253 −0.3318∗∗∗
(0.1086) (0.1044)
N 1226 816 1226 874
Wald 60.8964 225.8244 75.5240 83.1064
Note: Prais-Winsten regression coefficients with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses and
country dummies (not shown in table). ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests).
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Re-Estimation of Models 1-4 with Log-Transformations
The variables vote loss, party size and ideological extremity are skewed to the right. There-
fore, models 1-4 are re-estimated using log-transformations of these variables. The results
of the analyses do not differ substantively from those reported in chapter 4.
Table C.1 – Models 1-4 Re-Estimated with Log-Transformations
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
mainstream mainstream
parties parties
(Constant) 14.7308∗∗∗ 15.5847∗∗∗ 15.5578∗∗∗ 15.6729∗∗∗
(1.0294) (1.1261) (1.1135) (1.3123)
Challenger Party (CP) −1.1033∗∗∗ −2.5152∗∗∗
(0.2724) (0.7556)
Mainstream Government Party (MGP) 0.1464 −0.2515
(0.2156) (0.9002)
Vote loss (log) 0.1503 0.1422 −0.1044 −0.0909
(0.1043) (0.1065) (0.1418) (0.1428)
Intra party balance of power −0.0110 −0.0591∗ 0.0657∗∗ 0.0599
(0.0172) (0.0337) (0.0268) (0.0474)
Party size (log) 0.7216∗∗∗ 0.7246∗∗∗ −0.0266 −0.0326
(0.1489) (0.1535) (0.2147) (0.2142)
Ideological extremity (log) −1.4530∗∗∗ −1.4463∗∗∗ −0.7046∗ −0.7106∗
(0.2504) (0.2537) (0.3627) (0.3666)
CP×Intra party balance of power 0.0792∗
(0.0405)
MGP×Intra party balance of power 0.0228
(0.0485)
N 999 999 717 717
Wald 12513.5850 4929.2980 2436.0683 2607.4429
Note: Prais-Winsten regression coefficients with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses and
country dummies (not shown in table). ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests). A log-
transformation of the variables vote loss, party size and ideological extremity is used.
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Re-Estimation of Models 5-8 with Log-Transformations
The dependent variable, absolute change in issue attention diversity, and the independent
variable strength of challenger parties are skewed to the right. Therefore, models 5-8 are
re-estimated using log-transformations of these variables. The results of the analyses do
not differ substantively from those reported in chapter 4.
Table C.2 – Models 5-8 Re-Estimated with Log-Transformations
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
(Constant) 1.5365∗∗∗ 1.7163∗∗∗ 1.6050∗∗∗ 1.3270∗∗∗
(0.1171) (0.1096) (0.1151) (0.1528)
Office exclusion 0.0612∗∗ −0.2295∗∗∗ 0.0632∗∗ 0.0546∗
(0.0301) (0.0581) (0.0295) (0.0295)
Vote loss −0.0164 −0.0091 −0.1038∗∗∗ −0.0191
(0.0211) (0.0182) (0.0398) (0.0205)
Strength challengers (log) −0.0225 −0.0255 −0.0188 0.0736
(0.0191) (0.0181) (0.0190) (0.0511)
Intra party balance of powers (IPBP) −0.0055 −0.0152∗∗∗ −0.0098∗∗ 0.0065
(0.0040) (0.0032) (0.0039) (0.0071)
IPBP×Office exclusion 0.0161∗∗∗
(0.0031)
IPBP×Vote loss 0.0052∗∗
(0.0024)
IPBP×Strength challengers (log) −0.0057∗
(0.0031)
N 864 864 864 864
Wald 170.6607 307.9854 170.6607 173.5822
Note: Prais-Winsten regression coefficients with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses and
country dummies (not shown in table). ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests). A
log-transformation of the dependent variable, absolute change in issue attention diversity, as well as
of the independent variables vote loss and strength of challenger parties is used.
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Regression Models with Interaction Terms
The table reports the models including the interaction terms between the variable indicat-
ing support for issue entrepreneurs and the average salience issue entrepreneurs attach to
‘their’ issues.
Table D.1 – Regression Models Predicting Party Emphases of Green,
Immigration and European Integration Issues (Interactive
Models)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Green issues Immigration issues EU issues
CMP data CMP data CHES data
Green Party Supportt−1 −0.022∗∗
(0.008)
Mean Green Issue Salience Green Parties 0.011
(0.017)
Green Party Supportt−1×
Mean Green Issue Salience Green Parties 0.005
(0.008)
Far Right Party Supportt−1 0.006
(0.004)
Mean Immigration Salience Far Right Parties 0.074
(0.075)
Far Right Party Supportt−1×
Mean Immigration Salience Far Right Parties 0.005
(0.008)
Eurosceptic Party Supportt−1 −0.063∗∗∗
(0.019)
Mean EU Issue Salience Eurosceptic Parties 0.016
(0.022)
Eurosceptic Party Supportt−1×
Mean EU Issue Salience Eurosceptic Parties 0.032∗∗∗
(0.007)
Incumbent Party 0.017 −0.028 0.045
(0.025) (0.044) (0.051)
Party Size 0.003 0.006 −0.005
(0.002) (0.006) (0.005)
GDP 0.004 0.016∗ −0.013∗∗
(0.005) (0.009) (.006)
Chernobyl 0.157∗∗∗
(0.025)
Immigration rate (log) 0.025
(0.018)
Euro 0.292∗∗∗
(0.045)
(Constant) −0.056 −0.017 1.759∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.253) (0.101)
N 717 607 756
Party Clusters 146 130 135
R2 0.655 0.577 0.504
Note: Prais-Winsten regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by party in parentheses
and party dummy fixed effects (not shown in table). ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests).
The dependent variables capture the importance of green, immigration and EU issues to parties at t0
measured on a 0-4 scale using party manifesto data (model 1 &2) and expert survey data (model 3).
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Re-estimation of Model 3 using CMP data
I re-estimate model 3 (predicting parties’ issue attention to EU issues) using party man-
ifesto data. The results do not differ substantively from the models using expert survey
data, as presented in chapter 5.
Table D.2 – Model 3 Re-Estimated with CMP Data
Model 3
EU issues
CMP data
Eurosceptic Party Supportt−1 0.011∗∗
(0.006)
Incumbent Party 0.033
(0.037)
Party Size −0.004
(0.004)
GDP 0.006
(0.007)
Euro −0.074∗
(0.038)
(Constant) 0.377∗
(0.177)
N 680
Party Clusters 124
R2 0.273
Note: Prais-Winsten regression coefficients with robust stan-
dard errors clustered by party in parentheses and party
dummy fixed effects (not shown in table). ∗∗∗p < 0.01,
∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests). The dependent vari-
able captures the importance of EU issues to parties at t0
measured on a 0-4 scale using party manifesto data.
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Regression Models for Mainstream Parties Only (I)
The table below present the results of models 1-3 re-estimated for a subset of mainstream
parties only. The results do not differ substantively from the models presented in chapter
5, which also include non-mainstream parties.
Table D.3 – Regression Models Predicting Mainstream Party Emphases
of Green, Immigration and European Integration Issues
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Green issues Immigration issues EU issues
CMP data CMP data CHES data
Green Party Supportt−1 −0.016∗∗∗
(0.004)
Far Right Party Supportt−1 0.012∗
(0.006)
Eurosceptic Party Supportt−1 0.020∗
(0.011)
Incumbent Party 0.005 −0.042 0.004
(0.025) (0.043) (0.064)
Party Size 0.002 0.007 −0.006
(0.002) (0.008) (0.005)
GDP 0.005 0.014∗ −0.010
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
Chernobyl 0.130∗∗∗
(0.018)
Immigration rate (log) 0.074∗∗∗
(0.022)
Euro 0.383∗∗∗
(0.059)
(Constant) 0.0000 −0.160 2.522∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.336) (0.168)
N 577 431 414
Mainstream Party Clusters 92 85 67
R2 0.479 0.315 0.3193
Note: Prais-Winsten regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by mainstream
party in parentheses and party dummy fixed effects (not shown in table). ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05,
∗p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests). The dependent variables capture the importance of green, immigration
and EU issues to parties at t0 measured on a 0-4 scale using party manifesto data (model 1 &2) and
expert survey data (model 3).
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Regression Models for Mainstream Parties Only (II)
Models 1-3 re-estimated for a subset of mainstream parties only, including the interaction
terms.
Table D.4 – Regression Models Predicting Mainstream Party Emphases
of Green, Immigration and European Integration Issues
(Interactive Models)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Green issues Immigration issues EU issues
CMP data CMP data CHES data
Green Party Supportt−1 −0.021∗∗
(0.010)
Mean Green Issue Salience Green Parties 0.018
(0.019)
Green Party Supportt−1×
Mean Green Issue Salience Green Parties 0.004
(0.010)
Far Right Party Supportt−1 0.005
(0.005)
Mean Immigration Salience Far Right Parties 0.048
(0.060)
Far Right Party Supportt−1×
Mean Immigration Salience Far Right Parties 0.010
(0.007)
Eurosceptic Party Supportt−1 −0.063∗∗∗
(0.022)
Mean EU Issue Salience Eurosceptic Parties 0.003
(0.026)
Eurosceptic Party Supportt−1×
Mean EU Issue Salience Eurosceptic Parties 0.031∗∗∗
(0.007)
Incumbent Party 0.011 −0.048 −0.003
(0.027) (0.050) (0.059)
Party Size 0.003 0.008 −0.006
(0.002) (0.007) (0.005)
GDP 0.007 0.014∗ −0.009
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
Chernobyl 0.147∗∗∗
(0.022)
Immigration rate (log) 0.064∗∗
(0.020)
Euro 0.275∗∗∗
(0.058)
(Constant) −0.067 −0.172 2.571∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.285) (0.166)
N 510 431 414
Mainstream Party Clusters 92 85 67
R2 0.489 0.448 0.371
Note: Prais-Winsten regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by mainstream party
in parentheses and party dummy fixed effects (not shown in table). ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
(two-tailed tests). The dependent variables capture the importance of green, immigration and EU issues
to parties at t0 measured on a 0-4 scale using party manifesto data (model 1 &2) and expert survey data
(model 3).
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Regression Models Mainstream Parties Only (Marginal Effects Plots)
The figures below present the marginal effects plots for the interactive models including
a subset of mainstream parties only. The interpretation of the marginal effects is substan-
tively similar to the plots presented in chapter 5.
Figure D.1 – Marginal Effects of Support for Issue Entrepreneurs on
Mainstream Parties’ Issue Emphases
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Note: The figures show marginal effect plots
with 95% confidence intervals. The rug plots
indicate individual observations for the con-
ditioning variable.
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Model 3 Re-Estimated Controlling for Intra-Party Dissent (I)
The table below report the results of a re-estimation of model 3 (predicting attention to EU
issues) including controls for intra-party dissent on the issue. The results, as presented in
chapter 5, are robust to the inclusion of this control variable.
Table D.5 – Model 3 Re-Estimated Controlling for Intra-Party Dissent
Model 3 Model 3
EU issues EU issues
CMP data CMP data
(Interactive model)
Eurosceptic Party Supportt−1 0.022∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗
(0.008) 0.018
Mean EU Issue Salience Eurosceptic Parties 0.006
(0.023)
Eurosceptic Party Supportt−1×
Mean EU Issue Salience Eurosceptic Parties 0.027∗∗∗
(0.007)
Intra-Party Dissent 0.620∗∗ 0.568∗∗
(0.242) (0.236)
Intra-Party Dissent2 −0.058 −0.063
(0.045) (0.044)
Incumbent Party 0.076 0.062
(0.055) (0.050)
Party Size −0.006 −0.005
(0.006) (0.005)
GDP −0.006 −0.007
(0.006) (0.006)
Euro 0.261∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.006)
(Constant) 0.600∗ 0.791∗∗
(0.347) (0.335)
N 754 754
Party Clusters 135 135
R2 0.512 0.535
Note: Prais-Winsten regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by party in
parentheses and party dummy fixed effects (not shown in table). ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05,
∗p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests). The dependent variable captures the importance of EU issues to
parties at t0 measured on a 0-4 scale using expert survey data.
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Model 3 Re-Estimated Controlling for Intra-Party Dissent (Marginal
Effects Plot)
The figure below, based on table D.5, presents the marginal effects plot for the interactive
model 3 including a control variable for intra-party dissent on European Union issues. The
interpretation of the marginal effects is substantively similar to the plot presented in chap-
ter 5.
Figure D.2 – Marginal Effects Plot (EU model Including Intra-Party
Dissent))
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Note: The figure shows the marginal effect plot with 95%
confidence intervals. The rug plot indicates individual
observations for the conditioning variable.
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Re-Estimation of Models 1-2 with Log-Transformations
The measures for green issue salience (the dependent variable in model 1) and
immigration issue salience (the dependent variable in model 2) as well as all three
the conditioning variables in the interactive models are skewed to the right. There,
I re-estimate models 1 and 2 as well as all three the interactive models using log-
transformations of these variables. The results of these analyses, presented below,
do not differ substantively from those reported in chapter 5.
Table D.6 – Regression Models Predicting Party Emphases of Green,
Immigration and European Integration Issues
(Log-Transformed Models)
Model 1 Model 2
Green issues Immigration issues
CMP data CMP data
Green Party Supportt−1 −0.012∗∗∗
(0.003)
Far Right Party Supportt−1 0.007∗∗
(0.003)
Incumbent Party 0.008 −0.007
(0.017) (0.024)
Party Size 0.002 0.003
(0.001) (0.004)
GDP 0.001 0.009∗
(0.003) (0.005)
Chernobyl 0.112∗∗∗
(0.012)
Immigration rate (log) 0.023∗
(0.012)
(Constant) 0.020 0.069
(0.053) (0.180)
N 810 609
Party Clusters 146 130
R2 0.594 0.465
Note: Prais-Winsten regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered
by party in parentheses and party dummy fixed effects (not shown in table).
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests). The dependent variables cap-
ture the importance of green and immigration to parties at t0 measured on a 0-4
scale using party manifesto data. Both dependent variables are log-transformed.
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Re-estimation of Interactive Models 1-3 with Log-Transformations
The table below shows the interactive models 1-3 re-estimated using log-transformations.
Table D.7 – Regression Models Predicting Party Emphases of Green,
Immigration and European Integration Issues (Interactive
Models with Log-Transformations)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Green issues Immigration issues EU issues
CMP data CMP data CHES data
Green Party Supportt−1 −0.013∗
(0.007)
Mean Green Issue Salience Green Parties 0.018
(log) (0.024)
Green Party Supportt−1×
Mean Green Issue Salience Green Parties −0.001
(log) (0.009)
Far Right Party Supportt−1 0.002
(0.003)
Mean Immigration Salience Far Right Parties 0.087
(log) (0.071)
Far Right Party Supportt−1×
Mean Immigration Salience Far Right Parties 0.008
(log) (0.009)
Eurosceptic Party Supportt−1 −0.110∗∗∗
(0.026)
Mean EU Issue Salience Eurosceptic Parties 0.008
(log) (0.049)
Eurosceptic Party Supportt−1×
Mean EU Issue Salience Eurosceptic Parties 0.103∗∗∗
(log) (0.020)
Incumbent Party 0.013 −0.005 0.045
(0.018) (0.026) (0.051)
Party Size 0.002 0.003 −0.005
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
GDP 0.003 0.010∗ −0.014∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Chernobyl 0.121∗∗∗
(0.018)
Immigration rate (log) 0.021∗
(0.012)
Euro 0.283∗∗∗
(0.046)
(Constant) −0.018 0.059 1.824∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.158) (0.102)
N 717 607 756
Party Clusters 146 130 135
R2 0.602 0.526 0.506
Note: Prais-Winsten regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by party in parentheses
and party dummy fixed effects (not shown in table). ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests).
A log-transformation of the variables mean green (immigration) (EU) issue salience green (far right)
(Eurosceptic) parties is used. In models 1 and 2, the dependent variable is also log-transformed.
Appendix D. Appendix Chapter 5 145
Re-Estimation of Models 1-3 with Log-Transformations (Marginal
Effects Plots)
The figures below present the marginal effects plots for the interactive models using the
log-transformed variables. The interpretation of the marginal effects is substantively simi-
lar to the plots presented in chapter 5.
Figure D.3 – Marginal Effects of Support for Issue Entrepreneurs on
Other Parties’ Issue Emphases (Log-Transformed Models)
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Note: The figures show marginal effect plots
with 95% confidence intervals. The rug plots
indicate individual observations for the con-
ditioning variable.
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Regression Models with Lagged Dependent Variables (I)
The table below present the results of models 1-3 re-estimated including lagged dependent
variables (LDVs) and panel-corrected standard errors (PSCEs). The results do not differ
substantively from the models presented in chapter 5.
Table D.8 – Regression Models Predicting Party Emphases of Green,
Immigration and European Integration Issues (Models with
Lagged Dependent Variables)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Green issues Immigration issues EU issues
CMP data CMP data CHES data
Green Party Supportt−1 −0.016∗∗∗
(0.004)
Far Right Party Supportt−1 0.013∗∗∗
(0.004)
Eurosceptic Party Supportt−1 0.016∗
(0.009)
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.037 0.095 0.371∗
(0.123) (0.145) (0.205)
Controls & Party Dummy Fixed Effects
N 717 717 622
Party Clusters 146 146 134
R2 0.646 0.513 0.712
Note: Regression coefficients with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses and party dummy fixed
effects (not shown in table). ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests). The dependent variables
capture the importance of green, immigration and EU issues to parties at t0 measured on a 0-4 scale using
party manifesto data (model 1 &2) and expert survey data (model 3).
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Regression Models with Lagged Dependent Variables (II)
Models 1-3 re-estimated with lagged dependent variables and panel-corrected standard er-
rors, including the interaction terms.
Table D.9 – Regression Models Predicting Party Emphases of Green,
Immigration and European Integration Issues (Interactive
Models with Lagged Dependent Variables)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Green issues Immigration issues EU issues
CMP data CMP data CHES data
Green Party Supportt−1 −0.021∗∗
(0.008)
Mean Green Issue Salience Green Parties 0.010
(0.015)
Green Party Supportt−1×
Mean Green Issue Salience Green Parties 0.005
(0.008)
Far Right Party Supportt−1 0.005
(0.004)
Mean Immigration Salience Far Right Parties 0.062
(0.099)
Far Right Party Supportt−1×
Mean Immigration Salience Far Right Parties 0.008
(0.010)
Eurosceptic Party Supportt−1 −0.027
(0.019)
Mean EU Issue Salience Eurosceptic Parties 0.018
(0.034)
Eurosceptic Party Supportt−1×
Mean EU Issue Salience Eurosceptic Parties 0.016∗∗
(0.007)
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.028 0.005 0.343∗
(0.131) (0.134) (0.199)
Controls & Party Dummy Fixed Effects
N 717 717 622
Party Clusters 146 146 134
R2 0.648 0.540 0.722
Note: Regression coefficients with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses and party dummy
fixed effects (not shown in table). ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests). The dependent
variables capture the importance of green, immigration and EU issues to parties at t0 measured on a 0-4
scale using party manifesto data (model 1 &2) and expert survey data (model 3).
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Regression Models with Lagged Dependent Variables (Marginal Ef-
fects Plots)
The figures below present the marginal effects plots for the interactive models including
the lagged dependent variables. The interpretation of the marginal effects is substantively
similar to the plots presented in chapter 5.
Figure D.4 – Marginal Effects of Support for Issue Entrepreneurs on
Other Parties’ Issue Emphases (Models with Lagged
Dependent Variables)
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Note: The figures show marginal effect plots
with 95% confidence intervals. The rug plots
indicate individual observations for the con-
ditioning variable.
Bibliography
Abou-Chadi, Tarik. 2014. “Niche Party Success and Mainstream Party Policy Shifts
— How Green and Radical Right Parties Differ in Their Impact.” British Journal
of Political Science FirstView:1–20.
URL: doi:10.1017/S0007123414000155
Achen, Christopher H. 2000. “Why Lagged Dependent Variables Can Suppress the
Explanatory Power Other Independent Variables.” APSA 2000 (Political Method-
ology Section) Annual Meeting Paper .
URL: http://www.polmeth.wustl.edu/media/Paper/achen00.pdf
Adams, Greg D. 1997. “Abortion: Evidence of an Issue Evolution.” American
Journal of Political Science 41(3):718–737.
Adams, James. 2016. “On the Relationship between (Parties’ and Voters’) Issue
Attention and their Issue Positions: Response to Dowding, Hindmoor and Mar-
tin.” Journal of Public Policy 36(1):25–31.
Adams, James, Lawrence Ezrow and Zeynep Somer-Topcu. 2011. “Is Anybody
Listening? Evidence That Voters Do Not Respond to European Parties’ Policy
Statements During Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 55(2):370–382.
Adams, James, Michael Clark, Lawrence Ezrow and Garrett Glasgow. 2004. “Un-
derstanding Change and Stability in Party Ideologies: Do Parties Respond to
Public Opinion or to Past Election Results?” British Journal of Political Science
34(4):589–610.
Adams, James, Michael Clark, Lawrence Ezrow and Garrett Glasgow. 2006. “Are
Niche Parties Fundamentally Different from Mainstream Parties? The Causes
and the Electoral Consequences of Western European Parties’ Policy Shifts,
1976–1998.” American Journal of Political Science 50(3):513–529.
Adams, James and Zeynep Somer-Topcu. 2009. “Policy Adjustment by Parties
in Response to Rival Parties’ Policy Shifts: Spatial Theory and the Dynamics
of Party Competition in Twenty-Five Post-War Democracies.” British Journal of
Political Science 39(4):825.
149
Bibliography 150
Akkerman, Tjitske. 2012. “Comparing Radical Right Parties in Government: Immi-
gration and Integration Policies in Nine Countries (1996–2010).” West European
Politics 35(3):511–529.
Aldrich, John H. 1983. “A Downsian Spatial Model with Party Activism.” The
American Political Science Review 77(4):974–990.
Aldrich, John H. 2011. Why Parties? A Second Look. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Alexandrova, Petya. 2015. “Upsetting the Agenda: the Clout of External Focusing
Events in the European Council.” Journal of Public Policy 35(3):505–530.
Alonso, Sonia and Sara Claro da Fonseca. 2011. “Immigration, Left and Right.”
Party Politics 18(6):865–884.
Ansolabehere, Stephen and Shanto Iyengar. 1994. “Riding the Wave and Claiming
Ownership over Issues: The Joint Effects of Advertising and News Coverage in
Campaigns.” Public Opinion Quarterly 58(3):335–357.
Aragone`s, Enriqueta, Micael Castanheira and Marco Giani. 2015. “Electoral Com-
petition through Issue Selection.” American Journal of Political Science 59(1):71–90.
Arzheimer, Kai and Elisabeth Carter. 2006. “Political Opportunity Structures
and Right-Wing Extremist Party Success.” European Journal of Political Research
45(3):419–443.
Bakker, Ryan, Catherine De Vries, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Gary
Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen and Milada Vachudova.
2015. “Measuring Party Positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill Expert Survey
Trend File, 1999–2010.” Party Politics 21(1):143–152.
Bale, Tim. 2003. “Cinderella and her Ugly Sisters: the Mainstream and Extreme
Right in Europe’s Bipolarising Party Systems.” West European Politics 26(3):67–
90.
Bale, Tim. 2008. “Turning Round the Telescope. Centre-Right Parties and Im-
migration and Integration Policy in Europe.” Journal of European Public Policy
15(3):315–330.
Bale, Tim. 2011. The Conservative Party: From Thatcher to Cameron. Cambridge:
Polity.
Bale, Tim, Christoffer Green-Pedersen, Andre´ Krouwel, Kurt Richard Luther and
Nick Sitter. 2010. “If You Can’t Beat Them, Join Them? Explaining Social Demo-
cratic Responses to the Challenge from the Populist Radical Right in Western
Europe.” Political Studies 58(3):410–426.
Bartolini, Stefano. 1999. “Collusion, Competition and Democracy Part I.” Journal
of Theoretical Politics 11(4):435–470.
Bibliography 151
Bartolini, Stefano. 2000. The Political Mobilization of the European Left, 1860-1980.
The Class Cleavage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Baum, Christopher F. 2001. “Residual Diagnostics for Cross-Section Time Series
Regression Models.” The Stata Journal 1(1):101–104.
Bawn, Kathleen and Zeynep Somer-Topcu. 2012. “Government versus Oppossition
at the Polls: How Governing Status Affects the Impact of Policy Positions.”
American Journal of Political Science 46(3):433–446.
Beck, Nathaniel and Jonathan N. Katz. 1995. “What To Do (And Not To Do) with
Time-Series Cross-Section Data.” American Political Science Review 89(3):634–647.
Beck, Nathaniel and Jonathan N. Katz. 1996. “Nuisance vs. Substance: Specifying
and Estimating Time-Series-Cross-Section Models.” Political Analysis 6(1):1–36.
Be´langer, E´ric and Bonnie M. Meguid. 2008. “Issue Salience, Issue Ownership,
and Issue-Based Vote Choice.” Electoral Studies 27(3):477–491.
Benoit, Kenneth and Michael Laver. 2006. Party Policy in Modern Democracies. New
York: Routledge.
Benoit, Kenneth and Michael Laver. 2012. “The Dimensionality of Political
Space: Epistemological and Methodogical Considerations.” European Union Pol-
itics 13(2):194–218.
Bevan, Shaun and Peter John. 2016. “Policy Representation by Party Leaders and
Followers: What Drives UK Prime Minister’s Questions?” Government and Op-
position 51(1):59–83.
Bille, Lars. 2001. “Democratizing a Democratic Procedure: Myth or Reality? Can-
didate Selection in Western European Parties, 1960-1990.” Party Politics 7(3):363–
380.
Birkland, Thomas A. 1998. “Focusing events, mobilization, and agenda setting.”
Journal of public policy 18(1):53–74.
Bischof, Daniel. 2015. “Towards a Renewal of the Niche Party Concept: Parties,
Market Shares and Condensed Offers.” Party Politics OnlineFirst:1–16.
URL: doi:10.1177/1354068815588259
Boydstun, Amber E., Shaun Bevan and Herschel F. Thomas. 2014. “The Importance
of Attention Diversity and How to Measure It.” Policy Studies Journal 42(2):173–
196.
Brambor, Thomas, William R. Clark and Matt Golder. 2006. “Understanding In-
teraction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses.” Political Analysis 14(1):63–82.
Brandenburg, Heinz. 2002. “Who Follows Whom?: The Impact of Parties on Media
Agenda Formation in the 1997 British General Election Campaign.” The Harvard
International Journal of Press/Politics 7(3):34–54.
Bibliography 152
Broockman, David E. and Daniel M. Butler. 2015. “The Causal Effects of Elite
Position-Taking on Voter Attitudes: Field Experiments with Elite Communica-
tion.” American Journal of Political Science OnlineFirst:1–14.
URL: doi: 10.1111/ajps.12243
Budge, Ian. 1994. “A New Spatial Theory of Party Competition: Uncertainty,
Ideology and Policy Equilibria Viewed Comparatively and Temporally.” British
Journal of Political Science 24(4):443.
Budge, Ian. 2000. “Expert Judgements of Party Policy Positions: Uses and Limita-
tions in Political Research.” European Journal of Political Research 37(1):103–113.
Budge, Ian. 2015. “Issue Emphases, Saliency Theory and Issue Ownership: A
Historical and Conceptual Analysis.” West European Politics 38(4):761–777.
Budge, Ian and Dennis Farlie. 1983. Explaining and Predicting Elections: Issue Effects
and Party Strategies in Twenty-Three Democracies. London: Allan and Unwin.
Budge, Ian, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara and Eric
Tanenbaum. 2001. Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and
Governments, 1945-1998. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Budge, Ian, Lawrence Ezrow and Michael D. McDonald. 2010. “Ideology, Party
Factionalism and Policy Change: An Integrated Dynamic Theory.” British Jour-
nal of Political Science 40(4):781–804.
Budge, Ian and Thomas Meyer. 2013. Understanding and Validating the Left-Right
Scale (RILE). In Mapping Policy Preferences from Texts III: Statistical Solutions for
Manifesto Analysts, ed. Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, Ian Budge, Michael D. Mc-
Donald and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. Oxford: Oxford University Press pp. 85–
106.
Carmines, Edward G. and James A. Stimson. 1986. “On the Structure and Se-
quence of Issue Evolution.” The American Political Science Review 80(3):901–920.
Carmines, Edward G. and James A. Stimson. 1989. Issue Evolution. Race and the
Transformation of American Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Carter, Neil. 2006. “Party Politicization of the Environment in Britain.” Party Poli-
tics 12(6):747–767.
Ceron, Andrea. 2012. “Bounded oligarchy: How and When Factions Constrain
Leaders in Party Position-Taking.” Electoral Studies 31(4):689–107.
Cho, Sungdai and James W. Endersby. 2003. “Issues, the Spatial Theory of Vot-
ing, and British General Elections: A Comparison of Proximity and Directional
Models.” Public Choice 114(3-4):275–293.
Choi, In. 2001. “Unit Root Tests for Panel Data.” Journal of International Money and
Finance 20(2):249–272.
Bibliography 153
Clarke, Harold, David Sanders, Marianne Stewart and Paul Whiteley. 2006. “Tak-
ing the Bloom Off New Labour’s Rose: Party Choice and Voter Turnout in
Britain, 2005.” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 16(1):3–36.
Colomer, Joseph M. and Riccardo Puglisi. 2005. “Cleavages, Issues and Parties: A
Critical Overview of the Literature.” European Political Science 4(4):502–520.
Cross, William P. and Richard S. Katz. 2013. The Challenges of Intra-party Democracy.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dahlstro¨m, Carl and Peter Esaiasson. 2011. “The Immigration Issue and Anti-
Immigrant Party Success in Sweden 1970-2006: A Deviant Case Analysis.” Party
Politics 19(2):343–364.
Dalton, Russell J. 2004. Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices. The Erosion of
Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Dalton, Russell J. 2015. “Party Representation Across Multiple Issue Dimensions.”
Party Politics FirstView:1–14.
URL: doi: 10.1177/1354068815614515
Dalton, Russell J. and Martin P. Wattenberg. 2000. Parties without Partisans. Political
Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Damore, David F. 2004. “The Dynamics of Issue Ownership in Presidential Cam-
paigns.” Political Research Quarterly 57(3):391–397.
Damore, David F. 2005. “Issue Convergence in Presidential Campaigns.” Political
Behavior 27(1):71–97.
de Hoyos, Rafael E. and Vasilis Sarafidis. 2006. “Testing for Cross-Sectional De-
pendence in Panel-Data Models.” Stata Journal 6(4):482.
De La O, Ana Lorena and Jonathan A. Rodden. 2008. “Does Religion Distract the
Poor?: Income and Issue Voting Around the World.” Comparative Political Studies
41(4/5):437.
de Sio, Lorenzo and Till Weber. 2014. “Issue Yield: A Model of Party Strategy in
Multidimensional Space.” American Political Science Review 108(04):870–885.
de Vries, Catherine E. 2007. “Sleeping Giant: Fact or Fairytale?: How European
Integration Affects National Elections.” European Union Politics 8(3):363–385.
de Vries, Catherine E. and Erica E. Edwards. 2009. “Taking Europe To Its Extremes:
Extremist Parties and Public Euroscepticism.” Party Politics 15(1):5–28.
de Vries, Catherine E. and Sara B. Hobolt. 2012. “When Dimensions Collide: The
Electoral Success of Issue Entrepreneurs.” European Union Politics 13(2):246–268.
Bibliography 154
Dolezal, Martin, Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik, Wolfgang C Mu¨ller and Anna Katha-
rina Winkler. 2014. “How Parties Compete for Votes: A Test of Saliency Theory.”
European Journal of Political Research 53(1):57–76.
Do¨ring, Holger and Philip Manow. 2015. Parliaments and governments database (Parl-
Gov): Information on Parties, Elections and Cabinets in Modern Democracies. Devel-
opment Version.
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper.
Drukker, David M. 2003. “Testing for Serial Correlation in Linear Panel-Data
Models.” Stata Journal 3(2):168–177.
Dumont, Patrick and Hanna Ba¨ck. 2006. “Why So Few, and Why So Late? Green
Parties and the Question of Governmental Participation.” European Journal of
Political Research 45(s1):S35–S67.
Duncan, Fraser. 2007. “‘Lately, Things Just don’t Seem the Same’: External Shocks,
Party Change and the Adaptation of the Dutch Christian Democrats during
’Purple Hague’ 1994-8.” Party Politics 13(1):69–87.
Eurostat. 2015. “Population on 1 January by Age and Sex.” Population (Demogra-
phy, Migration and Projections) .
URL: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/population-demography-migration-
projections/population-data/database (accessed October 5, 2015)
Ezrow, Lawrence. 2008. “Research Note: On the Inverse Relationship between
Votes and Proximity for Niche Parties.” European Journal of Political Research
47(2):206–220.
Ezrow, Lawrence, Catherine E. de Vries, Marco Steenbergen and Erica E. Edwards.
2011. “Mean Voter Representation and Partisan Constituency Representation:
Do Parties Respond to the Mean Voter Position or to Their Supporters?” Party
Politics 17(3):275–301.
Fernandez-Vazquez, Pablo. 2014. “And Yet It Moves: The Effect of Election Plat-
forms on Party Policy Images.” Comparative Political Studies 47(14):1919–1944.
Flanagan, Scott C. and Aie-Rie Lee. 2003. “The New Politics, Culture Wars, and the
Authoritarian-Libertarian Value Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies.”
Comparative Political Studies 36(3):235–270.
Frank, Thomas. 2004. What’s the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives Won the
Heart of America. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
Franzmann, Simon and Andre´ Kaiser. 2006. “Locating Political Parties in Policy
Space: A Reanalysis of Party Manifesto Data.” Party Politics 12(2):163–188.
Franzmann, Simon T. 2011. “Competition, Contest, and Cooperation: The Analytic
Framework of the Issue Market.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 23(3):317–343.
Bibliography 155
Froio, Caterina, Shaun Bevan and Will Jennings. 2016. “Party Mandates and the
Politics of Attention: Party platforms, Public Priorities and the Policy Agenda
in Britain.” Party Politics OnlineFirst:1–12.
Gabel, Matthew J. and John D. Huber. 2000. “Putting Parties in Their Place: Infer-
ring Party Left-Right Ideological Positions from Party Manifestos Data.” Ameri-
can Journal of Political Science pp. 94–103.
Gelman, Andrew and Jennifer Hill. 2007. Data Analysis using Regression and Multi-
level/Hierarchical Models. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gemenis, Kostas. 2013. “What To Do (And Not To Do) with the Comparative
Manifestos Project data.” Political Studies 61(S1):3–23.
Green, Jane. 2011. “A Test of Core Vote Theories: The British Conservatives, 1997-
2005.” British Journal of Political Science 41(04):735–764.
Green, Jane and Sara B. Hobolt. 2008. “Owning the Issue Agenda: Party Strategies
and Vote Choices in British Elections.” Electoral Studies 27(3):460–476.
Green-Pedersen, Christoffer. 2007a. “The Conflict of Conflicts in Comparative Per-
spective: Euthanasia as a Political Issue in Denmark, Belgium, and the Nether-
lands.” Comparative Politics 39(3):273–291.
Green-Pedersen, Christoffer. 2007b. “The Growing Importance of Issue Competi-
tion: The Changing Nature of Party Competition in Western Europe.” Political
Studies 55(3):607–628.
Green-Pedersen, Christoffer. 2012. “A Giant Fast Asleep? Party Incentives and the
Politicisation of European Integration.” Political Studies 60(1):115–130.
Green-Pedersen, Christoffer and Jesper Krogstrup. 2008. “Immigration as a Po-
litical Issue in Denmark and Sweden.” European Journal of Political Research
47(5):610–634.
Green-Pedersen, Christoffer and Peter B. Mortensen. 2010. “Who Sets the Agenda
and Who Responds to it in the Danish Parliament? A New Model of Issue Com-
petition and Agenda-Setting.” European Journal of Political Research 49(2):257–281.
Green-Pedersen, Christoffer and Peter B Mortensen. 2014. “Avoidance and
Engagement: Issue Competition in Multiparty Systems.” Political Studies
FirstView:1–18.
URL: doi: 10.1111/1467-9248.12121
Greene, William H. 2000. Econometric Analysis (4th edition). New York: MacMillan.
Greene, Zachary. 2015. “Competing on the Issues: How Experience in Government
and Economic Conditions Influence the Scope of Parties’ Policy Message.” Party
Politics FirstView:1–14.
URL: doi: 10.1177/1354068814567026
Bibliography 156
Grofman, Bernard. 2004. “Downs and Two-Party Convergence.” Annual Review of
Political Science 7(1):25–46.
Halpin, Darren R. and Herschel F. Thomas III. 2012. “Evaluating the Breadth of
Policy Engagement by Organized Interests.” Public Administration 90(3):582–599.
Han, Kyung Joon. 2015. “The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties on the Posi-
tions of Mainstream Parties Regarding Multiculturalism.” West European Politics
38(3):557–576.
Harmel, Robert and Kenneth Janda. 1994. “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals
and Party Change.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 6(3):259–287.
Harmel, Robert and Kenneth Janda. 1996. Longitudinal Study of Party Change, 1950-
1990.
URL: http://janda.org/ICPP/ICPP1990/index.htm
Hay, Colin. 2007. Why We Hate Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hertner, Isabelle. 2015. “Is it Always Up To the Leadership? European Policy-
Making in the Labour Party, Parti Socialiste (PS) and Sozialdemokratische Partei
Deutschlands (SPD).” Party Politics 21(3):470–480.
Hillygus, Sunshine D. 2010. Campaign Effects on Vote Choice. In Oxford Hand-
book of American Elections and Political Behavior, ed. Jan Leighly. Oxford: Oxford
University Press pp. 326–345.
Hobolt, Sara B. and Catherine E. de Vries. 2015. “Issue Entrepreneurship and
Multiparty Competition.” Comparative Political Studies 48(9):1159–1185.
Hobolt, Sara B. and James Tilley. 2016. “Fleeing the Centre: The Rise of Challenger
Parties in the Aftermath of the Euro Crisis.” West European Politics 39(5):971–991.
Hobolt, Sara B. and Jeffrey A. Karp. 2010. “Voters and Coalition Governments.”
Electoral Studies 29(3):299–307.
Hobolt, Sara B., Robert Klemmensen and Mark Pickup. 2008. “The Dynamics of
Issue Diversity in Party Rhetoric.” OCSID 03 Working Paper .
URL: http://ocsid.politics.ox.ac.uk/publications/
Holian, David B. 2004. “He’s Stealing my Issues! Clinton’s Crime Rhetoric and
the Dynamics of Issue Ownership.” Political Behavior 26(2):95–124.
Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks. 2009. “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European
Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus.” British
Journal of Political Science 39(01):1–23.
Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks and Carole J. Wilson. 2002. “Does Left/Right Struc-
ture Party Positions on European Integration?” Comparative Political Studies
35(8):965–989.
Bibliography 157
Hooghe, Liesbet, Ryan Bakker, Anna Brigevich, Catherine De Vries, Erica Ed-
wards, Gary Marks, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen and Milada Vachudova.
2010. “Reliability and Validity of the 2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill Expert Sur-
veys on Party Positioning.” European Journal of Political Research 49(5):687–703.
Hopmann, David N., Christian Elmelund-Præstekær, Erik Albæk, Rens Vliegen-
thart and Claes H. de Vreese. 2012. “Party Media Agenda-Setting: How Parties
influence Election News Coverage.” Party Politics 18(2):173–191.
Hotelling, Harold. 1929. “Stability in Competition.” The Economic Journal
39(153):41–57.
Jennings, Will, Shaun Bevan, Arco Timmermans, Gerard Breeman, Sylvain
Brouard, Laura Chaque´s-Bonafont, Christoffer Green-Pedersen, Peter John, Pe-
ter B. Mortensen and Anna M. Palau. 2011. “Effects of the Core Functions of
Government on the Diversity of Executive Agendas.” Comparative Political Stud-
ies 44(8):1001–1030.
Karreth, Johannes, Jonathan T. Polk and Christopher S. Allen. 2013. “Catchall or
Catch and Release? The Electoral Consequences of Social Democratic Parties’
March to the Middle in Western Europe.” Comparative Political Studies 46(7):791–
822.
Kernell, Georgia. 2015. “Party Nomination Rules and Campaign Participation.”
Political Studies 48(13):1814–1843.
Kirchheimer, Otto. 1966. The Transformation of Western European Party Systems.
In Political Parties and Political Development, ed. Joseph LaPalombara and Myron
Weiner. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Pres pp. 177–200.
Kitschelt, Herbert. 1988. “Left-Libertarian Parties: Explaining Innovation in Com-
petitive Party Systems.” World Politics 40(2):194–234.
Kitschelt, Herbert. 1989. The Logics of Party Formation. Ecological Politics in Belgium
and West Germany. Ithaca (NY) & London: Cornell University Press.
Kitschelt, Herbert. 1994. The Transformation of European Social Democracy. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kitschelt, Herbert. 2007. Party Systems. In Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics,
ed. Carles Boix and Susan Stokes. Oxford: Oxford University Press pp. 522–554.
Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, Ian Budge and Micheal
McDonald. 2006. Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and
Governments in Eastern Europe, the European Union and the OECD, 1990-2003. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press.
Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Richard I. Hofferbert and Ian Budge. 1994. Parties, Poli-
cies, and Democracy. Boulder (CO): Westview Press.
Bibliography 158
Klu¨ver, Heike and In˜aki Sagarzazu. 2016. “Setting the Agenda or Responding
to Voters? Political Parties, Voters and Issue Attention.” West European Politics
39(2):380–398.
Klu¨ver, Heike and Jae-Jae Spoon. 2014. “Who Responds? Voters, Parties and Issue
Attention.” British Journal of Political Science FirstView:1–22.
URL: doi: 10.1017/S0007123414000313
Klu¨ver, Heike and Jae-Jae Spoon. 2015. “Bringing Salience Back In: Explaining
Voting Defection in the European Parliament.” Party Politics 21(4):553––564.
Kriesi, Hans Peter, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Born-
schier and Timotheos Frey. 2006. “Globalization and the Transformation of the
National Political Space: Six European Countries Compared.” European Journal
of Political Research 45(6):921–956.
Laakso, Markku and Rein Taagepera. 1979. “Effective Number of Parties: A Mea-
sure with Application to West Europe.” Comparative Political Studies 12(1):3–27.
Lacewell, Onawa Promise. 2013. “Beyond Class: Class Party Programmatic Re-
sponses to Globalization Pressures and Cleavage Change.” APSA 2013 Annual
Meeting Paper .
URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2300918
Laver, Michael. 2001. “Why Vote-seeking Parties May Make Voters Miserable.”
Irish Political Studies 26(4):489–500.
Laver, Michael. 2005. “Policy and the Dynamics of Political Competition.” Ameri-
can Political Science Review 99(02):263–281.
Laver, Michael and Ben W. Hunt. 1992. Policy and Party Competition. New York &
London: Routledge.
Lefkofridi, Zoe, Markus Wagner and Johanna E. Willmann. 2014. “Left-
Authoritarians and Policy Representation in Western Europe: Electoral Choice
across Ideological Dimensions.” West European Politics 37(1):65–90.
Lehrer, Ron. 2012. “Intra-Party Democracy and Party Responsiveness.” West Eu-
ropean Politics 35(16):1295–1319.
Lindaman, Kara and Donald P Haider-Markel. 2002. “Issue Evolution, Political
Parties, and the Culture Wars.” Political Research Quarterly 55(1):91–110.
Lipset, Seymour Martin and Stein Rokkan. 1976. Cleavage Structures, Party Sys-
tems, and Voter Alignments. An Introduction. In Party Systems and Voter Align-
ments: Cross-National Perspectives, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan.
New York: The Free Press pp. 1–64.
Lowe, Will, Kenneth Benoit, Slava Mikhaylov and Michael Laver. 2011. “Scal-
ing Policy Preferences from Coded Political Texts.” Legislative Studies Quarterly
36(1):123–155.
Bibliography 159
Mair, Peter. 2002. In the Aggregate: Mass Electoral Behavior in Europe, 1950-2000.
In Comparative Democratic Politics, ed. Hans Keman. London: Sage pp. 122–142.
Mair, Peter. 2007. Left-Right Orientations. In The Oxford Handbook of Political Be-
havior, ed. Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press pp. 206–222.
Mair, Peter and Ingrid van Biezen. 2001. “Party Membership in Twenty European
Democracies, 1980–2000.” Party Politics 7(1):5–21.
Marks, Gary, Liesbet Hooghe, Moira Nelson and Erica Edwards. 2006. “Party
Competition and European Integration in the East and West: Different Structure,
Same Causality.” Comparative Political Studies 39(2):155–175.
McCombs, Maxwell E. and Donald L. Shaw. 1972. “The Agenda-Setting Function
of Mass Media.” Public Opinion Quarterly 36(2):176–187.
McCombs, Maxwell E. and Jian-Hua Zhu. 1995. “Capacity, Diversity, and Volatil-
ity of the Public Agenda Trends From 1954 to 1994.” Public Opinion Quarterly
59(4):495–525.
Meguid, Bonnie M. 2005. “Competition between Unequals: The Role of Main-
stream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success.” American Political Science Review
99(3):347.
Meguid, Bonnie M. 2008. Party Competition between Unequals. Strategies and Electoral
Fortunes in Western Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Meijers, Maurits J. 2015. “Contagious Euroscepticism: The Impact of Eurosceptic
Support on Mainstream Party Positions on European Integration.” Party Politics
OnlineFirst:1–11.
URL: doi: 10.1177/1354068815601787
Meyer, Marco and Harald Schoen. 2015. “Avoiding Vote Loss by Changing Policy
Positions: The Fukushima Disaster, Party Responses, and the German Elec-
torate.” Party Politics OnlineFirst:1–13.
URL: doi: 10.1177/1354068815602145
Meyer, Thomas M. and Bernhard Miller. 2015. “The Niche Party Concept and its
Measurement.” Party Politics 21(2):259–271.
Meyer, Thomas M. and Markus Wagner. 2013. “Mainstream or Niche? Vote-
Seeking Incentives and the Programmatic Strategies of Political Parties.” Com-
parative Political Studies 46(10):1246–1272.
Meyer, Thomas M. and Markus Wagner. 2015. “Issue Engagement in Election
Campaigns. The Impact of Electoral Incentives and Organizational Constraints.”
Political Science Research and Methods FirstView:1–17.
URL: doi:10.1017/psrm.2015.40
Bibliography 160
Mudde, Cas. 1999. “The Single-Issue Party Thesis: Extreme Right Parties and the
Immigration Issue.” West European Politics 22(3):182–197.
Mudde, Cas. 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Mu¨ller, Wolfgang C and Kaare Strøm. 1999. Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political
Parties in Western Europe make Hard Decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Netjes, Catherine E. and Harmen A. Binnema. 2007. “The Salience of the European
Integration Issue: Three Data Sources Compared.” Electoral Studies 26(1):39–49.
Norris, Pippa. 2005. Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Odmalm, Pontus. 2011. “Political Parties and ‘the Immigration Issue’: Issue Own-
ership in Swedish Parliamentary Elections 1991–2010.” West European Politics
34(5):1070–1091.
OECD. 2015. “International Migration Database.” OECD International Migration
Statistics (database) .
URL: doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en (accessed October 5, 2015)
Panagopoulos, Costas. 2015. “All About that Base: Changing Campaign Strategies
in US Presidential Elections.” Party Politics OnlineFirst:1–12.
URL: doi: 10.1177/1354068815605676
Panebianco, Angelo. 1988. Political Parties: Organization and Power. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Pedersen, Helene Helboe. 2010. “How Intra-Party Power Relations Affect the
Coalition Behaviour of Political Parties.” Party Politics 16(6):737–754.
Pedersen, Helene Helboe. 2012. “What Do Parties Want? Policy versus Office.”
West European Politics 35(4):896–910.
Pesaran, Mohammad H. 2004. “General Diagnostic Tests for Cross Section Depen-
dence in Panels.” CESifo working papers, No. 1229 .
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18868
Petrocik, John R. 1996. “Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980
Case Study.” American Journal of Political Science 40(3):825–850.
Petrocik, John R., William L. Benoit and Glenn J. Hansen. 2003. “Issue Ownership
and Presidential Campaigning, 1952-2000.” Political Science Quarterly 118(4):599–
626.
Plu¨mper, Thomas, Vera E. Troeger and Philip Manow. 2005. “Panel Data Analysis
in Comparative Politics: Linking Method to Theory.” European Journal of Political
Research 44(2):327–354.
Bibliography 161
Polk, Jonathan and Ann-Kristin Ko¨lln. 2016. “The Lives of the Party: Contem-
porary Approaches to the Study of Intraparty Politics in Europe.” Party Politics
OnlineFirst:1–4.
URL: doi:10.1177/1354068816655572
Pulzer, Peter. 1999. “The German Federal Election of 1998.” West European Politics
22(3):241–249.
Ray, Leonard. 1999. “Measuring Party Orientations Toward European Integration:
Results from an Expert Survey.” European Journal of Political Research 36(2):283–
306.
Rihoux, Benoıˆt and Wolfgang Ru¨dig. 2006. “Analyzing Greens in Power: Setting
the Agenda.” European Journal of Political Research 45(s1):S1–S33.
Riker, William H. 1982. Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the
Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Science. Prospect Heights (IL): Wave-
land Press.
Riker, William H. 1986. The Art of Political Manipulation. New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press.
Riker, William H. 1993a. Introduction. In Agenda Formation, ed. William H. Riker.
Ann Arbor (MI): University of Michigan Press pp. 1–12.
Riker, William H. 1993b. Rhetorical Interaction in the Ratification Campaigns. In
Agenda Formation, ed. William H. Riker. Ann Arbor (MI): University of Michigan
Press pp. 81–123.
Robertson, David. 1976. A Theory of Party Competition. London: John Wiley & Sons.
Rohrschneider, Robert and Stephen Whitefield. 2012. The Strain of Representation:
How Parties Represent Diverse Voters in Western and Eastern Europe. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press.
Rooduijn, Matthijs, Sarah L. de Lange and Wouter van der Brug. 2014. “A populist
Zeitgeist? Programmatic Contagion by Populist Parties in Western Europe.”
Party Politics 20(4):563–575.
Rovny, Jan. 2012. “Who Emphasizes and Who Blurs? Party Strategies in Multidi-
mensional Competition.” European Union Politics 12(2):269–292.
Rovny, Jan. 2014. “Communism, Federalism, and Ethnic Minorities: Explaining
Party Competition Patterns in Eastern Europe.” World Politics 66(4):669–708.
Sargent, Thomas J. 1976. “A Classical Macroeconometric Model for the United
States.” The Journal of Political Economy 84:207–237.
Scarrow, Susan. 2015. Beyond Party Members: Changing Approaches to Partisan Mo-
bilization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bibliography 162
Schattschneider, Elmer E. 1960. The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democ-
racy in America. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Schlesinger, Joseph A. 1975. “The Primary Goals of Political Parties: A Clarifica-
tion of Positive Theory.” The American Political Science Review 69(03):840–849.
Schumacher, Gijs, Catherine E. de Vries and Barbara Vis. 2013. “Why Do Par-
ties Change Position? Party Organization and Environmental Incentives.” The
Journal of Politics 75(2):464–477.
Schumacher, Gijs and Kees van Kersbergen. 2014. “Do Mainstream Parties Adapt
to the Welfare Chauvinism of Populist Parties?” Party Politics OnlineFirst:1–13.
URL: doi: 10.1177/1354068814549345
Seeberg, Henrik B. 2013. “The Opposition’s Policy Influence Through Issue Politi-
cisation.” Journal of Public Policy 33(1):89–107.
Seeberg, Henrik B. 2014. “Who Owns the Issue? A Comparative Study of Issue
Ownership.” APSA 2014 Annual Meeting Paper .
URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2455350
Shannon, Caude E. and Warren Weaver. 1949. The Mathematical Theory of Commu-
nication. Urbana (IL): The University of Illinois Press.
Sheingate, Adam D. 2006. “Structure and Opportunity: Committee Jurisdiction
and Issue Attention in Congress.” American Journal of Political Science 50(4):844–
859.
Sigelman, Lee and Emmett H. Buell. 2004. “Avoidance or Engagement? Issue Con-
vergence in US Presidential Campaigns, 1960-2000.” American Journal of Political
Science 48(4):650–661.
Somer-Topcu, Zeynep. 2009. “Timely Decisions: The Effects of Past National Elec-
tions on Party Policy Change.” The Journal of Politics 71(01):238.
Somer-Topcu, Zeynep. 2015. “Everything to Everyone: The Electoral Conse-
quences of the Broad-Appeal Strategy in Europe.” American Journal of Political
Science 59(4):841–854.
Spies, Dennis and Simon T. Franzmann. 2011. “A Two-Dimensional Approach
to the Political Opportunity Structure of Extreme Right Parties in Western Eu-
rope.” West European Politics 34(5):1044–1069.
Spoon, Jae-Jae, Sara B. Hobolt and Catherine E. de Vries. 2014. “Going Green:
Explaining Issue Competition on the Environment.” European Journal of Political
Research 53(2):363–380.
Steenbergen, Marco R. and David J. Scott. 2004. Contesting Europe? The Salience
of European Integration as a Party Issue. In European Integration and Political
Conflict, ed. Gary Marks and Marco R. Steenbergen. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press pp. 165–191.
Bibliography 163
Steenbergen, Marco R and Gary Marks. 2007. “Evaluating Expert Judgements.”
European Journal of Political Research 46(3):347–366.
Stimson, James A., Michael B. MacKuen and Robert S. Erikson. 1995. “Dynamic
Representation.” American Political Science Review pp. 543–565.
Stokes, Donald E. 1963. “Spatial Models of Party Competition.” The American
Political Science Review 57(2):368–377.
Stoll, Heather. 2010. “Elite-Level Conflict Salience and Dimensionality in Western
Europe: Concepts and Empirical Findings.” West European Politics 33(3):445–473.
Strøm, Kaare. 1990. “A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties.” Amer-
ican journal of political science 34(2):565–598.
Szczerbiak, Aleks and Paul Taggart. 2000. “Opposing Europe: Party Systems
and Opposition to the Union, the Euro and Europeanisation.” Opposing Europe
Working Paper No. 1, Sussex European Institute .
URL: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/SEI/pdfs/wp36.pdf
Taggart, Paul. 1998. “A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contempo-
rary Western European Party Systems.” European Journal of Political Research
33(3):363–388.
Taggart, Paul and Aleks Szczerbiak. 2008. Introduction: Opposing Europe? The
Politics of Euroscepticism in Europe. In Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party
Politics of Euroscepticism. Volume 1: Case Studies and Country Surveys, ed. Aleks
Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart. Oxford: Oxford University Press pp. 1–15.
Tavits, Margit. 2007. “Principle vs. Pragmatism: Policy Shifts and Political Com-
petition.” American Journal of Political Science 51(1):151–165.
Tavits, Margit. 2008. “The Role of Parties’ Past Behavior in Coalition Formation.”
American Political Science Review 102(4):495–507.
Tavits, Margit and Joshua D. Potter. 2015. “The Effect of Inequality and Social
Identity on Party Strategies.” American Journal of Political Science 59(3):744–758.
URL: doi: 10.1111/ajps.12144
the Economist. 2015. “An Interview with David Cameron. A Lucky Leader in an
Unlucky Time.” From the Print Edition. April 25, 2015 .
URL: http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21649461-conservative-prime-minister-
fight-his-life-time-put-his-shoulder (accessed July 13, 2015)
the World Bank. 2015. “World Development Indicators.”.
URL: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators (accessed
June 30, 2015)
Usherwood, Simon. 2008. “The Dilemmas of a Single-Issue Party–The UK Inde-
pendence Party.” Representation 44(3):255–264.
Bibliography 164
van Biezen, Ingrid and Thomas Poguntke. 2014. “The Decline of Membership-
Based Politics.” Party Politics 20(2):205–216.
van de Wardt, Marc. 2014a. The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Patterns of Issue Com-
petition between Government, Challenger and Mainstream Opposition Parties in West-
ern Europes. PhD Thesis: University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Social and Be-
havioural Sciences, Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research (AISSR).
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11245/1.417003
van de Wardt, Marc. 2014b. “Putting the Damper on: Do Parties De-Emphasize
Issues in Response to Internal Divisions Among their Supporters?” Party Politics
20(3):330–340.
van de Wardt, Marc. 2015. “Desperate Needs, Desperate Deeds: Why Mainstream
Parties Respond to the Issues of Niche Parties.” West European Politics 38(1):93–
122.
van de Wardt, Marc, Catherine E. de Vries and Sara B. Hobolt. 2014. “Exploiting
the Cracks: Wedge Issues in Multiparty Competition.” The Journal of Politics
76(4):986–999.
van der Brug, Wouter and Joost van Spanje. 2009. “Immigration, Europe and the
‘New’ Cultural Dimension.” European Journal of Political Research 48(3):309–334.
van der Eijk, Cees and Mark N. Franklin. 2004. Potential for Contestation on
European Matters at National Elections in Europe. In European Integration and
Political Conflict, ed. Gary Marks and Marco R. Steenbergen. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press pp. 165–191.
van Holsteyn, Joop J. M. and Galen A. Irwin. 2003. “Never a Dull Moment: Pim
Fortuyn and the Dutch Parliamentary Election of 2002.” West European Politics
26(2):41–66.
van Kersbergen, Kees and Andre´ Krouwel. 2008. “A Double-Edged Sword! The
Dutch Centre-Right and the ‘Foreigners Issue’.” Journal of European Public Policy
15(3):398–414.
van Spanje, Joost. 2010. “Contagious Parties: Anti-Immigration Parties and Their
Impact on Other Parties’ Immigration Stances in Contemporary Western Eu-
rope.” Party Politics 16(5):563–586.
Vavreck, Lynn. 2009. The Message Matters: the Economy and Presidential Campaigns.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Volkens, Andrea, Pola Lehmann, Nicolas Merz, Sven Regel and Annika Werner.
2014. The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Ver-
sion 2014b. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fu¨r Sozialforschung. with
Lacewell, Onawa Promise.
Bibliography 165
Wagner, Markus. 2011. “Defining and Measuring Niche Parties.” Party Politics
18(6):845–864.
Wagner, Markus. 2012. “When Do Parties Emphasise Extreme Positions? How
Strategic Incentives for Policy Differentiation Influence Issue Importance.” Eu-
ropean Journal of Political Research 51(1):64–88.
Wagner, Markus and Thomas M. Meyer. 2014. “Which Issues do Parties Empha-
sise? Salience Strategies and Party Organisation in Multiparty Systems.” West
European Politics 37(5):1019–1045.
Walgrave, Stefaan and Fre´de´ric Varone. 2008. “Punctuated Equilibrium and
Agenda Setting: Bringing Parties Back in: Policy Change after the Dutroux
Crisis in Belgium.” Governance 21(3):365–395.
Walgrave, Stefaan, Jonas Lefevere and Anke Tresch. 2012. “The Associative Di-
mension of Issue Ownership.” Public Opinion Quarterly 76(4):771–782.
Walgrave, Stefaan, Jonas Lefevere and Michiel Nuytemans. 2009. “Issue Own-
ership Stability and Change: How Political Parties Claim and Maintain Issues
through Media Appearances.” Political Communication 26(2):153–172.
Walgrave, Stefaan and Peter van Aelst. 2006. “The Contingency of the Mass Me-
dia’s Political Agenda Setting Power: Toward a Preliminary Theory.” Journal of
Communication 56(1):88–109.
Ward, Dalston, Jeong Hyun Kim, Matthew Graham and Margit Tavits. 2015. “How
Economic Integration Affects Party Issue Emphases.” Comparative Political Stud-
ies 48(10):1227–1259.
Ware, Alan. 1992. “Activist–Leader Relations and the Structure of Political Parties:
‘Exchange’ Models and Vote-Seeking Behaviour in Parties.” British Journal of
Political Science 22(01):71–92.
Werts, Han, Peer Scheepers and Marcel Lubbers. 2012. “Euro-Scepticism and Rad-
ical Right-Wing Voting in Europe, 2002–2008: Social Cleavages, Socio-Political
Attitudes and Contextual Characteristics Determining Voting for the Radical
Right.” European Union Politics 14(2):183–205.
Williams, Laron K., Katsunori Seki and Guy D. Whitten. 2016. “You’ve Got Some
Explaining To Do. The Influence of Economic Conditions and Spatial Competi-
tion on Party Strategy.” Political Science Research and Methods 4(1):47–63.
Wlezien, Christopher. 2005. “On the Salience of Political Issues: The Problem with
‘Most Important Problem’.” Electoral Studies 24(4):555–579.
Wolkenstein, Fabio. 2015. “A Deliberative Model of Intra-Party Democracy.” Jour-
nal of Political Philosophy Online Early View:1–24.
URL: doi: 10.1111/jopp.12064
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data.
Cambridge: The MIT Press.
